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Shmuel S. Oren

Researcher at University of California, Berkeley

Publications -  253
Citations -  12716

Shmuel S. Oren is an academic researcher from University of California, Berkeley. The author has contributed to research in topics: Electricity market & Electric power industry. The author has an hindex of 57, co-authored 247 publications receiving 11721 citations. Previous affiliations of Shmuel S. Oren include University of California & Tsinghua University.

Papers
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Reserve Requirements for Wind Power Integration: A Scenario-Based Stochastic Programming Framework

TL;DR: A two-stage stochastic programming model for committing reserves in systems with large amounts of wind power outperforms common reserve rules and is tested on a model of California consisting of 122 generators.
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Optimal Transmission Switching With Contingency Analysis

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the N-1 reliable dc optimal dispatch with transmission switching and demonstrate that these networks can be operated to satisfy N 1 standards while cutting costs by incorporating transmission switching into the dispatch.
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Co-Optimization of Generation Unit Commitment and Transmission Switching With N-1 Reliability

TL;DR: This paper presents a co-optimization formulation of the generation unit commitment and transmission switching problem while ensuring N-1 reliability, and shows that the optimal topology of the network can vary from hour to hour.
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Distribution Locational Marginal Pricing for Optimal Electric Vehicle Charging Management

TL;DR: In this paper, an integrated distribution locational marginal pricing (DLMP) method designed to alleviate congestion induced by electric vehicle (EV) loads in future power systems is presented, which considers EV aggregators as price takers in local DSO market and demand price elasticity.
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Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation

TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a non-cooperative game where the patentee acts as a Stackelberg leader selecting a licensing strategy by taking into account the reaction and competitive interaction of the firms.