R
Ross Anderson
Researcher at University of Cambridge
Publications - 292
Citations - 28411
Ross Anderson is an academic researcher from University of Cambridge. The author has contributed to research in topics: Smart card & Cryptography. The author has an hindex of 73, co-authored 278 publications receiving 27260 citations. Previous affiliations of Ross Anderson include Boston Children's Hospital & The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Papers
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Journal ArticleDOI
Centrality prediction in dynamic human contact networks
TL;DR: It is found that node importance is highly predictable due to both periodic and legacy effects of human social behaviour, and reasonable prediction functions are designed that can be efficiently computed in linear time, and are thus practical for processing dynamic networks in real-time.
Journal ArticleDOI
Information security: where computer science, economics and psychology meet
Ross Anderson,Tyler Moore +1 more
TL;DR: The promise of this multidisciplinary research programme is a novel framework for analysing information security problems—one that is both principled and effective.
On the Security Economics of Electricity Metering.
Ross Anderson,Shailendra Fuloria +1 more
TL;DR: Energy metering is ripe for a security-economics analysis, and a first cut is attempted, which ends up with five recommendations for the regulation of a future smart meter infrastructure.
Journal Article
On trust establishment in mobile ad-hoc networks
Laurent Eschenauer,Virgil D. Gligor,John S. Baras,Matt Blaze,Virgil D. Gligor,John Ioannidis,Pekka Nikander,Ross Anderson,Bruce Christianson +8 more
TL;DR: It is argued that peer-to-peer networks are especially suitable to solve the problems of generation, distribution, and discovery of trust evidence in mobile ad-hoc networks, and the importance of evaluation metrics in trust establishment is illustrated.
Book ChapterDOI
Liability and Computer Security: Nine Principles
TL;DR: Nine principles are derived which might help designers avoid the most common pitfalls in computer security systems, which are at least as much about shedding liability as about minimising risk.