计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

Models for the processes by which ideas and influence propagate through a social network have been studied in a number of domains, including the diffusion of medical and technological innovations, the sudden and widespread adoption of various strategies in game-theoretic settings, and the effects of "word of mouth" in the promotion of new products. Recently, motivated by the design of viral marketing strategies, Domingos and Richardson posed a fundamental algorithmic problem for such social network processes: if we can try to convince a subset of individuals to adopt a new product or innovation, and the goal is to trigger a large cascade of further adoptions, which set of individuals should we target?We consider this problem in several of the most widely studied models in social network analysis. The optimization problem of selecting the most influential nodes is NP-hard here, and we provide the first provable approximation guarantees for efficient algorithms. Using an analysis framework based on submodular functions, we show that a natural greedy strategy obtains a solution that is provably within 63% of optimal for several classes of models; our framework suggests a general approach for reasoning about the performance guarantees of algorithms for these types of influence problems in social networks.We also provide computational experiments on large collaboration networks, showing that in addition to their provable guarantees, our approximation algorithms significantly out-perform node-selection heuristics based on the well-studied notions of degree centrality and distance centrality from the field of social networks.

/pdf/maximizing-the-spread-of-influence-through-a-social-network-47y1ehuvwi.pdf

Maximizing the Spread of Influence through a Social Network

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The combination of the compactness of networks, featuring small diameters, and their complex architectures results in a variety of critical effects dramatically different from those in cooperative systems on lattices. In the last few years, important steps have been made toward understanding the qualitatively new critical phenomena in complex networks. The results, concepts, and methods of this rapidly developing field are reviewed. Two closely related classes of these critical phenomena are considered, namely, structural phase transitions in the network architectures and transitions in cooperative models on networks as substrates. Systems where a network and interacting agents on it influence each other are also discussed. A wide range of critical phenomena in equilibrium and growing networks including the birth of the giant connected component, percolation, $k$-core percolation, phenomena near epidemic thresholds, condensation transitions, critical phenomena in spin models placed on networks, synchronization, and self-organized criticality effects in interacting systems on networks are mentioned. Strong finite-size effects in these systems and open problems and perspectives are also discussed.

/pdf/critical-phenomena-in-complex-networks-4vxnv3f75f.pdf

Critical phenomena in complex networks

A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.

http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/Personal/stengel/TEXTE/agt-stengel.pdf

Algorithmic Game Theory

In the Steiner Network problem, we are given a graph G with edge-costs and connectivity requirements ruv between node pairs u,v. The goal is to find a minimum-cost subgraph H of G that contains ruv edge-disjoint paths for all u,v ∈ V. In Prize-Collecting Steiner Network problems, we do not need to satisfy all requirements, but are given a penalty function for violating the connectivity requirements, and the goal is to find a subgraph H that minimizes the cost plus the penalty. The case when ruv ∈ {0,1} is the classic Prize-Collecting Steiner Forest problem.In this article, we present a novel linear programming relaxation for the Prize-Collecting Steiner Network problem, and by rounding it, obtain the first constant-factor approximation algorithm for submodular and monotone nondecreasing penalty functions. In particular, our setting includes all-or-nothing penalty functions, which charge the penalty even if the connectivity requirement is slightly violated; this resolves an open question posed by Nagarajan et al. [2008]. We further generalize our results for element-connectivity and node-connectivity.

/pdf/prize-collecting-steiner-network-problems-9nl8jw5cxz.pdf

Prize-collecting steiner network problems

Data tables in data warehouses are updated to minimize staleness and stretch of the data tables. New data is received from external sources and, in response, update requests are generated. Accumulated update requests may be batched. Data tables may be weighted to affect the order in which update requests are serviced.

