A system and method for securely streaming encrypted digital media content out of a digital container to a user's media player. This streaming occurs after the digital container has been delivered to the user's machine and after the user has been authorized to access the encrypted content. The user's operating system and media player treat the data stream as if it were a being delivered over the Internet (or other network) from a streaming web server. However, no Internet connection is required after the container has been delivered to the user and the data stream suffers no quality loss due to network traffic or web server access problems. In this process of the invention, the encrypted content files are decrypted and fed to the user's media player in real time and are never written to the user's hard drive or storage device. This process makes unauthorized copying of the digital content contained in the digital container virtually impossible.

Secure streaming container

Im Jahre 1977 wurde der „Data Encryption Algorithm“ (DEA) vom „National Bureau of Standards“ (NBS, später „National Institute of Standards and Technology“ – NIST) zum amerikanischen Verschlüsselungsstandard für Bundesbehörden erklärt [NBS_77]. 1981 folgte die Verabschiedung der DEA-Spezifikation als ANSI-Standard „DES“ [ANSI_81]. Die Empfehlung des DES als StandardVerschlüsselungsverfahren wurde auf fünf Jahre befristet und 1983, 1988 und 1993 um jeweils weitere fünf Jahre verlängert. Derzeit liegt eine Neufassung des NISTStandards vor [NIST_99], in dem der DES für weitere fünf Jahre übergangsweise zugelassen sein soll, aber die Verwendung von Triple-DES empfohlen wird: eine dreifache Anwendung des DES mit drei verschiedenen Schlüsseln (effektive Schlüssellänge: 168 bit) [NIST_99]. Der DES basiert auf einer von Horst Feistel bei IBM entwickelten Blockchiffre („Lucipher“) mit einer Schlüssellänge von 128 bit. Da die amerikanische „National Security Agency“ (NSA) dafür gesorgt hatte, daß der DES eine Schlüssellänge von lediglich 64 bit besitzt, von denen nur 56 bit relevant sind, und spezielle Substitutionsboxen (den „kryptographischen Kern“ des Verfahrens) erhielt, deren Konstruktionskriterien von der NSA nicht veröffentlicht wurden, war das Verfahren von Beginn an umstritten. Kritiker nahmen an, daß es eine geheime „Trapdoor“ in dem Verfahren gäbe, die der NSA eine OnlineEntschlüsselung auch ohne Kenntnis des Schlüssels erlauben würde. Zwar ließ sich dieser Verdacht nicht erhärten, aber sowohl die Zunahme von Rechenleistung als auch die Parallelisierung von Suchalgorithmen machen heute eine Schlüssellänge von 56 bit zum Sicherheitsrisiko. Zuletzt konnte 1998 mit einer von der „Electronic Frontier Foundation“ (EFF) entwickelten Spezialmaschine mit 1.800 parallel arbeitenden, eigens entwickelten Krypto-Prozessoren ein DES-Schlüssel in einer Rekordzeit von 2,5 Tagen gefunden werden. Um einen Nachfolger für den DES zu finden, kündigte das NIST am 2. Januar 1997 die Suche nach einem „Advanced Encryption Standard“ (AES) an. Ziel dieser Initiative ist, in enger Kooperation mit Forschung und Industrie ein symmetrisches Verschlüsselungsverfahren zu finden, das geeignet ist, bis weit ins 21. Jahrhundert hinein amerikanische Behördendaten wirkungsvoll zu verschlüsseln. Dazu wurde am 12. September 1997 ein offizieller „Call for Algorithm“ ausgeschrieben. An die vorzuschlagenden symmetrischen Verschlüsselungsalgorithmen wurden die folgenden Anforderungen gestellt: nicht-klassifiziert und veröffentlicht, weltweit lizenzfrei verfügbar, effizient implementierbar in Hardund Software, Blockchiffren mit einer Blocklänge von 128 bit sowie Schlüssellängen von 128, 192 und 256 bit unterstützt. Auf der ersten „AES Candidate Conference“ (AES1) veröffentlichte das NIST am 20. August 1998 eine Liste von 15 vorgeschlagenen Algorithmen und forderte die Fachöffentlichkeit zu deren Analyse auf. Die Ergebnisse wurden auf der zweiten „AES Candidate Conference“ (22.-23. März 1999 in Rom, AES2) vorgestellt und unter internationalen Kryptologen diskutiert. Die Kommentierungsphase endete am 15. April 1999. Auf der Basis der eingegangenen Kommentare und Analysen wählte das NIST fünf Kandidaten aus, die es am 9. August 1999 öffentlich bekanntmachte: MARS (IBM) RC6 (RSA Lab.) Rijndael (Daemen, Rijmen) Serpent (Anderson, Biham, Knudsen) Twofish (Schneier, Kelsey, Whiting, Wagner, Hall, Ferguson).

