From the Publisher:
A valuable reference for the novice as well as for the expert who needs a wider scope of coverage within the area of cryptography, this book provides easy and rapid access of information and includes more than 200 algorithms and protocols; more than 200 tables and figures; more than 1,000 numbered definitions, facts, examples, notes, and remarks; and over 1,250 significant references, including brief comments on each paper.

Handbook of Applied Cryptography

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To solve the problem, wherein it is impossible for an electronic content information provider to provide commercially secure and effective method, for a configurable general-purpose electronic commercial transaction/distribution control system. SOLUTION: In this system, having at least one protected processing environment for safely controlling at least one portion of decoding of digital information, a secure content distribution method comprises a process for encapsulating digital information in one or more digital containers; a process for encrypting at least a portion of digital information; a process for associating at least partially secure control information for managing interactions with encrypted digital information and/or digital container; a process for delivering one or more digital containers to a digital information user; and a process for using a protected processing environment, for safely controlling at least a portion of the decoding of the digital information. COPYRIGHT: (C)2006,JPO&NCIPI

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a423264.pdf

Systems and Methods for Secure Transaction Management and Electronic Rights Protection

We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Random graphs

Cryptosystem designers frequently assume that secrets will be manipulated in closed, reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, actual computers and microchips leak information about the operations they process. This paper examines specific methods for analyzing power consumption measurements to find secret keys from tamper resistant devices. We also discuss approaches for building cryptosystems that can operate securely in existing hardware that leaks information.

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Differential Power Analysis

We study two families of error-correcting codes defined in terms of very sparse matrices "MN" (MacKay-Neal (1995)) codes are recently invented, and "Gallager codes" were first investigated in 1962, but appear to have been largely forgotten, in spite of their excellent properties The decoding of both codes can be tackled with a practical sum-product algorithm We prove that these codes are "very good", in that sequences of codes exist which, when optimally decoded, achieve information rates up to the Shannon limit This result holds not only for the binary-symmetric channel but also for any channel with symmetric stationary ergodic noise We give experimental results for binary-symmetric channels and Gaussian channels demonstrating that practical performance substantially better than that of standard convolutional and concatenated codes can be achieved; indeed, the performance of Gallager codes is almost as close to the Shannon limit as that of turbo codes

/pdf/good-error-correcting-codes-based-on-very-sparse-matrices-3kdz0lhhm4.pdf

Good error-correcting codes based on very sparse matrices

EMV is the dominant protocol used for smart card payments worldwide, with over 730 million cards in circulation. Known to bank customers as “Chip and PIN”, it is used in Europe; it is being introduced in Canada; and there is pressure from banks to introduce it in the USA too. EMV secures credit and debit card transactions by authenticating both the card and the customer presenting it through a combination of cryptographic authentication codes, digital signatures, and the entry of a PIN. In this paper we describe and demonstrate a protocol flaw which allows criminals to use a genuine card to make a payment without knowing the card’s PIN, and to remain undetected even when the merchant has an online connection to the banking network. The fraudster performs a man-in-the-middle attack to trick the terminal into believing the PIN verified correctly, while telling the card that no PIN was entered at all. The paper considers how the flaws arose, why they remained unknown despite EMV’s wide deployment for the best part of a decade, and how they might be fixed. Because we have found and validated a practical attack against the core functionality of EMV, we conclude that the protocol is broken. This failure is significant in the field of protocol design, and also has important public policy implications, in light of growing reports of fraud on stolen EMV cards. Frequently, banks deny such fraud victims a refund, asserting that a card cannot be used without the correct PIN, and concluding that the customer must be grossly negligent or lying. Our attack can explain a number of these cases, and exposes the need for further research to bridge the gap between the theoretical and practical security of bank payment systems. It also demonstrates the need for the next version of EMV to be engineered properly.

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Chip and PIN is Broken

Hidden copyright marks have been proposed as a solution for solving the illegal copying and proof of ownership problems in the context of multimedia objects. Many systems have been proposed, but it is still difficult to have even a rough idea of their performance and hence to compare them. So we first describe some general attacks on audio and image marking systems. Then we propose a benchmark to compare image marking software on a fair basis. This benchmark is based on a set of attacks that any system ought to survive.

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Evaluation of copyright marking systems

We demonstrate how 1-of-n encoded speed-independent circuits provide a good framework for constructing smart card functions that are resistant to side channel attacks and fault injection. A novel alarm propagation technique is also introduced. These techniques have been used to produce a prototype smart card chip: a 16-bit secure processor with Montgomery modular exponentiator and smart card UART.

/pdf/improving-smart-card-security-using-self-timed-circuits-34u321fnib.pdf

Improving smart card security using self-timed circuits

We present a number of attacks, some new, on public key protocols. We also advance a number of principles which may help designers avoid many of the pitfalls, and help attackers spot errors which can be exploited.

/pdf/robustness-principles-for-public-key-protocols-549m1zrf58.pdf

Robustness Principles for Public Key Protocols

We propose the first practical and secure way to integrate the iris biometric into cryptographic applications. A repeatable binary string, which we call a biometric key, is generated reliably from genuine iris codes. A well-known difficulty has been how to cope with the 10 to 20% of error bits within an iris code and derive an errorfree key. To solve this problem, we carefully studied the error patterns within iris codes, and devised a two-layer error correction technique that combines Hadamard and Reed-Solomon codes. The key is generated from a subject’s iris image with the aid of auxiliary error-correction data, which do not reveal the key, and can be saved in a tamper-resistant token such as a smart card. The reproduction of the key depends on two factors: the iris biometric and the token. The attacker has to procure both of them to compromise the key. We evaluated our technique using iris samples from 70 different eyes, with 10 samples from each eye. We found that an error-free key can be reproduced reliably from genuine iris codes with a 99.5% success rate. We can generate up to 140 bits of biometric key, more than enough for 128-bit AES. The extraction of a repeatable binary string from biometrics opens new possible applications, where a strong binding is required between a person and cryptographic operations. For example, it is possible to identify individuals without maintaining a central database of biometric templates, to which privacy objections might be raised.

/pdf/combining-cryptography-with-biometrics-effectively-182o3c6u6h.pdf

Ross Anderson

Papers

Chip and PIN is Broken

Evaluation of copyright marking systems

Improving smart card security using self-timed circuits

Robustness Principles for Public Key Protocols

Combining cryptography with biometrics effectively