From the Publisher:
A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols; more than 200 tables and figures; more than 1,000 numbered definitions, facts, examples, notes, and remarks; and over 1,250 significant references, including brief comments on each paper.

Handbook of Applied Cryptography

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To solve the problem, wherein it is impossible for an electronic content information provider to provide commercially secure and effective method, for a configurable general-purpose electronic commercial transaction/distribution control system. SOLUTION: In this system, having at least one protected processing environment for safely controlling at least one portion of decoding of digital information, a secure content distribution method comprises a process for encapsulating digital information in one or more digital containers; a process for encrypting at least a portion of digital information; a process for associating at least partially secure control information for managing interactions with encrypted digital information and/or digital container; a process for delivering one or more digital containers to a digital information user; and a process for using a protected processing environment, for safely controlling at least a portion of the decoding of the digital information. COPYRIGHT: (C)2006,JPO&NCIPI

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a423264.pdf

Systems and Methods for Secure Transaction Management and Electronic Rights Protection

We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Random graphs

Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. We also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.

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Differential Power Analysis

We study two families of error-correcting codes defined in terms of very sparse matrices "MN" (MacKay-Neal (1995)) codes are recently invented, and "Gallager codes" were first investigated in 1962, but appear to have been largely forgotten, in spite of their excellent properties The decoding of both codes can be tackled with a practical sum-product algorithm We prove that these codes are "very good", in that sequences of codes exist which, when optimally decoded, achieve information rates up to the Shannon limit This result holds not only for the binary-symmetric channel but also for any channel with symmetric stationary ergodic noise We give experimental results for binary-symmetric channels and Gaussian channels demonstrating that practical performance substantially better than that of standard convolutional and concatenated codes can be achieved; indeed, the performance of Gallager codes is almost as close to the Shannon limit as that of turbo codes

/pdf/good-error-correcting-codes-based-on-very-sparse-matrices-3kdz0lhhm4.pdf

Good error-correcting codes based on very sparse matrices

Despite high hopes for quantum computation in the 1990s, progress in the past decade has been slow; we still cannot perform computation with more than about three qubits and are no closer to solving problems of real interest than a decade ago. Separately, recent experiments in fluid mechanics have demonstrated the emergence of a full range of quantum phenomena from completely classical motion. We present two specific hypotheses. First, Kuramoto theory may give a basis for geometrical thinking about entanglement. Second, we consider a recent soliton model of the electron, in which the quantum-mechanical wave function is a phase modulation of a carrier wave. Both models are consistent with one another and with observation. Both models suggest how entanglement and decoherence may be related to device geometry. Both models predict that it will be dicult to maintain phase coherence of more than three qubits in the plane, or four qubits in a three-dimensional structure. The soliton model also shows that the experimental work which appeared to demonstrate a violation of Bell’s inequalities might not actually do so; regardless of whether it is a correct description of the world, it exposes a flaw in the logic of the Bell tests. Thus the case for the security of EPR-based quantum cryptography has just not been made. We propose experiments in quantum computation to test this. Finally, we examine two possible interpretations of such soliton models: one is consistent with the transactional interpretation of quantum mechanics, while the other is an entirely classical model in which we do not have to abandon the idea of a single world where action is local and causal.

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Why quantum computing is hard { and quantum cryptography is not provably secure

The protocol work that started off a quarter of a century ago may have seemed at the time like a minor detail within the larger project of designing robust distributed systems. Yet it has already grown into the main unifying theme of security engineering. Application-level protocols, and especially those from which an attacker can harvest data over many runs, open up new problems. The resulting analysis techniques are set to invade the world of composable security and the world of multiparty computation. The influence and consequences of Roger’s contribution just keep on growing.

Protocol Analysis, Composability and Computation

We proposed a new block cipher, Serpent, as a candidate for the Advanced Encryption Standard. This algorithm uses a new structure that simultaneously allows a more rapid avalanche, a more efficient bitslice implementation, and an easy analysis that enables us to demonstrate its security against all known types of attack. Although designed primarily for efficient implementation on Intel Pentium/MMX platforms, it is also suited for implementation on smartcards and other 8-bit processors. In this note we describe why. We also describe why many other candidates are not suitable.

Serpent and Smartcards

In this talk, I will speculate about the likely near-term and medium-term scientific developments in the protection of embedded systems.

A common view of the Internet divides its history into three waves, the first being centered around mainframes and terminals, and the second (from about 1992 until now) on PCs, browsers, and a GUI.The third wave, starting now, will see the connection of all sorts of devices that are currently in proprietary networks, standalone, or even non-computerized. By the end of 2003, there might well be more mobile phones connected to the Internet than computers. Within a few years we will see many of the world's fridges, heart monitors, bus ticket dispensers, burglar alarms, and electricity meters talking IP. By 2010, 'ubiquitous computing' will be part of our lives.

Some of the likely effects of ubiquitous computing are already apparent. For example, applications with intermittent connectivity will have to maintain much of their security state locally rather than globally. This will create new markets for processors with appropriate levels of tamper-resistance. But what will this mean?

I will discuss protection requirements at four levels.

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Protecting Embedded Systems - The Next Ten Years

The history of steganography.- Computer based steganography: How it works and why therefore any restrictions on cryptography are nonsense, at best.- Hiding data in the OSI network model.- Stretching the limits of steganography.- Trials of traced traitors.- Establishing big brother using covert channels and other covert techniques.- Covert channels-A context-based view.- Covert channel analysis for Stubs.- Anonymous addresses and confidentiality of location.- MIXes in mobile communication systems: Location management with privacy.- Hiding Routing information.- The Newton channel.- A progress report on subliminal-free channels.- Modeling cryptographic protocols and their collusion analysis.- A secure, robust watermark for multimedia.- Modulation and information hiding in images.- Watermarking document images with bounding box expansion.- The history of subliminal channels.- Blind decoding, blind undeniable signatures, and their applications to privacy protection.- Practical invisibility in digital communication.- Fractal based image steganography.- Echo hiding.- Tamper resistant software: an implementation.- Oblivious key escrow.- HMOS: Her Majesty's Orthography Service.- Information hiding terminology.

Ross Anderson

Papers

Why quantum computing is hard { and quantum cryptography is not provably secure

Protocol Analysis, Composability and Computation

Serpent and Smartcards

Protecting Embedded Systems - The Next Ten Years

Information Hiding: First International Workshop, Cambridge, U.K., May 30 - June 1, 1996. Proceedings