When public goods can only be provided when donations cross a minimum threshold, this creates an advantage in that Pareto Efficient outcomes can be Nash Equililibria. Despite this, experiments have shown that the groups struggle to coordinate on one of the many efficient equilibria. We apply a mechanism used successfully in continuous public goods games, the Hired Gun Mechanism (Andreoni and Gee, 2012), to see if it can successfully get subjects across the threshold. When we use the mechanism to eliminate only inefficient equilibria, without addressing coordination, there is a modest but statistically insignificant improvement with the mechanism. However, when we hone the mechanism to eliminate all but one of the provision-point equilibria, thereby addressing the coordination issue, the mechanism moves all subjects to the desired efficient outcome almost immediately. In fact, after only one round using the hired gun mechanism, all subject are coordinating on the chosen equilibrium. The mechanism can be applied in settings where a group (1) has a plan for public good provision, (2) can measure contributions, (3) can fine members and (4) has an agreed upon standard for expected contributions. In these settings simple punishments, when focused on solving coordination as well as free riding, can greatly improve efficiency.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2612965_code2406767.pdf?abstractid=2612965&mirid=1

Gunning for Efficiency with Third Party Enforcement in Threshold Public Goods

In a laboratory experiment we test the interaction effects of status and group identity on interpersonal trust. Natural group identity is generated by school affiliation. Status (expert or agent) is awarded based on relative performance in a math quiz that is ex ante less favorable to the subjects from one group. We find that "promoted" trustors (individuals from the disadvantaged group that nevertheless achieve the status of expert) trust less both in-group and out-group trustees, compared to the other members of their group. Rather than playing against the effects of natural group identity, status promotion singles-out individuals. In contrast, trustworthiness is not affected by status and there is no evidence that interacting with promoted individuals impacts trust or trustworthiness.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/193380/1/dp12086.pdf

The effects of status mobility and group identity on trust

In this study, the main goal is to determine the effects of the variable anodic oxidation process parameters on the hardness and wear properties of the AA7075-T6 alloy, which is widely used in the gun industry, automotive, aircraft, and space industry. Samples obtained using the process parameters designed by the Taguchi method were subjected to various experiments and the findings obtained from these experiments were compared with S/N graphs determined using ANOVA analysis. As a result of these findings, it was determined that different coating thickness, hardness and wear resistance were obtained by varying the anodic oxidation process parameters. The highest oxide layer thickness obtained was determined as 70.63 µm. In addition, the oxide layer formed by the anodic oxidation process has significantly increased the hardness and wear resistance of the AA 7075-T6 alloy. Also, as a result of the experiments and ANOVA analysis, it was determined that the oxide layer obtained with the parameters of 22V constant voltage, 1.3A/dm2 current density, 2°C temperature, 140 minutes of processing time will have the superior wear performance.

/pdf/determining-optimum-anodic-oxidation-parameters-for-hardness-3i6o6m5y91.pdf

Determining Optimum Anodic Oxidation Parameters for Hardness and Wear Properties of AA7075-T6 Alloys Using Taguchi Design

While considered as appealing for positive and normative reasons, anecdotal evidence suggests that upward social mobility may harm interpersonal interactions. We report on an experiment testing the effect of upward social mobility on interpersonal trust. Individuals are characterized both by a natural group identity and by a status awarded by means of relative performance in a task in which natural identities strongly predict performance. Upward mobility is characterized by the access to the high status of individuals belonging to the natural group associated with a lower expected performance. We find that socially mobile individuals trust less than those who are not socially mobile, especially when the trustee belongs to the same natural group. In contrast, upward mobility does not affect trustworthiness. We find no evidence that interacting with an upwardly mobile individual impacts trust or trustworthiness.

Does upward mobility harm trust

We study allocation behavior when outcome inequality is inevitable but a fair process is feasible, as in selecting one person from several candidates for a job or award. We show that allocators may be influenced by inappropriate criteria, impeding the implementation of a fair process. We study four interventions to induce process fairness without restricting the allocator’s decisions: Increasing the transparency of the allocation process; providing a private randomization device; allowing the allocator to delegate to a public randomization device; and allowing the allocator to avoid information on inappropriate criteria. All interventions except transparency have positive effects, but differ substantially in their impact.

Implementing (Un)fair Procedures? Favoritism and Process Fairness when Inequality is Inevitable

Social identity is embedded in social structures, generated by various social processes, and has multiple dimensions. We report ?ndings from a laboratory experiment eliciting two-dimensional social identities: a horizontal identity determined either randomly or by preferences and a vertical identity de?ned by income status and determined either by luck or performance. We also vary income gaps between vertical identity groups. Participants make redistributive allocation decisions between two others di¤ering in identity attributes. We ?nd robust evidence of in-group favoritism and that both the identity distance between the allocator and the in-group recipient and income gaps in?uence the degree of in-group favoritism.

Multidimensional Group Identity and Redistributive Allocation: An Experimental Study

We explore the robustness of the “hired-gun” mechanism proposed by Andreoni and Gee (2012) —a centralized punishment mechanism to promote the collective provision of public goods. In order to avoid the race to the bottom, the hired-gun mechanism relies on the use of the unilateral and tie punishment imposed on the lowest contributor(s). We examine the effectiveness of the hired-gun mechanism under varying sizes of the unilateral and tie punishment by theoretically deriving and experimentally testing a range of punishment parameters that would lead to full contribution. We show that, to some extent, the effectiveness of the mechanism depends on the size of both types of punishments. In particular, the lack of unilateral punishment renders the mechanism less effective.

/pdf/firing-the-right-bullets-exploring-the-effectiveness-of-the-1ylvhv8td1.pdf

Firing the right bullets: Exploring the effectiveness of the hired-gun mechanism in the provision of public goods

Social identity is embedded in social structures, generated by various social processes, and has multiple dimensions. We report findings from a laboratory experiment eliciting two-dimensional social identities: a horizontal identity determined either randomly or by preferences and a vertical identity defined by income status and determined either by luck or performance. We also vary income gaps between vertical identity groups. Participants make redistributive allocation decisions between two beneficiaries differing in identity attributes. We find robust evidence of in-group favoritism and that both the identity distance between the allocator and the in-group recipient and income gaps influence the degree of in-group favoritism.

Multidimensional social identity and redistributive preferences: an experimental study

This paper evaluates the role of centralized punishment in boosting contribution to the provision of public goods. To avoid the race to the bottom in the provision of public goods, this centralized punishment mechanism relies on the use of the unilateral and tie punishment imposed on the lowest contributor(s). In this paper, we aim to examine how severe this unilateral and tie punishment should be to achieve the full-contribution equilibrium. Specifically, we are interested in investigating the size of the “bullets” that the “hired gun” should carry. We theoretically derive a range of punishment mechanisms which would lead to full contribution and which are also experimentally tested. Our experimental results generally substantiate the theoretical prediction except for the more lenient punishment parameters. This discrepancy is successfully explained by individual evolutionary learning.

Ruike Zhang

Papers

Multidimensional Group Identity and Redistributive Allocation: An Experimental Study

Firing the right bullets: Exploring the effectiveness of the hired-gun mechanism in the provision of public goods

Multidimensional social identity and redistributive preferences: an experimental study

How Large Should the “Bullets” be? Dissecting the Role of Unilateral and Tie Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods