Simple priorities and core stability in hedonic games
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In this paper, the authors study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy, and propose two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies.Abstract:
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend or as an enemy. Two simple priority criteria for comparison of coalitions are suggested, and the corresponding preference restrictions based on appreciation of friends and aversion to enemies are considered. We characterize internally stable coalitions on the proposed domains and show how these characterizations can be used for generating a strict core element in the first case and a core element in the second case. Moreover, we prove that an element of the strict core under friends appreciation can be found in polynomial time, while finding an element of the core under enemies aversion is NP-hard.read more
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Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory
TL;DR: This talk introduces basic concepts from cooperative game theory, and in particular the key solution concepts: the core and the Shapley value, and introduces the key issues that arise if one is to consider the cooperative games in a computational setting.
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Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic games
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Fractional hedonic games
TL;DR: In this article, the utility of a player in a coalition structure is the average value he ascribes to the members of his coalition, and a number of conditions under which the core of fractional hedonic games is non-empty and algorithms for computing a core stable outcome are proposed.
References
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Depth-First Search and Linear Graph Algorithms
TL;DR: The value of depth-first search or “backtracking” as a technique for solving problems is illustrated by two examples of an improved version of an algorithm for finding the strongly connected components of a directed graph.
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The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
TL;DR: This work considers the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings, and shows that if coalitions can be ordered according to some characteristic over which players have single-peaked preferences, then there exists an individually stable coalition partition.
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The Core of an N Person Game
TL;DR: In this paper, the core of the n-person game is defined as those utility vectors which are feasible for the entire group of players and which can be blocked by no coalition.
Journal ArticleDOI
Core in a Simple Coalition Formation Game
TL;DR: The core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition is analyzed, and two top-coalition properties each of which guarantee the existence of a core allocation are introduced.
Journal ArticleDOI
Hedonic coalitions: optimality and stability
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors studied the stability of coalitions in a cooperative game with hedonic coalitions and showed that transfers among coalitions may be necessary to attain Pareto optimality.