R
Ross Anderson
Researcher at University of Cambridge
Publications - 292
Citations - 28411
Ross Anderson is an academic researcher from University of Cambridge. The author has contributed to research in topics: Smart card & Cryptography. The author has an hindex of 73, co-authored 278 publications receiving 27260 citations. Previous affiliations of Ross Anderson include Boston Children's Hospital & The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
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Book
Children's Databases - Safety and Privacy
TL;DR: In this article, the authors describe the policy background, the systems that are being built, the problems with them, and the legal situation in the UK, and conclude with three suggested regulatory action strategies for the Commissioner: one minimal strategy in which he tackles only the clear breaches of the law, one moderate strategy, which seeks to educate departments and agencies and guide them towards best practice, and finally a vigorous option in which they would seek to bring UK data protection practice in these areas more in line with normal practice in Europe, and indeed with our obligations under European law.
Book ChapterDOI
Security Protocols and Evidence: Where Many Payment Systems Fail
Steven J. Murdoch,Ross Anderson +1 more
TL;DR: It is shown how the EMV protocol – the dominant card payment system worldwide – does not produce adequate evidence for resolving disputes, and five principles for designing systems to produce robust evidence are proposed.
Book ChapterDOI
Authentication for Resilience: The Case of SDN
TL;DR: Software Defined Networks aim to deconstruct current routers into a small number of controllers, which are general purpose machines, and a large number of switches that contain programmable forwarding engines.
Journal ArticleDOI
Practical RSA trapdoor
TL;DR: The author shows an easy way to construct weak keys for RSA, and it appears to be hard to tell that these keys are weak without knowledge of a secret.
The Case for Serpent
TL;DR: Serpent should be chosen because it is the most secure of the AES finalists, not only does it have ample safety margin, but its simple structure enables us to be sure that none of the currently known attacks will work.