Showing papers in "Games and Economic Behavior in 2003"

TL;DR: This work introduces a social network and assumes that agents can only observe the actions of agents to whom they are connected by this network, and allows agents to choose a different action at each date.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the architecture of strategically stable networks and show that in a setting where firms are ex-ante identical, the asymmetric networks are often asymmetric, with some firms having a large number of links while others having few links or no links at all.

TL;DR: The strategic equivalence of a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games is established and the results allow to disentangle negative and positive externalities, and to apply theorems and results intended for Rent-seeking games to other games, and vice versa.

TL;DR: A structural econometric model which incorporates risk aversion into a quantal response equilibrium explains the data very well and risk aversion estimates are stable across the different games and are close to those obtained from laboratory and field auction data.

TL;DR: A thorough generalization of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooperative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm symmetry and linear demand assumptions is provided.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the invariance of random matching results to noise in a large class of two-strategy population games where payoffs may vary non-linearly with the distribution of strategies among the population.

TL;DR: An assumption underlying current models of learning in games is that learning takes place only through repeated experience of outcomes, so choices in the no-feedback conditions should not converge towards the Nash equilibrium, but this assumption is tested using Nagel's competitive guessing game.

TL;DR: The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not.

TL;DR: For the case of two buyers, the authors showed that equilibrium in the sealed high-bid auction is unique when buyers' reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite support and positive mass at the lower endpoint.

TL;DR: A large class of statistical hypotheses testing procedures are exhibited that solve the problem of whether the players themselves can learn to play equilibrium strategies without assuming that they have prior knowledge of their opponents' strategies and/or payoffs.

TL;DR: Symmetric equilibria are constructed for a class of symmetric auction games that have two identical bidders bidding in three simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auctions for identical objects and appear to be a previously unknown structure.

TL;DR: An adaptive learning model that assumes updating of the individual probabilities of choice outperforms alternative static and dynamic models in accounting for the major results observed in the high-stake experiment.

TL;DR: Tight lower bounds are identified on the effectiveness of the English auction for general private- values environments, and for private-values environments where bidders' valuations are non-negatively correlated.

TL;DR: In this paper, two behavioral models of two-person normal-form game play are presented and estimated, using three experimental data sets, which are variants of the Quantal Response Equilibrium model defined by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, Games Econ. Behav. 10, 6-38), but allow a player to hold inaccurate beliefs about the behavior of her opponent.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the selection efficiency of such contests and showed that the performance can be improved by limiting the competition in two ways: having a small number of contestants and restricting the quality of the contestants.

TL;DR: The results show that the fact that private information is dispersed between the candidates creates a strong incentive for them to bias their messages toward the electorate's prior, as more prior information becomes available, welfare can decrease.

TL;DR: Regret-based dynamics have been introduced and studied in the context of discrete-time repeated play and the appropriate state space for this analysis is the space of distributions on the product of the players' pure action spaces (rather than the products of their mixed action spaces).

TL;DR: Symmetric equilibria having simple, intuitive forms are shown to exist in first-price, second-price and all-pay versions of majority auction games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large.

TL;DR: This work uses the reverse ultimatum game, in which proposers have multiple chances to offer responders a division of some fixed pie, to study deadlines experimentally and finds that strategic considerations are evident in the differences in observed behavior between the deadline and no deadline conditions.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that for any distribution, over the alternative strategies there is a strategy f which is, at any sequence of states, as good as μ -almost any alternative strategy g.

TL;DR: The theoretical analysis of interim rationalizable bids in symmetric first-price auctions with interdependent values and affiliated signals may shed some light on experimental findings about deviations from the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss a subscription game in which service providers (e.g., museums) team up in offering a limited time subscription or access pass allowing unlimited usage of their services.

TL;DR: A new notion of stability called local probabilistic stability (LPS), which requires that a population which begins play in equilibrium settle into a fixed stochastic pattern around the equilibrium, is proposed and used to prove a simple characterization of LPS.

TL;DR: The command structure of Shapley (1994) is applied to model members' interaction relations by simple games and an equilibrium authority distribution is formulated by the power-in/power-out mechanism.

TL;DR: The concept of Fully permissible Sets (FFS) as discussed by the authors is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets and is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent.

TL;DR: It is shown that random best- response and continuous best-response learning dynamics give rise to (different) simple sufficient conditions for identifying outcomes as stochastically stable.

TL;DR: I consider issues in distributed computation that should be of relevance to game theory, and focuses on representing knowledge and uncertainty, dealing with failures, and specification of mechanisms.

TL;DR: This paper will investigate three related forms of command channels and their contexts, which can explain such issues as the controlling power, responsibility, democracy in instituting governments, sharing sovereign and indivisible common property.

TL;DR: An equilibrium concept for a strategic model in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players is suggested and the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote are investigated.

TL;DR: An implementation of the Owen value is presented, inspired by the bidding mechanism introduced by Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), where first players of each coalition play the bidding mechanisms trying to obtain the resources of the coalition.