Showing papers by "Justin L. Barrett published in 2011"

Reidian Religious Epistemology and the Cognitive Science of Religion

Abstract: Some contemporary philosophers defend the claim that it is rational to believe that God exists even if that belief is not based on evidence. Many such defenses are developed from a religious epistemology inspired by the work of Thomas Reid’s “common sense” epistemology that posits the existence of numerous cognitive faculties that nonreflectively deliver beliefs. Reid argued that one is justified in believing the automatic deliverances of these faculties unless evidence mounts to contradict them. Reformed Epistemologists have suggested that, likewise, one should give the benefit of the doubt to beliefs that are produced by a god-faculty or sensus divinitatis. Recent research in the cognitive science of religion provides new reasons to believe that humans are naturally endowed with cognitive faculties that stimulate belief in the divine. We discuss these scientific findings in relation to the arguments of Reformed Epistemologists and also with regard to arguments against the rational justification of religious beliefs.

Cognitive Science of Religion: Looking Back, Looking Forward

Abstract: The cognitive science of religion (CSR) arose out of attempts to “science up” religious studies and the anthropology of religion without eliminating interpretive approaches. While maintaining this historical orientation, CSR holds promise to help bridge to other areas within the scientific study of religion. Particularly fruitful areas of future collaboration and complementary study are evolutionary studies of religion, psychology of religion, sociology of religion, and archeology of religion. In response to an invitation to explore the potential of CSR for the 50th anniversary of this journal, I briefly summarize CSR's history and current state and then offer exemplary future directions that might bring CSR into fruitful connection with other areas in the greater scientific study of religion.

Cognitive science, religion, and theology : from human minds to divine minds

Abstract: "Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology "is the eighth title published in the Templeton Science and Religion Series, in which scientists from a wide range of fields distill their experience and knowledge into brief tours of their respective specialties. In this volume, well-known cognitive scientist Justin L. Barrett offers an accessible overview of this interdisciplinary field, reviews key findings in this area, and discusses the implications of these findings for religious thought and practice. Cognitive science is the interdisciplinary study of minds and mental activity, and as such, it addresses a fundamental feature of what it is to be human. Further, in so far as religious traditions concern ideas and beliefs about the nature of humans, the nature of the world, and the nature of the divine, cognitive science can contribute both directly and indirectly to these theological concerns. Barrett shows how direct contributions come from the growing area called cognitive science of religion (CSR), which investigates how human cognitive systems inform and constrain religious thought, experience, and expression. CSR attempts to provide answers to questions such as: Why it is that humans tend to be religious? And why are certain ideas (e.g. the possibility of an afterlife) so cross-culturally recurrent? Barrett also covers the indirect implications that cognitive science has for theology, such as human similarities and differences with the animal world, freedom and determinism, and the relationship between minds and bodies. "Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology "critically reviews the research on these fascinating questions and discusses the many implications that arise from them. In addition, this short volume also offers suggestions for future research, making it ideal not only for those looking for an overview of the field thus far, but also for those seeking a glimpse of where the field might be going in the future.

Cognitive Constraints on the Visual Arts: An Empirical Study of the Role of Perceived Intentions in Appreciation Judgements

Abstract: What influences people’s appreciation of works of art? In this paper, we provide a new cognitive approach to this big question, and the first empirical results in support of it. As a work of art typically does not activate intuitive cognition for functional artefacts, it is represented as an instance of non-verbal symbolic communication. By application of Sperber and Wilson’s (1986/1995) Relevance Theory of communication, we hypothesize that understanding the artist’s intention plays a crucial role in intuitive art appreciation judgements. About 60 works of fine art, representing a wide range of periods, genres and styles, were selected in the permanent exhibitions at Tate Britain in London, and rated by more than 500 visitors for goodness and understanding of the artist’s intention. Results suggest that works of art whose artist’s intention is easy to understand tend to be preferred over those with more obscure intentions, even when controlling for familiarity effects.

Chapter 11. Metarepresentation, Homo religiosus , and Homo symbolicus

Abstract: What cognitive adaptation enabled humans to become the distinctively symbolic species that we are? Drawing upon insights from the cognitive sciences and evolutionary psychology, research in cognitive science of religion (CSR) converges on the claim that the ability to form mental representations about mental representations (metarepresentation) is a key factor enabling and encouraging religious expression. Such metarepresentation may also be the key to symbolic behaviour – including linguistic expression – more generally. If so, then the same cognitive equipment that underwrites symbolism also gave rise to religion, and the two could have evolved concurrently.