National Institute of Standards and Technology における超伝導研究及び生活

Advances in sensing and tracking technology enable location-based applications but they also create significant privacy risks. Anonymity can provide a high degree of privacy, save service users from dealing with service providers’ privacy policies, and reduce the service providers’ requirements for safeguarding private information. However, guaranteeing anonymous usage of location-based services requires that the precise location information transmitted by a user cannot be easily used to re-identify the subject. This paper presents a middleware architecture and algorithms that can be used by a centralized location broker service. The adaptive algorithms adjust the resolution of location information along spatial or temporal dimensions to meet specified anonymity constraints based on the entities who may be using location services within a given area. Using a model based on automotive traffic counts and cartographic material, we estimate the realistically expected spatial resolution for different anonymity constraints. The median resolution generated by our algorithms is 125 meters. Thus, anonymous location-based requests for urban areas would have the same accuracy currently needed for E-911 services; this would provide sufficient resolution for wayfinding, automated bus routing services and similar location-dependent services.

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Anonymous Usage of Location-Based Services Through Spatial and Temporal Cloaking

Vehicular networks are very likely to be deployed in the coming years and thus become the most relevant form of mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we address the security of these networks. We provide a detailed threat analysis and devise an appropriate security architecture. We also describe some major design decisions still to be made, which in some cases have more than mere technical implications. We provide a set of security protocols, we show that they protect privacy and we analyze their robustness and efficiency.

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Securing vehicular ad hoc networks

From the Department of Neurology (P.B.C.) and the Division of Medical Genetics (K.L.N.), University of Pennsylvania Medical Center; and the Department of Medical Oncology, Fox Chase Cancer Center (E.P.H.) — both in Philadelphia. Address reprint requests to Dr. Crino at the Department of Neurology, 3 West Gates Bldg., 3400 Spruce St., University of Pennsylvania Medical Center, Philadelphia, PA 19104, or at peter.crino@ uphs.upenn.edu.

The tuberous sclerosis complex.

A flow processing facility, which uses a set of artificial neurons for pattern recognition, such as a self-organizing map, in order to provide security and protection to a computer or computer system supports unified threat management based at least in part on patterns relevant to a variety of types of threats that relate to computer systems, including computer networks. Flow processing for switching, security, and other network applications, including a facility that processes a data flow to address patterns relevant to a variety of conditions are directed at internal network security, virtualization, and web connection security. A flow processing facility for inspecting payloads of network traffic packets detects security threats and intrusions across accessible layers of the IP-stack by applying content matching and behavioral anomaly detection techniques based on regular expression matching and self-organizing maps. Exposing threats and intrusions within packet payload at or near real-time rates enhances network security from both external and internal sources while ensuring security policy is rigorously applied to data and system resources. Intrusion Detection and Protection (IDP) is provided by a flow processing facility that processes a data flow to address patterns relevant to a variety of types of network and data integrity threats that relate to computer systems, including computer networks.

Systems and methods for processing data flows

We present the design and implementation of a system that enables trusted computing for an unlimited number of virtual machines on a single hardware platform. To this end, we virtualized the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). As a result, the TPM's secure storage and cryptographic functions are available to operating systems and applications running in virtual machines. Our new facility supports higher-level services for establishing trust in virtualized environments, for example remote attestation of software integrity.

We implemented the full TPM specification in software and added functions to create and destroy virtual TPM instances. We integrated our software TPM into a hypervisor environment to make TPM functions available to virtual machines. Our virtual TPM supports suspend and resume operations, as well as migration of a virtual TPM instance with its respective virtual machine across platforms. We present four designs for certificate chains to link the virtual TPM to a hardware TPM, with security vs. efficiency trade-offs based on threat models. Finally, we demonstrate a working system by layering an existing integrity measurement application on top of our virtual TPM facility.

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vTPM: virtualizing the trusted platform module

We present the sHype hypervisor security architecture and examine in detail its mandatory access control facilities. While existing hypervisor security approaches aiming at high assurance have been proven useful for high-security environments that prioritize security over performance and code reuse, our approach aims at commercial security where near-zero performance overhead, non-intrusive implementation, and usability are of paramount importance. sHype enforces strong isolation at the granularity of a virtual machine, thus providing a robust foundation on which higher software layers can enact finer-grained controls. We provide the rationale behind the sHype design and describe and evaluate our implementation for the Xen open-source hypervisor

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Building a MAC-based security architecture for the Xen open-source hypervisor

Meeting the challenge of building a user-configurable secure coprocessor provided several lessons in hardware and software development and continues to spur further research. In developing the 4758, we met our major research security goals and provided the following features: (1) a lifetime-secure tamper-responding device, rather than one that is secure only between resets that deployment-specific security officers perform; (2) a secure booting process in which each layer progressively validates the next less-trusted layer, with hardware restricting access to its secrets before passing control to that layer; (3) an actual manufacturable product - a nontrivial accomplishment considering that we designed the device so that it does not have a personality until configured in the field; (4) the first FIPS 140-1 Level 4 validation, arguably the only general-purpose computational platform validated at this level so far; and (5) a multipurpose programmable device based on a 99-MHz 486 CPU internal environment, with a real operating system, a C language development environment and relatively high-speed cryptography.

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Building the IBM 4758 secure coprocessor

Tuberous sclerosis complex (TSC), an autosomal dominant disease caused by mutations in either TSC1 or TSC2, is characterized by the development of hamartomas in a variety of organs. Concordant with the tumor-suppressor model, loss of heterozygosity (LOH) is known to occur in these hamartomas at loci of both TSC1 and TSC2. LOH has been documented in renal angiomyolipomas (AMLs), but loss of the wild-type allele in cortical tubers appears to be very uncommon. Analysis of second, somatic events in tumors for which the status of both TSC1 and TSC2 is known is essential for exploration of the pathogenesis of TSC-lesion development. We analyzed 24 hamartomas from 10 patients for second-hit mutations, by several methods, including LOH, scanning of all exons of both TSC1 and TSC2, promoter methylation of TSC2, and clonality analysis. Our results document loss of the wild-type allele in six of seven AMLs, without evidence of the inactivation of the second allele in many of the other lesions, including tumors that appear to be clonally derived. Laser-capture microdissection further demonstrated loss of the second allele in all three cellular components of an AML. This study thus provides evidence that, in both TSC1 and TSC2, somatic mutations resulting in the loss of wild-type alleles may not be necessary in some tumor types—and that other mechanisms may contribute to tumorigenesis in this setting.

Survey of somatic mutations in tuberous sclerosis complex (TSC) hamartomas suggests different genetic mechanisms for pathogenesis of TSC lesions.

Automotive telematics may be defined as the information-intensive applications that are being enabled for vehicles by a combination of telecommunications and computing technology. Telematics by its nature requires the capture of sensor data, storage and exchange of data to obtain remote services. In order for automotive telematics to grow to its full potential, telematics data must be protected. Data protection must include privacy and security for end-users, service providers and application providers. In this paper, we propose a new framework for data protection that is built on the foundation of privacy and security technologies. The privacy technology enables users and service providers to define flexible data model and policy models. The security technology provides traditional capabilities such as encryption, authentication, non-repudiation. In addition, it provides secure environments for protected execution, which is essential to limiting data access to specific purposes.

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Ronald Perez

Papers

vTPM: virtualizing the trusted platform module

Building a MAC-based security architecture for the Xen open-source hypervisor

Building the IBM 4758 secure coprocessor

Survey of somatic mutations in tuberous sclerosis complex (TSC) hamartomas suggests different genetic mechanisms for pathogenesis of TSC lesions.

Framework for security and privacy in automotive telematics