Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems

Supply chain collaboration: making sense of the strategy continuum

http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_578.pdf

Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

The theory of cooperative games provides a rich mathematical framework with which to understand the interactions between self-interested agents in settings where they can benefit from cooperation, and where binding agreements between agents can be made. Our aim in this talk is to describe the issues that arise when we consider cooperative game theory through a computational lens. We begin by introducing basic concepts from cooperative game theory, and in particular the key solution concepts: the core and the Shapley value. We then introduce the key issues that arise if one is to consider the cooperative games in a computational setting: in particular, the issue of representing games, and the computational complexity of cooperative solution concepts.

/pdf/computational-aspects-of-cooperative-game-theory-22sw4t9fz8.pdf

Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory

This paper investigates empirically the determinants of individuals' attitudes towards preventing environmental damage in Spain using data from the World Values Survey and European Values Survey for the periods 1990, 1995 and 1999/2000 Compared to many previous studies, we present a richer set of independent variables and found that strongly neglected variables such as political interest and social capital have a strong impact on individuals' preferences to prevent environmental damage An interesting aspect in our study is the ability to investigate environmental preferences over time The results show strong differences over time Finally, using disaggregated data for Spanish regions, we also find significant regional differences

/pdf/the-determinants-of-individuals-attitudes-towards-preventing-3ah20jksge.pdf

The Determinants of Individuals' Attitudes Towards Preventing Environmental Damage

This paper surveys the research area of cooperative games associated with several types of operations research problems in which various decision makers (players) are involved. Cooperating players not only face a joint optimisation problem in trying, e.g., to minimise total joint costs, but also face an additional allocation problem in how to distribute these joint costs back to the individual players. This interplay between optimisation and allocation is the main subject of the area of operations research games. It is surveyed on the basis of a distinction between the nature of the underlying optimisation problem: connection, routing, scheduling, production and inventory.

/pdf/operations-research-games-a-survey-5dlw41nghi.pdf

Operations Research Games: a Survey

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. It turns out that the first domain restriction guarantees non-emptiness of the strong core and the second domain restriction ensures non-emptiness of the weak core of the corresponding hedonic games. Moreover, an element of the strong core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the weak core under enemies aversion is NP-hard. We examine also the relationship between our domain restrictions and some sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core already known in the literature.

Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games

In this paper we present an axiomatic analysis of several ranking methods for general tournaments. We find that the ranking method obtained by applying maximum likelihood to the (Zermelo-)Bradley-Terry model, the most common method in statistics and psychology, is one of the ranking methods that perform best with respect to the set of properties under consideration. A less known ranking method, generalised row sum, performs well too. We also study, among others, the fair bets ranking method, widely studied in social choice, and the least squares method.

Paired comparisons analysis: an axiomatic approach to ranking methods

In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. We characterize internally stable coalitions on the proposed domains and show how these characterizations can be used for generating a strict core element in the first case and a core element in the second case. Moreover, we prove that an element of the strict core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the core under enemies aversion is NP-hard.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/117928/1/NDL2004-051.pdf

Ruud Hendrickx

Papers

Operations Research Games: a Survey

Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games

Paired comparisons analysis: an axiomatic approach to ranking methods

Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games

Multi-issue allocation situations