Probability Distributions.- Linear Models for Regression.- Linear Models for Classification.- Neural Networks.- Kernel Methods.- Sparse Kernel Machines.- Graphical Models.- Mixture Models and EM.- Approximate Inference.- Sampling Methods.- Continuous Latent Variables.- Sequential Data.- Combining Models.

Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

An Introduction to MultiAgent Systems.

Agent-based modelling and simulation (ABMS) is a relatively new approach to modelling systems composed of autonomous, interacting agents. Agent-based modelling is a way to model the dynamics of complex systems and complex adaptive systems. Such systems often self-organize themselves and create emergent order. Agent-based models also include models of behaviour (human or otherwise) and are used to observe the collective effects of agent behaviours and interactions. The development of agent modelling tools, the availability of micro-data, and advances in computation have made possible a growing number of agent-based applications across a variety of domains and disciplines. This article provides a brief introduction to ABMS, illustrates the main concepts and foundations, discusses some recent applications across a variety of disciplines, and identifies methods and toolkits for developing agent models.

/pdf/tutorial-on-agent-based-modelling-and-simulation-4xgz9pwney.pdf

Tutorial on agent-based modelling and simulation

A review of computer tools for analysing the integration of renewable energy into various energy systems

Model verification and validation (V&V) are critical to the long term use of agent-based models of social processes. This paper addresses one important aspect of social simulation V&V, specifically that of component-level V&V. In this paper the Repast Simphony (Repast S) declarative model assembly infrastructure for supporting component-level V&V is discussed.

A Declarative Model Assembly Infrastructure for Verification and Validation

Repast is a widely used, free, and open-source agent-based modeling and simulation toolkit Three Repast platforms are currently available, each of which has the same core features but a different environment for these features Repast Simphony (Repast S) extends the Repast portfolio by offering a new approach to simulation development and execution This paper presents a model of physical infrastructure network interdependency as an introductory tutorial and illustration of the visual modeling capabilities of Repast S

Visual agent-based model development with repast simphony.

This engaging study returns to a truly remarkable year, the year in which both Ulysses and The Waste Land were published, in which The Great Gatsby was set, and during which the Fascisti took over in Italy, the Irish Free State was born, the Harlem Renaissance reached its peak, Charlie Chaplin's popularity crested, and King Tutankhamen's tomb was discovered. In short, the year which not only in hindsight became the primal scene of literary modernism but which served as the cradle for a host of major political and aesthetic transformations resonating around the globe. In his previous study, the acclaimed Dialect of Modernism (OUP, 1994), Michael North looked at the racial and linguistic struggles over the English language which gave birth to the many strains of modernism. Here, he expands his vision to encompass the global stage, and tells the story of how books changed the future of the world as we know it in one unforgettable year.

Reading 1922: A Return to the Scene of the Modern

Agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) is a new approach to modeling systems comprised of autonomous, interacting agents. ABMS promises to have far-reaching effects on the way that businesses use computers to support decision-making and researchers use electronic laboratories to support their research. Some have gone so far as to contend that ABMS "is a third way of doing science," in addition to traditional deductive and inductive reasoning (Axelrod 1997). Computational advances have made possible a growing number of agent-based models across a variety of application domains. Applications range from modeling agent behavior in the stock market, supply chains, and consumer markets, to predicting the spread of epidemics, the threat of bio-warfare, and the factors responsible for the fall of ancient civilizations. This tutorial describes the theoretical and practical foundations of ABMS, identifies toolkits and methods for developing agent models, and illustrates the development of a simple agent-based model.

/pdf/agent-based-modeling-and-simulation-abms-examples-4t3t0gj9zn.pdf

Agent-based modeling and simulation: ABMS examples

Electricity markets are complex adaptive systems that operate under a wide range of rules that span a variety of time scales. These rules are imposed both from above by society and below by physics. Many electricity markets are undergoing or are about to undergo a transition from centrally regulated systems to decentralized markets. Furthermore, several electricity markets have recently undergone this transition with extremely unsatisfactory results, most notably in California. These high stakes transitions require the introduction of largely untested regulatory structures. Suitable laboratories that can be used to test regulatory structures before they are applied to real systems are needed. Agent-based models can provide such electronic laboratories or ''e-laboratories.'' To better understand the requirements of an electricity market e-laboratory, a live electricity market simulation was created. This experience helped to shape the development of the Electricity Market Complex Adaptive Systems (EMCAS) model. To explore EMCAS' potential as an e-laboratory, several variations of the live simulation were created. These variations probed the possible effects of changing power plant outages and price setting rules on electricity market prices.

/pdf/e-laboratories-agent-based-modeling-of-electricity-markets-3ie3d3b5kx.pdf

Michael North

Papers

A Declarative Model Assembly Infrastructure for Verification and Validation

Visual agent-based model development with repast simphony.

Reading 1922: A Return to the Scene of the Modern

Agent-based modeling and simulation: ABMS examples

E-laboratories : agent-based modeling of electricity markets.