Corruption and Growth

Introduction References and Suggested Readings PART I REAL DYNAMIC MACROECONOMIC MODELS 1. Dynamic Programming A General Intertemporal Problem A Recursive Problem Bellman's Equations Nonstochastic Examples The Optimal Linear Regulator Problem Stochastic Control Problems Examples of Stochastic Control Problems The Stochastic Linear Optimal Regulator Problem Dynamic Programming and Lucas's Critique Dynamic Games and the Time Inconsistency Phenomenon Conclusions Exercises References and Suggested Readings 2. Search Nonnegative Random Variables Stigler's Model of Search Sequential Search for the Lowest Price Mean-Preserving Spreads Increases in Risk and the Reservation Price Intertemporal Job Search Waiting Times Firing Jovanovic's Matching Model Conclusions Exercises References and Suggested Readings 3. Asset Prices and Consumption Hall's Random Walk Theory of Consumption The Random Walk Theory of Stock Prices Lucas's Model of Asset Prices Mehra and Prescott's Finite-State Version of Lucas's Model Asset Pricing More Generally The Modigliani-Miller Theorem Government Debt and the Ricardian Proposition Remarks on Testing and Estimation Conclusions Exercises References and Suggested Readings PART II MONETARY ECONOMICS AND GOVERNMENT FINANCE 4. Currency in the Utility Function The Price of Inconvertible Government Currency in Lucas's Tree Model Issues and Models in Monetary Economics Government Debt in the Utility Function Government Currency in the Utility Function Seignorage and the Optimum Quantity of Currency A Neutrality Proposition Conclusions References and Suggested Readings 5. Cash-in-Advance Models A One-Country Model Fisher Equations Inflation-Indexed Government Debt Interactions of Monetary and Fiscal Policies Interest on Reserves A Two-Country Model Exchange Rate Indeterminacy Conclusions Exercises References and Suggested Readings 6. Credit and Currency with Long-Lived Agents The Physical Setup Optimal Allocations Competitive Equilibrium A Digression on the Balances of Trade and Payments The Ricardian Doctrine about Taxes and Government Debt The Model with Valued Currency and No Private Debt An Interventionist Optimal Monetary Equilibrium Townsend's \"Turnpike\" Interpretation Conclusions Exercises References and Suggested Readings 7. Credit and Currency with Overlapping Generations The Overlapping-Generations Model The Ricardian Doctrine about Taxes and Government Debt Again A Ricardian Proposition Currency, Bonds, and Open-Market Operations Computing Equilibria Interpretations as Currency Equilibria Optimality Four Examples on Inflation and Its Causes Seignorage and the Laffer Curve Dynamics of Seignorage Forced Saving International Exchange Rates Conclusions Exercises References and Suggested Readings 8. Government Finance in Stochastic Overlapping-Generations Models The Economy Some Examples A General Irrelevance Theorem Wallace's Modigliani-Miller Theorem for Open-Market Operations Chamley and Polemarchakis's Neutrality Theorem Interpretation as a Constant Fiscal Policy Indexed Government Bonds A Ricardian Proposition Further Irrelevance Theorems Conclusions Exercises References and Suggested Readings Appendix. Functional Analysis for Macroeconomics Metric Spaces and Operators First-Order Linear Difference Equations A Formula of Hansen and Sargent A Quadratic Optimization Problem in R A Discounted Quadratic Optimization Problem Predicting a Geometric Distributed Lead of a Stochastic Process Discounted Dynamic Programming A Search Problem Exercises References and Suggested Readings Index

Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory

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Does Flattening Government Improve Economic Performance? Evidence from China

The autoregressive model for cointegrated variables is analyzed with respect to the role of the constant and linear terms. Various models for 1(1) variables defined by restrictions on the deterministic terms are discussed, and it is shown that statistical inference can be performed by reduced rank regression. The asymptotic distributions of the test statistics and estimators are found. A similar analysis is given for models for 1(2) variables with a constant term.

The role of the constant and linear terms in cointegration analysis of nonstationary variables : Cointegrated systems. I

In this paper we offer a comprehensive and updated review of the impact of fiscal decentralization on the economy, society and politics. We start with the examination of two crucial and yet unsolved issues in the literature on decentralization: its proper measurement and the potential endogeneity of fiscal decentralization with many of the variables of interest we are trying to investigate. Then we discuss the main findings in the existing literature on the effects of decentralization on a relevant list of socio-economic variables. The impact of fiscal decentralization reforms on political institutions is also considered. Complete answers to the many questions on the impact of fiscal decentralization are not likely to be certain but overall there are reasons to be optimistic about the overall positive impact of the decentralized systems that have been introduced all over the world in the past several decades. The survey offered in this paper by necessity has to be selective but it presents a balanced view of what is known and what is not yet known opening room for further research and practice on fiscal decentralization.

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The Impact of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey.

This paper is intended to provide an assessment of the impact of the silent revolution of the last three decades on moving governments closer to people to establish fair, accountable, incorruptible and responsive governance. To accomplish this, a unique data set is constructed for 182 countries by compiling data from a wide variety of sources to examine success toward decentralized decision making across the globe. An important feature of this data set is that, for comparative purposes, it measures government decision making at the local level rather than at the sub-national levels used in the existing literature. The data are used to rank countries on political, fiscal and administrative dimensions of decentralization and localization. These sub-indexes are aggregated and adjusted for heterogeneity to develop an overall ranking of countries on the closeness of their government to the people. The resulting rankings provide a useful explanation of the Arab Spring and other recent political movements and waves of dissatisfaction with governance around the world.

How Close is Your Government to its People? Worldwide Indicators on Localization and Decentralization

This paper addresses vulnerability of revenue to external shocks using export composition to capture economic structure and differentiating countries according to income levels, resource endowments...

https://tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00220388.2016.1153071

Tax Revenue Performance and Vulnerability in Developing Countries

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How close is your government to its people ? worldwide indicators on localization and decentralization

We attempt to improve the understanding and measurement of decentralization and its relationship with corruption in a worldwide context. This is done by presenting the conceptual underpinnings of such a relationship as well as using more defensible measures of both decentralization in its various dimensions as well as corruption for a sample of 158 countries. It is the first paper that treats various tiers of local governments (below the intermediate order of government) as the unit of comparative analysis. By pursuing rigorous econometric analysis we demonstrate that decentralization, when properly measured to mean moving government closer to people by empowering local governments, is shown to have a significant negative effect on the incidence of corruption regardless of the choice of the estimation procedures or the measures of corruption used. In terms of various dimensions of decentralized local governance, political decentralization matters even when we control for fiscal decentralization. Further v...

Decentralization and Corruption: New Cross-Country Evidence

This study uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to quantify the effects of corruption and tax evasion on fiscal policy and economic growth. The model is calibrated to match estimates of tax evasion in developing countries. The calibrated model is able to generate reasonable predictions for net tax rates, the corruption associated with public investment projects, and the negative correlation between corruption and tax revenue. The presence of corruption and evasion is shown to have significant, but not large, negative effects on economic growth. The relatively moderate effects help explain the absence of a robust negative correlation between growth and corruption in cross-country data. The model also implies that cracking down on tax evasion before addressing corruption can be a bad idea and that higher wages for public officials can improve welfare. (JEL H3, O4)

Maksym Ivanyna

Papers

How Close is Your Government to its People? Worldwide Indicators on Localization and Decentralization

Tax Revenue Performance and Vulnerability in Developing Countries

How close is your government to its people ? worldwide indicators on localization and decentralization

Decentralization and Corruption: New Cross-Country Evidence

The culture of corruption, tax evasion, and economic growth