Probability Distributions.- Linear Models for Regression.- Linear Models for Classification.- Neural Networks.- Kernel Methods.- Sparse Kernel Machines.- Graphical Models.- Mixture Models and EM.- Approximate Inference.- Sampling Methods.- Continuous Latent Variables.- Sequential Data.- Combining Models.

Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems.

Agent-based modelling and simulation (ABMS) is a relatively new approach to modelling systems composed of autonomous, interacting agents. Agent-based modelling is a way to model the dynamics of complex systems and complex adaptive systems. Such systems often self-organize themselves and create emergent order. Agent-based models also include models of behaviour (human or otherwise) and are used to observe the collective effects of agent behaviours and interactions. The development of agent modelling tools, the availability of micro-data, and advances in computation have made possible a growing number of agent-based applications across a variety of domains and disciplines. This article provides a brief introduction to ABMS, illustrates the main concepts and foundations, discusses some recent applications across a variety of disciplines, and identifies methods and toolkits for developing agent models.

/pdf/tutorial-on-agent-based-modelling-and-simulation-4xgz9pwney.pdf

Tutorial on agent-based modelling and simulation

A review of computer tools for analysing the integration of renewable energy into various energy systems

Agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) is a new approach to modeling systems comprised of interacting autonomous agents. ABMS promises to have far-reaching effects on the way that businesses use computers to support decision-making and researchers use electronic laboratories to do research. Some have gone so far as to contend that ABMS is a new way of doing science. Computational advances make possible a growing number of agent-based applications across many fields. Applications range from modeling agent behavior in the stock market and supply chains, to predicting the spread of epidemics and the threat of bio-warfare, from modeling the growth and decline of ancient civilizations to modeling the complexities of the human immune system, and many more. This tutorial describes the foundations of ABMS, identifies ABMS tool-kits and development methods illustrated through a supply chain example, and provides thoughts on the appropriate contexts for ABMS versus conventional modeling techniques.

/pdf/tutorial-on-agent-based-modeling-and-simulation-part-2-how-48d12imyof.pdf

Tutorial on agent-based modeling and simulation part 2: how to model with agents

Managing Business Complexity

Agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) is a new approach to modeling systems comprised of autonomous, interacting agents. Computational advances have made possible a growing number of agent-based models across a variety of application domains. Applications range from modeling agent behavior in the stock market, supply chains, and consumer markets, to predicting the spread of epidemics, mitigating the threat of bio-warfare, and understanding the factors that may be responsible for the fall of ancient civilizations. Such progress suggests the potential of ABMS to have far-reaching effects on the way that businesses use computers to support decision-making and researchers use agent-based models as electronic laboratories. Some contend that ABMS "is a third way of doing science" and could augment traditional deductive and inductive reasoning as discovery methods. This brief tutorial introduces agent-based modeling by describing the foundations of ABMS, discussing some illustrative applications, and addressing toolkits and methods for developing agent-based models.

/pdf/agent-based-modeling-and-simulation-2elsdjti5f.pdf

Agent-based modeling and simulation

The use of object-orientation for both spatial data and spatial process models facilitates their integration, which can allow exploration and explanation of spatial-temporal phenomena. In order to better understand how tight coupling might proceed and to evaluate the possible functional and efficiency gains from such a tight coupling, we identify four key relationships affecting how geographic data (fields and objects) and agent-based process models can interact: identity, causal, temporal and topological. We discuss approaches to implementing tight integration, focusing on a middleware approach that links existing GIS and ABM development platforms, and illustrate the need and approaches with example agent-based models.

/pdf/spatial-process-and-data-models-toward-integration-of-agent-3cl4g5plk9.pdf

Michael North

Papers

Tutorial on agent-based modeling and simulation part 2: how to model with agents

Managing Business Complexity

Agent-based modeling and simulation

Spatial process and data models: Toward integration of agent-based models and GIS

Spatial process and data models : toward integration of agent-based models and GIS.