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Richard Cole
Researcher at New York University
Publications - 194
Citations - 11002
Richard Cole is an academic researcher from New York University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Parallel algorithm & Time complexity. The author has an hindex of 57, co-authored 193 publications receiving 10474 citations. Previous affiliations of Richard Cole include Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences & Tel Aviv University.
Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
An O ( n log n ) Algorithm for the Maximum Agreement Subtree Problem for Binary Trees
TL;DR: This work considers the case which occurs frequently in practice, i.e., the case when the trees are binary, and gives an O(nlog n) time algorithm for the maximum agreement subtree problem.
Book
Searching and Storing Similar Lists
TL;DR: An optimal data structure for storing a sequence of similar lists is presented; it supports rapid searching of an arbitrary list and applications include an optimal planar point location algorithm, more general than previous ones, a 3-dimensional point location algorithms, and a new representation scheme for polyhedra.
Journal ArticleDOI
Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items
Richard Cole,Vasilis Gkatzelis +1 more
TL;DR: This work studies the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with additive valuations with the goal of maximizing the geometric mean of the agents' valuations, i.e., the Nash social ...
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare
Richard Cole,Nikhil R. Devanur,Vasilis Gkatzelis,Kamal Jain,Tung Mai,Vijay V. Vazirani,Sadra Yazdanbod +6 more
TL;DR: In this article, a new integer program for the Nash social welfare maximization problem whose fractional relaxation has a bounded integrality gap was given. But the integrality-gap of this program is at most 2.89.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments
TL;DR: This work revisits the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective and provides an elegant truthful mechanism that yields surprisingly good approximation guarantees for the widely used solution of Proportional Fairness.