Santiago Zanella-Béguelin

TL;DR: This paper outlines a framework to analyze and verify both the runtime safety and the functional correctness of Ethereum contracts by translation to F*, a functional programming language aimed at program verification.

TL;DR: Logjam, a novel flaw in TLS that lets a man-in-the-middle downgrade connections to "export-grade" Diffie-Hellman, is presented and a close reading of published NSA leaks shows that the agency's attacks on VPNs are consistent with having achieved a break.

TL;DR: A new, completely redesigned, version of F*, a language that works both as a proof assistant as well as a general-purpose, verification-oriented, effectful programming language that confirms F*'s pay-as-you-go cost model.

TL;DR: The central component of CertiPriv is a quantitative extension of probabilistic relational Hoare logic that enables one to derive differential privacy guarantees for programs from first principles, and provides the first machine-checked proofs of correctness of the Laplacian, Gaussian, and exponential mechanisms and of the privacy of randomized and streaming algorithms from the literature.

TL;DR: RF*, a relational extension of F*, a general-purpose higher-order stateful programming language with a verification system based on refinement types, is presented, which is a relational Hoare logic for a higher- order, stateful, probabilistic language.