scispace - formally typeset
T

Thomas Espitau

Researcher at Pierre-and-Marie-Curie University

Publications -  43
Citations -  656

Thomas Espitau is an academic researcher from Pierre-and-Marie-Curie University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Probabilistic logic & Cryptography. The author has an hindex of 12, co-authored 42 publications receiving 450 citations. Previous affiliations of Thomas Espitau include Centre national de la recherche scientifique & University of Paris.

Papers
More filters
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Side-Channel Attacks on BLISS Lattice-Based Signatures: Exploiting Branch Tracing against strongSwan and Electromagnetic Emanations in Microcontrollers

TL;DR: This paper investigates the security of the BLISS lattice-based signature scheme, one of the most promising candidates for postquantum-secure signatures, against side-channel attacks, and shows that a single execution of the strongSwan signature algorithm is actually sufficient for full key recovery.
Book ChapterDOI

Synthesizing Probabilistic Invariants via Doob’s Decomposition

TL;DR: In this paper, an approach is proposed to find a martingale, an expression on the program variables whose expectation remains invariant, and then apply the optional stopping theorem in order to infer properties at termination time.
Book ChapterDOI

Loop-Abort Faults on Lattice-Based Fiat-Shamir and Hash-and-Sign Signatures

TL;DR: This work focuses on the implementation security issues related to postquantum schemes and their applications in e-commerce, e.g. the supply and demand for identity protection in the e-sports industry.
Book ChapterDOI

LWE Without Modular Reduction and Improved Side-Channel Attacks Against BLISS

TL;DR: The variant of Regev’s learning with errors (LWE) problem in which modular reduction is omitted is analyzed, and it is shown that the problem can be solved efficiently as long as the variance of e is not superpolynomially larger than that of \(\mathbf { a}\).
Proceedings ArticleDOI

GALACTICS: Gaussian Sampling for Lattice-Based Constant- Time Implementation of Cryptographic Signatures, Revisited

TL;DR: In this article, a constant-time implementation of the BLISS lattice-based signature scheme is proposed, with complete timing attack protection, achieving the same level of efficiency as the original unprotected code, without resorting on floating point arithmetic or platform-specific optimizations like AVX intrinsics.