Minimizing staleness in real-time data warehouses

Moss and Rabani[12] study constrained node-weighted Steiner tree problems with two independent weight values associated with each node, namely, cost and prize (or penalty). They give an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the prize-collecting node-weighted Steiner tree problem (PCST). They use the algorithm for PCST to obtain a bicriteria (2, O(log n))-approximation algorithm for the Budgeted node-weighted Steiner tree problem. Their solution may cost up to twice the budget, but collects a factor Omega(1/log n) of the optimal prize. We improve these results from at least two aspects. 
Our first main result is a primal-dual O(log h)-approximation algorithm for a more general problem, prize-collecting node-weighted Steiner forest, where we have (h) demands each requesting the connectivity of a pair of vertices. Our algorithm can be seen as a greedy algorithm which reduces the number of demands by choosing a structure with minimum cost-to-reduction ratio. This natural style of argument (also used by Klein and Ravi[10] and Guha et al.[8]) leads to a much simpler algorithm than that of Moss and Rabani[12] for PCST. 
Our second main contribution is for the Budgeted node-weighted Steiner tree problem, which is also an improvement to [12] and [8]. In the unrooted case, we improve upon an O(log^2(n))-approximation of [8], and present an O(log n)-approximation algorithm without any budget violation. For the rooted case, where a specified vertex has to appear in the solution tree, we improve the bicriteria result of [12] to a bicriteria approximation ratio of (1+eps, O(log n)/(eps^2)) for any positive (possibly subconstant) (eps). That is, for any permissible budget violation (1+eps), we present an algorithm achieving a tradeoff in the guarantee for prize. Indeed, we show that this is almost tight for the natural linear-programming relaxation used by us as well as in [12].

Improved Approximation Algorithms for (Budgeted) Node-weighted Steiner Problems

This paper is a theoretical and experimental study of two related facility location problems that emanated from networking. Suppose we are given a network modeled as a directed graph G = (V, A), together with (not-necessarily-disjoint) subsets C and F of V, where C is a set of customer locations and F is a set of potential facility locations (and typically C ⊆ F). Our goal is to find a minimum sized subset F' ⊆ F such that for every customer c ∈ C there are two locations f1, f2 ∈ F' such that traffic from c to f1 and to f2 is routed on disjoint paths (usually shortest paths) under the network's routing protocols.

Although we prove that this problem is impossible to approximate in the worst case even to within a factor of 2log1--en for any e > 0 (assuming no NP-complete language can be solved in quasipolynomial time), we show that the situation is much better in practice. We propose three algorithms that build solutions and determine lower bounds on the optimum solution, and evaluate them on several large real ISP topologies and on synthetic networks designed to reflect real-world LAN/WAN network structure. Our main algorithms are (1) an algorithm that performs multiple runs of a straightforward randomized greedy heuristic and returns the best result found, (2) a genetic algorithm that uses the greedy algorithm as a subroutine, and (3) a new "Double Hitting Set" algorithm. All three approaches perform surprising well, although, in practice, the most cost-effective approach is the multirun greedy algorithm. This yields results that average within 0.7% of optimal for our synthetic instances and within 2.9% for our real-world instances, excluding the largest (and most realistic) one. For the latter instance, the other two algorithms come into their own, finding solutions that are more than three times better than those of the multi-start greedy approach.

In terms of our motivating monitoring application, where every customer location can be a facility location, the results are even better. Here the above Double Hitting Set solution is 90% better than the default solution which places a monitor at each customer location -- such comparisons help justify the proposed alternative monitoring scheme of [8]. Our results also show that, on average for our real-world instances, we could save an additional 18% by choosing the (shortest path) routes ourselves, rather than taking the simpler approach of relying on the network to choose them for us.

/pdf/disjoint-path-facility-location-theory-and-practice-3hfgy8zpd9.pdf

Disjoint-path facility location: theory and practice

We study an extensive class of movement minimization problems that arise from many practical scenarios but so far have little theoretical study. In general, these problems involve planning the coordinated motion of a collection of agents (representing robots, people, map labels, network messages, etc.) to achieve a global property in the network while minimizing the maximum or average movement (expended energy). The only previous theoretical results about this class of problems are about approximation and are mainly negative: many movement problems of interest have polynomial inapproximability. Given that the number of mobile agents is typically much smaller than the complexity of the environment, we turn to fixed-parameter tractability. We characterize the boundary between tractable and intractable movement problems in a very general setup: it turns out the complexity of the problem fundamentally depends on the treewidth of the minimal configurations. Thus, the complexity of a particular problem can be determined by answering a purely combinatorial question. Using our general tools, we determine the complexity of several concrete problems and fortunately show that many movement problems of interest can be solved efficiently.

/pdf/minimizing-movement-fixed-parameter-tractability-4jmb1hu4s8.pdf

MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi

Papers

Prize-collecting steiner network problems

Minimizing staleness in real-time data warehouses

Improved Approximation Algorithms for (Budgeted) Node-weighted Steiner Problems

Disjoint-path facility location: theory and practice

Minimizing Movement: Fixed-Parameter Tractability