Showing papers by "Øystein Foros published in 2011"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare the profitability of a merger between two firms in which one firm fully acquires another and a partial ownership arrangement in which the acquiring firm, although owning less than 100% of the acquired firm, is nevertheless able to obtain corporate control over all pricing decisions.
54 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and that viewers single-home, and show that allowing for crowding in viewer attention spans for ads may reverse standard results.
Abstract: Standard media economics models imply that increased platform competition decreases ad levels and that mergers reduce per-viewer ad prices. The empirical evidence, however, is mixed. We attribute the theoretical predictions to the combined assumptions that there is no advertising congestion and that viewers single-home. Allowing for crowding in viewer attention spans for ads may reverse standard results, as does allowing viewers to multi-home.
45 citations
TL;DR: There may be a permanent need for regulation analogous to what the authors have for domestic call termination for mobile phone usage when traveling abroad, and there is a risk that wholesale price-cap regulation stimulates wasteful rent-seeking activity.
14 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance (RPM) to dampen competition and find that even though the motive for using RPM is thus anticompetitive, market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers.
10 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a situation where one firm has a cost advantage over rivals and can transfer the source of its advantage wholly or partially to a subset of rival firms, and present conditions under which this transfer will occur and consider the welfare properties of exclusion.
Abstract: We consider a contest where one firm has a cost advantage over rivals. Instead of taking the set of rivals as given, the favorite can transfer the source of its advantage wholly or partially to a subset of rival firms. Foreclosure of those firms that do not receive the cost reduction may result. We present conditions under which this transfer will occur and consider the welfare properties of exclusion. The expected payoff of the dominant firm is independent of the size of the cost reduction transferred to rivals. Applications include lobbying, patent races and access to essential infrastructure.
1 citations