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).

Technologies are disclosed to transfer responsibility and control over security from player makers to content authors by enabling integration of security logic and content. An exemplary optical disc carries an encrypted digital video title combined with data processing operations that implement the title's security policies and decryption processes. Player devices include a processing environment (e.g., a real-time virtual machine), which plays content by interpreting its processing operations. Players also provide procedure calls to enable content code to load data from media, perform network communications, determine playback environment configurations, access secure nonvolatile storage, submit data to CODECs for output, and/or perform cryptographic operations. Content can insert forensic watermarks in decoded output for tracing pirate copies. If pirates compromise a player or title, future content can be mastered with security features that, for example, block the attack, revoke pirated media, or use native code to correct player vulnerabilities.

Reprogrammable security for controlling piracy and enabling interactive content

Internet of Things (IoT), also referred to as the Internet of Objects, is envisioned as a transformative approach for providing numerous services. Compact smart devices constitute an essential part of IoT. They range widely in use, size, energy capacity, and computation power. However, the integration of these smart things into the standard Internet introduces several security challenges because the majority of Internet technologies and communication protocols were not designed to support IoT. Moreover, commercialization of IoT has led to public security concerns, including personal privacy issues, threat of cyber attacks, and organized crime. In order to provide a guideline for those who want to investigate IoT security and contribute to its improvement, this survey attempts to provide a comprehensive list of vulnerabilities and countermeasures against them on the edge-side layer of IoT, which consists of three levels: (i) edge nodes, (ii) communication, and (iii) edge computing. To achieve this goal, we first briefly describe three widely-known IoT reference models and define security in the context of IoT. Second, we discuss the possible applications of IoT and potential motivations of the attackers who target this new paradigm. Third, we discuss different attacks and threats. Fourth, we describe possible countermeasures against these attacks. Finally, we introduce two emerging security challenges not yet explained in detail in previous literature.

A Comprehensive Study of Security of Internet-of-Things

This paper presents a block cipher that is optimized with respect to latency when implemented in hardware. Such ciphers are desirable for many future pervasive applications with real-time security needs. Our cipher, named PRINCE, allows encryption of data within one clock cycle with a very competitive chip area compared to known solutions. The fully unrolled fashion in which such algorithms need to be implemented calls for innovative design choices. The number of rounds must be moderate and rounds must have short delays in hardware. At the same time, the traditional need that a cipher has to be iterative with very similar round functions disappears, an observation that increases the design space for the algorithm. An important further requirement is that realizing decryption and encryption results in minimum additional costs. PRINCE is designed in such a way that the overhead for decryption on top of encryption is negligible. More precisely for our cipher it holds that decryption for one key corresponds to encryption with a related key. This property we refer to as α-reflection is of independent interest and we prove its soundness against generic attacks.

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PRINCE: a low-latency block cipher for pervasive computing applications

We propose a new 64-bit blockcipher Piccolo supporting 80 and 128-bit keys Adopting several novel design and implementation techniques, Piccolo achieves both high security and notably compact implementation in hardware We show that Piccolo offers a sufficient security level against known analyses including recent related-key differential attacks and meet-in-the-middle attacks In our smallest implementation, the hardware requirements for the 80 and the 128-bit key mode are only 683 and 758 gate equivalents, respectively Moreover, Piccolo requires only 60 additional gate equivalents to support the decryption function due to its involution structure Furthermore, its efficiency on the energy consumption which is evaluated by energy per bit is also remarkable Thus, Piccolo is one of the competitive ultra-lightweight blockciphers which are suitable for extremely constrained environments such as RFID tags and sensor nodes

/pdf/piccolo-an-ultra-lightweight-blockcipher-1vh23tr717.pdf

Piccolo: an ultra-lightweight blockcipher

We propose a new 128-bit blockcipher CLEFIA supporting key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits, which is compatible with AES. CLEFIA achieves enough immunity against known attacks and flexibility for efficient implementation in both hardware and software by adopting several novel and state-of-the-art design techniques. CLEFIA achieves a good performance profile both in hardware and software. In hardware using a 0.09 μm CMOS ASIC library, about 1.60 Gbps with less than 6 Kgates, and in software, about 13 cycles/byte, 1.48 Gbps on 2.4 GHz AMD Athlon 64 is achieved. CLEFIA is a highly efficient blockcipher, especially in hardware.

