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Kevin Waugh

Researcher at Carnegie Mellon University

Publications -  39
Citations -  1943

Kevin Waugh is an academic researcher from Carnegie Mellon University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Extensive-form game & Nash equilibrium. The author has an hindex of 17, co-authored 38 publications receiving 1601 citations. Previous affiliations of Kevin Waugh include University of Alberta.

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DeepStack: Expert-level artificial intelligence in heads-up no-limit poker

TL;DR: DeepStack is introduced, an algorithm for imperfect-information settings that combines recursive reasoning to handle information asymmetry, decomposition to focus computation on the relevant decision, and a form of intuition that is automatically learned from self-play using deep learning.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Monte Carlo Sampling for Regret Minimization in Extensive Games

TL;DR: A general family of domain-independent CFR sample-based algorithms called Monte Carlo counterfactual regret minimization (MCCFR) is described, of which the original and poker-specific versions are special cases.
Journal ArticleDOI

DeepStack: Expert-Level Artificial Intelligence in No-Limit Poker

TL;DR: DeepStack as discussed by the authors combines recursive reasoning to handle information asymmetry, decomposition to focus computation on the relevant decision, and a form of intuition that is automatically learned from self-play using deep learning.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Accelerating best response calculation in large extensive games

TL;DR: This paper details a general technique for best response computations that can often avoid a full game tree traversal and applies this approach to computing the worst-case performance of a number of strategies in heads-up limit Texas hold'em, which, prior to this work, was not possible.
Proceedings Article

Abstraction pathologies in extensive games

TL;DR: This paper shows that the standard approach to finding strong strategies for large extensive games rests on shaky ground, and shows that pathologies arise when abstracting both chance nodes as well as a player's actions.