S
Santiago Zanella-Béguelin
Researcher at Microsoft
Publications - 32
Citations - 2391
Santiago Zanella-Béguelin is an academic researcher from Microsoft. The author has contributed to research in topics: Cryptography & Hash function. The author has an hindex of 17, co-authored 31 publications receiving 1983 citations. Previous affiliations of Santiago Zanella-Béguelin include Johns Hopkins University.
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Formal Verification of Smart Contracts: Short Paper
Karthikeyan Bhargavan,Antoine Delignat-Lavaud,Cédric Fournet,Anitha Gollamudi,Georges Gonthier,Nadim Kobeissi,Natalia Kulatova,Aseem Rastogi,Thomas Sibut-Pinote,Nikhil Swamy,Santiago Zanella-Béguelin +10 more
TL;DR: This paper outlines a framework to analyze and verify both the runtime safety and the functional correctness of Ethereum contracts by translation to F*, a functional programming language aimed at program verification.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice
David Adrian,Karthikeyan Bhargavan,Zakir Durumeric,Pierrick Gaudry,Matthew Green,J. Alex Halderman,Nadia Heninger,Drew Springall,Emmanuel Thomé,Luke Valenta,Benjamin VanderSloot,Eric Wustrow,Santiago Zanella-Béguelin,Paul Zimmermann +13 more
TL;DR: Logjam, a novel flaw in TLS that lets a man-in-the-middle downgrade connections to "export-grade" Diffie-Hellman, is presented and a close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency's attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved a break.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Dependent types and multi-monadic effects in F*
Nikhil Swamy,Cătălin Hriţcu,Chantal Keller,Aseem Rastogi,Antoine Delignat-Lavaud,Simon Forest,Karthikeyan Bhargavan,Cédric Fournet,Pierre-Yves Strub,Markulf Kohlweiss,Jean Karim Zinzindohoue,Santiago Zanella-Béguelin +11 more
TL;DR: A new, completely redesigned, version of F*, a language that works both as a proof assistant as well as a general-purpose, verification-oriented, effectful programming language that confirms F*'s pay-as-you-go cost model.
Journal ArticleDOI
Probabilistic Relational Reasoning for Differential Privacy
TL;DR: The central component of CertiPriv is a quantitative extension of probabilistic relational Hoare logic that enables one to derive differential privacy guarantees for programs from first principles, and provides the first machine-checked proofs of correctness of the Laplacian, Gaussian, and exponential mechanisms and of the privacy of randomized and streaming algorithms from the literature.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Probabilistic relational verification for cryptographic implementations
Gilles Barthe,Cédric Fournet,Benjamin Grégoire,Pierre-Yves Strub,Nikhil Swamy,Santiago Zanella-Béguelin +5 more
TL;DR: RF*, a relational extension of F*, a general-purpose higher-order stateful programming language with a verification system based on refinement types, is presented, which is a relational Hoare logic for a higher- order, stateful, probabilistic language.