/pdf/the-128-bit-blockcipher-clefia-extended-abstract-488t7elast.pdf

The 128-Bit Blockcipher CLEFIA (Extended Abstract)

In the past few years, lightweight cryptography has become a popular research discipline with a number of ciphers and hash functions proposed. The designers' focus has been predominantly to minimize the hardware area, while other goals such as low latency have been addressed rather recently only. However, the optimization goal of low energy for block cipher design has not been explicitly addressed so far. At the same time, it is a crucial measure of goodness for an algorithm. Indeed, a cipher optimized with respect to energy has wide applications, especially in constrained environments running on a tight power/energy budget such as medical implants.

This paper presents the block cipher Midorii¾?The name of the cipher is the Japanese translation for the word Green. that is optimized with respect to the energy consumed by the circuit per bt in encryption or decryption operation. We deliberate on the design choices that lead to low energy consumption in an electrical circuit, and try to optimize each component of the circuit as well as its entire architecture for energy. An added motivation is to make both encryption and decryption functionalities available by small tweak in the circuit that would not incur significant area or energy overheads. We propose two energy-efficient block ciphers Midori128i¾?and Midori64i¾?with block sizes equal to 128 and 64 bits respectively. These ciphers have the added property that a circuit that provides both the functionalities of encryption and decryption can be designed with very little overhead in terms of area and energy. We compare our results with other ciphers with similar characteristics: it was found that the energy consumptions ofi¾?Midori64i¾? and Midori128i¾? are by far better when compared ciphers like PRINCE and NOEKEON.

/pdf/midori-a-block-cipher-for-low-energy-1zpmlxg3mn.pdf

Midori: A Block Cipher for Low Energy

We propose a new 128-bit blockcipher CLEFIA supporting key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits, which is compatible with AES. CLEFIA achieves enough immunity against known attacks and flexibility for efficient implementation in both hardware and software by adopting several novel and state-of-the-art design techniques. CLEFIA achieves a good performance profile both in hardware and software. In hardware using a 0.09 µm CMOS ASIC library, about 1.60 Gbps with less than 6 Kgates, and in software, about 13 cycles/byte, 1.48 Gbps on 2.4 GHz AMD Athlon 64 is achieved. CLEFIA is a highly efficient blockcipher, especially in hardware.

/pdf/the-128-bit-blockcipher-clefia-3e48jy11b8.pdf

The 128-bit blockcipher CLEFIA

The differential power analysis (DPA) might break the implementation of elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) on memory constraint devices. Goubin proposed a variant of DPA using the point (0, y), which is not randomized in Jacobian coordinates or in the isomorphic class. This point often exists in the standard curves, and we have to care this attack. In this paper, we propose the zero-value point attack as an extension of Goubin's attack. Note that even if a point has no zero-value coordinate, the auxiliary registers might take zero-value. We investigate these zero-value registers that cannot be randomized by the above randomization. Indeed, we have found several points P = (x,y) which cause the zero-value registers, e.g., (1)3x 2 + a = 0, (2)5x 4 + 2ax 2 - 4bx + a 2 = 0, (3)P is y-coordinate self-collision point, etc. We demonstrate the standard curves that have these points. Interestingly, some conditions required for the zero-value attack depend on the explicit implementation of the addition formula - in order to resist this type of attacks, we have to care how to implement the addition formula. Finally, we note that Goubin's attack and the proposed attack assume that the base point P can be chosen by the attacker and the secret scalar d is fixed, so that they are not applicable to ECDSA signature generation.

Toru Akishita

Papers

Piccolo: an ultra-lightweight blockcipher

The 128-Bit Blockcipher CLEFIA (Extended Abstract)

Midori: A Block Cipher for Low Energy

The 128-bit blockcipher CLEFIA

Zero-value point attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystem