Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

With digital equipment becoming increasingly networked, either on wired or wireless networks, for personal and professional use alike, distributed software systems have become a crucial element in information and communications technologies. The study of these systems forms the core of the ARLES' work, which is specifically concerned with defining new system software architectures, based on the use of emerging networking technologies. In this context, we concentrate on the study of distributed systems which bring to life the vision of ubiquitous computing systems, also known as ambient intelligence.

반도체 공정 overview

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The concept of mind

The Study of Man. By Michael Polanyi. Price, $1.75. Pp. 102. University of Chicago Press, 5750 Ellis Ave., Chicago 37, 1959. One subtitle to Polanyi's challenging and fascinating book might be The Evolution and Natural History of Error , for Polanyi is at pains to expunge what he believes to be the false notion contained in the contemporary view of science which treats it as an object and basically impersonal discipline. According to Polanyi not only is this a radical and important error, but it is harmful to the objectives of science itself. Another subtitle could be Farewell to Detachment , for in place of cold objectivity he develops the idea that science is necessarily intensely personal. It is a human endeavor and human point of view which cannot be divorced from nor uprooted out of the human matrix from which it arises and in which it works. For a good while

Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

textRecently, software development and implementation projects have globalized at a rapid pace. Companies in North America, Europe, and the Far East are beginning to integrate international Information Technology (IT) resources to support operations across the globe. Offshore IT services have become a prevalent strategy to tap into emerging resource bases of countries like India, Phillipines, Eastern Europe.
However, global distributedness has introduced a number of gaps: Distance, time zone difference, socio-cultural diversity, differences of infrastructure, and governance differences. These gaps create challenges for the way software projects are coordinated and controlled. This research investigates the impact of gaps on coordination and control modes. It develops these ideas through an extensive theoretical basis and two qualitative case studies to further our understanding of globally distributed software projects, and extend our capability to manage these.

Coordination and Control of Globally Distributed Software Projects

A recent Offshoring Research Network (ORN) global survey of offshoring shows that since 2004 management concerns about operational issues on achieving the benefits of offshoring have increased significantly. In this paper we examine inter-task interdependence, a key operational determinant of inter-site interaction and communications in offshoring. We analyze existing theories of interdependence to examine the extent to which they provide guidance for understanding the interaction and communication requirements between work segments that are offshored and distributed across the globe. Using a series of mini-cases on globally distributed work (GDW), we show how the traditional typology of interdependence developed in the 1960s and 1970s is no longer adequate for understanding and managing task interdependencies in GDW. We propose three concepts to address this problem: integration interdependence, “hand-offs”, and information “stickiness”. We then show how our revised typology of interdependence enables a better understanding of the interactions and communication requirements between sites. Using this revised theory we propose guidelines for work design, and examine their implications for practical offshoring and work-distribution decisions. Implications for theory and practice for MNEs engaged in offshore relationships are discussed.

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Fjibs.2008.77.pdf

Offshoring and the global distribution of work: Implications for task interdependence theory and practice

Developing a knowledge-based perspective on coordination: The case of global software projects

Recent business trends have given rise to co-opetition: simultaneous co-operation and competition between firms. Co-opetition entails the sharing of knowledge which may be a key source of competitive advantage. Under co-opetition there is a paradox that the knowledge shared for cooperation may also be used for competition. While the existence of this problem is known, there is little investigation of how it may be modeled and, thus, managed.This paper begins by discussing the problem situation and its underlying theory. It then introduces a game-theoretic framework for analyzing inter-organizational knowledge sharing in the context of co-opetition. This allows the value of knowledge shared to be investigated and reveals that a crucial aspect will be the firm's ability to manage the process. Thus, based on the framework, the paper explores management guidelines predicated on co-ordination and control theory for the most challenging of four contingencies identified. The paper concludes with an agenda for future theoretical and empirical research.

Co-opetition and knowledge transfer

Corporate knowledge is considered a crucial determinant of sustainable competitive advantages. Recent resource-leveraging strategies emphasize inter-firm collaboration and knowledge sharing across firm boundaries, however. This strategic paradox of protecting versus sharing knowledge suggests the need for new paradigms that reconcile intra- and inter-organizational knowledge sharing. Building on organizational collaboration and control theory, this paper investigates contingencies of inter-organizational knowledge sharing and proposes four configurations of inter-organizational knowledge sharing for managing the paradox. It concludes with a critical review, suggestions for further conceptual and empirical research, and implications for research and practice.

/pdf/managing-inter-organizational-knowledge-sharing-3yc89cwm6z.pdf

Paul C. van Fenema

Papers

Coordination and Control of Globally Distributed Software Projects

Offshoring and the global distribution of work: Implications for task interdependence theory and practice

Developing a knowledge-based perspective on coordination: The case of global software projects

Co-opetition and knowledge transfer

Managing inter-organizational knowledge sharing