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Ramesh P. Rao

Researcher at Oklahoma State University–Stillwater

Publications -  92
Citations -  3786

Ramesh P. Rao is an academic researcher from Oklahoma State University–Stillwater. The author has contributed to research in topics: Shareholder & Dividend. The author has an hindex of 32, co-authored 90 publications receiving 3514 citations. Previous affiliations of Ramesh P. Rao include Texas Tech University & College of Business Administration.

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The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm and found that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage.
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Managerial Ownership, Debt Policy, and the Impact of Institutional Holdings: An Agency Perspective

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the effects of institutional ownership on the debt policy and managerial ownership of the firm and found that the use of debt and managerial stock ownership are inversely related to institutional ownership in the firm.
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Corporate governance in New Zealand: The effect of the 1993 Companies Act on the relation between board composition and firm performance

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the efficacy of monitoring by the board of directors, and especially independent outside directors, in New Zealand and find that the effects of the Companies Act and related legislation are relatively benign in so far as influencing the relationship between firm performance and outside board representation is concerned.
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Do Spin‐offs Expropriate Wealth from Bondholders?

TL;DR: In this article, the authors find evidence consistent with wealth expropriation for stockholder gains on the announcement of a spin-off and show that losses to bondholders tend to be more severe, the larger the gains to shareholders.
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Of What Value are Shareholder Proposals Sponsored by Public Pension Funds

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors address the empirical question, "Of what value are shareholder proposals sponsored by public pension funds?" and find that the primary function of a proposal is to act as a signaling mechanism in alerting the market that management is unwilling or unable to negotiate a settlement with the public fund in order to prevent the submission of the proposal.