The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

The theory of precautionary saving is shown in this paper to be isomorphic to the Arrow-Pratt theory of risk aversion, making possible the application of a large body of knowledge about risk aversion to precautionary saving, and more generally, to the theory of optimal choice under risk In particular, a measure of the strength of precautionary saving motive analogous to the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion is used to establish a number of new propositions about precautionary saving, and to give a new interpretation of the Oreze-Modigliani substitution effect

Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large

Handbook of the Economics of Finance

Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology

Typical value-at-risk (VaR) calculations involve the probabilities of extreme dollar losses, based on the statistical distributions of market prices. Such quantities do not account for the fact that the same dollar loss can have two very different economic valuations, depending on business conditions. We propose a nonparametric VaR measure that incorporates economic valuation according to the state-price density associated with the underlying price processes. The state-price density yields VaR values that are adjusted for risk aversion, time preferences, and other variations in economic valuation. In the context of a representative agent equilibrium model, we construct an estimator of the risk-aversion coefficient that is implied by the joint observations on the cross-section of option prices and time-series of underlying asset values.

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Non-Parametric Risk Management and Implied Risk Aversion

Financial development and economic growth: Recent evidence from China

Staged financing in venture capital: moral hazard and risks

This paper investigates the determinants of cross-border venture capital (VC) performance in the Chinese VC market. We focus on the impact of foreign VC firms' (VCs') human capital and domestic entrepreneurs' experience on the performance of both VC investments and portfolio companies using logit and Cox hazard models. After controlling for portfolio company quality, domestic VC industry development, domestic exit conditions and a number of other factors, little correlation was evident between VC performance and foreign VCs' human capital, such as experience, networks and reputation. In contrast, the domestic entrepreneurs' experience is crucial to VC performance. In particular, if an entrepreneur has more general experience in terms of the number of companies previously worked for or more special experience in terms of the number of companies previously served as a CEO or top manager, a portfolio company is more likely to pull off a successful exit through IPO or M&A, and the VCs are also likely to shorten their investment duration in the portfolio company.

Cross-border venture capital performance: Evidence from China

We investigate the determinants of cross-border venture capital (VC) performance using a large sample of 10,205 cross-border VC investments by 1,906 foreign VC firms (VCs) in 6,535 domestic portfolio companies. We focus on the impact of a domestic country’s economic freedom on the performance of both VC investments and portfolio companies using a probit model and the Cox hazard model. After controlling for other related factors of domestic countries, portfolio companies, VCs and the global VC market, as well as year and industry fixed effects, we find that a domestic country’s economic freedom is crucial to cross-border VC performance. In particular, in a more economically free country, as measured by the raw values of, quartiles of or the ranking in the index of economic freedom (IEF), a foreign VC-backed portfolio company is more likely to pull off a successful exit through an IPO (initial public offering) or an M&A (merger and acquisition), and a foreign VC firm is likely to spend a shorter investment duration in the portfolio company. We also identify interesting evidence on the impact of many other level factors of domestic countries, portfolio companies, VCs and the global VC market on cross-border VC performance.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2645313_code28090.pdf?abstractid=2645313&mirid=5

Susheng Wang

Papers

Financial development and economic growth: Recent evidence from China

Staged financing in venture capital: moral hazard and risks

Cross-border venture capital performance: Evidence from China

Economic Freedom and Cross-Border Venture Capital Performance

Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard*