http://rcer.econ.rochester.edu/RCERPAPERS/rcer_578.pdf

Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: an update

The paper proposes two axioms that capture the idea of sustainable development and derives the welfare criterion that they imply. The axioms require that neither the present nor the future should play a dictatorial role. Theorem 1 shows there exist sustainable preferences, which satisfy these axioms. They exhibit sensitivity to the present and to the long-run future, and specify trade-offs between them. It examines other welfare criteria which are generally utilized: discounted utility, lim inf. long run averages, overtaking and catching-up criteria, Ramsey's criterion, Rawlsian rules, and the criterion of satisfaction of basic needs, and finds that none satisfies the axioms for sustainability. Theorem 2 gives a characterization of all continuous independent sustainable preferences. Theorem 3 shows that in general sustainable growth paths cannot be approximated by paths which approximate discounted optima. Proposition 1 shows that paths which maximize the present value under a standard price system may fail to reach optimal sustainable welfare levels, and Example 4 that the two criteria can give rise to different value systems.

An axiomatic approach to sustainable development

This paper investigates the role of parking lots in improving the reliability of renewable-based distribution systems, through provision of vehicle-to-grid (V2G) programs during outage events. In this regard, municipal parking decks are viewed as distributed energy storage systems and the amount of available energy from these units in random contingency events is probabilistically modeled for reliability studies. Appropriate stochastic models are also introduced to capture the volatility and intermittency of renewable sources. Moreover, it is discussed that how the adopted outage management scheme (OMS) in contingency events can affect the reliability level of customers. In response, several OMSs on the basis of bankruptcy problem are proposed to fairly distribute the available resources among different microgrids/sections, once a failure occurs in the system. Subsequently, a general framework based on the non-sequential Monte Carlo simulation method is developed to evaluate different customers and system reliability indices in presence of emergency V2G programs. The effectiveness of the proposed framework is validated through implementation on a test system and several case studies are presented. The results suggest that realization of V2G programs offered by EV parking lots, accompanied by an appropriate OMS, can significantly enhance the reliability of supply in modern distribution networks.

Reliability Studies of Modern Distribution Systems Integrated With Renewable Generation and Parking Lots

Multi-issue allocation situations

A deterministic server is shared by users with identical linear waiting costs, requesting jobs of arbitrary lengths. Shortest jobs are served first for efficiency. The server can monitor the length of a job but not the identity of the job's user, thus merging, splitting, or partially transferring jobs offer cooperative strategic opportunities. Can we design cash transfers to neutralize such manipulations? We prove that mergeproofness and splitproofness are not compatible, and that it is similarly impossible to prevent all transfers of jobs involving three or more agents. On the other hand, robustness against pairwise transfers is feasible and essentially characterizes a one-dimensional set of scheduling methods. This line is borne by two outstanding methods: the merge-proof S+ and the split-proof S-. Splitproofness, unlike mergeproofness, is not compatible with several simple tests of equity. Thus, the two properties are far from equally demanding.

/pdf/on-scheduling-fees-to-prevent-merging-splitting-and-4zt8qzwk14.pdf

On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs

http://www2.kobe-u.ac.jp/~emiya437/papers/JuMiyagawaSakai2005Aug.pdf

Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations

Auction theory usually assumes the quasi-linearity of individual preferences. We drop this assumption and define an extension of second price mechanisms that applies to general preferences. It turns out that the extended second price mechanisms are the only rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and a mild non-imposition property. Their definition is simple just as much as the definition of usual second price mechanisms: everyone reports his maximum willingness to pay and the bidder whose reported value is highest buys the auctioned object for the price equal to the second highest reported value. The characterization is valid if efficiency is replaced by envy-freeness.

Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations

This paper examines the existence of equitable preferences on intergenerational consumption paths in an infinite horizon setting. There are two ethical considerations that capture the concept of intergenerational equity: inequality aversion in allocations and equality in treating generations. They are embodied in the Pigou–Dalton principle and anonymity, respectively. We investigate the existence of binary relations that satisfy these two axioms, as well as other standard axioms, such as monotonicity, transitivity, or continuity, on various domains. We show that any domain admitting such a binary relation is quite restricted: its interior is empty and contains no sustainable consumption path.

Equitable Intergenerational Preferences on Restricted Domains

A waste disposal facility has to be sited in one of several districts producing different amounts of waste. The construction cost of the facility depends on where it is sited. When a district accepts the facility, it bears a disutility. The problem here is to choose a siting district and to share the construction cost while considering fair compensation for the siting district. We provide an axiomatic framework to analyze this problem and seek normatively desirable and practical decision rules. A fair pricing rule is one that selects a district so as to minimize the social loss, applies a negative price to waste according to the social loss involved, and provides full compensation to the siting district. We show that this rule is a unique rule that satisfies certain requirements of efficiency, fairness, and robustness regarding the strategic transfers of waste. We then establish the nearly robustness of this rule to the misrepresentation of disutility information.

/pdf/fair-waste-pricing-an-axiomatic-analysis-to-the-nimby-1mt8gh2qyd.pdf

Toyotaka Sakai

Papers

Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations

Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations

Equitable Intergenerational Preferences on Restricted Domains

Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem

Secure implementation in allotment economies