Showing papers by "Michael W. Macy published in 2004"
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that structural position affects not only bargainingpower but also the ability of low-power actors to organize against unequal bargaining power, and they hypothesize that collective action among low power actors is facilitated by identification with others who are structurally disadvantaged.
Abstract: Our research aims to bring collective action back into the study of structural determinants of power in social exchange. Previous research has focused primarily on the bargaining power of actors whose locations in exchange networks confer different risks of exclusion. We argue that structural position affects not only bargainingpower but also the ability of low-power actors to organize against unequal bargaining power. We hypothesize that collective action among low-power actors is facilitated by identification with others who are structurally disadvantaged. We test two identity-theoretic expected utility models that specify how actors in a mixedmotive coalition game might take into account the payoffs to others in structurally equivalent positions. In the utilitarian model, actors maximize the greatest good to the greatest number. In the collectivist model, actors also seek to minimize in-group inequality. Results show some support for the utilitarian model among female participants and strong support for the collectivist model among both males and females. We speculate about causes of gender differences and identify directions for future exchange-theoretic research on social identity and socially embedded collective action.
55 citations
TL;DR: It was found that American participants were more than Japanese counterparts, to information regarding the past trust behavior of other players when they were deciding whom they trust and whether or not they reciprocate another's trust.
Abstract: American and Japanese students, 44 and 38, respectively, participated in an experiment, and played a game together in seven- or eight-person groups. The game was a repeated version of bilateral trust game: Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) with choice of dependence. In no-information condition, participants were not told that some of the group members were from another country. In information condition, they were told that about half of the members were Japanese and the rest were Americans. We examined whether or not people trusted ingroup members (those from the same country) more than outgroup members, and whether or not they cooperated with ingroup members more than outgroup members. We found no evidence of ingroup bias in terms of trust and cooperation, and we did not find significant differences in the levels of trust or cooperation between those found among Americans and those among Japanese. On the other hand, it was found that American participants were more sensitive than Japanese counterparts, to information regarding the past trust behavior of other players when they were deciding whom they trust and whether or not they reciprocate another's trust.
11 citations