The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex "Frontal Lobe" tasks: a latent variable analysis.

Co-Planar Stereotaxic Atlas of the Human Brain—3-Dimensional Proportional System: An Approach to Cerebral Imaging, J. Talairach, P. Tournoux. Georg Thieme Verlag, New York (1988), 122 pp., 130 figs. DM 268

Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) comprises a deficit in behavioral inhibition. A theoretical model is constructed that links inhibition to 4 executive neuropsychological functions that appear to depend on it for their effective execution: (a) working memory, (b) self-regulation of affect-motivation-arousal, (c) internalization of speech, and (d) reconstitution (behavioral analysis and synthesis). Extended to ADHD, the model predicts that ADHD should be associated with secondary impairments in these 4 executive abilities and the motor control they afford. The author reviews evidence for each of these domains of functioning and finds it to be strongest for deficits in behavioral inhibition, working memory, regulation of motivation, and motor control in those with ADHD. Although the model is promising as a potential theory of self-control and ADHD, far more research is required to evaluate its merits and the many predictions it makes about ADHD.

/pdf/behavioral-inhibition-sustained-attention-and-executive-3s4ta68l66.pdf

Behavioral inhibition, sustained attention, and executive functions: Constructing a unifying theory of ADHD.

This article reviews a diverse set of proposals for dual processing in higher cognition within largely disconnected literatures in cognitive and social psychology. All these theories have in common the distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and conscious. A number of authors have recently suggested that there may be two architecturally (and evolutionarily) distinct cognitive systems underlying these dual-process accounts. However, it emerges that (a) there are multiple kinds of implicit processes described by different theorists and (b) not all of the proposed attributes of the two kinds of processing can be sensibly mapped on to two systems as currently conceived. It is suggested that while some dual-process theories are concerned with parallel competing processes involving explicit and implicit knowledge systems, others are concerned with the influence of preconscious processes that contextualize and shape deliberative reasoning and decision-making.

/pdf/dual-processing-accounts-of-reasoning-judgment-and-social-118hw7hde7.pdf

Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition

Social interaction is a cornerstone of human life, yet the neural mechanisms underlying social cognition are poorly understood. Recently, research that integrates approaches from neuroscience and social psychology has begun to shed light on these processes, and converging evidence from neuroimaging studies suggests a unique role for the medial frontal cortex. We review the emerging literature that relates social cognition to the medial frontal cortex and, on the basis of anatomical and functional characteristics of this brain region, propose a theoretical model of medial frontal cortical function relevant to different aspects of social cognitive processing.

http://people.uncw.edu/tothj/PSY595/Amodio-Social%20Cognition-NRN-2006.pdf

Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social cognition.

Much of the cognitive lies beyond articulate, discursive thought, beyond the reach of current computational notions In Sketches of Thought, Vinod Goel argues that the cognitive computational conception of the world requires our thought processes to be precise, rigid, discrete, and unambiguous; yet there are dense, ambiguous, and amorphous symbol systems, like sketching, painting, and poetry, found in the arts and much of everyday discourse that have an important, nontrivial place in cognition Goel maintains that while on occasion our thoughts do conform to the current computational theory of mind, they often are -- indeed must be - vague, fluid, ambiguous, and amorphous He argues that if cognitive science takes the classical computational story seriously, it must deny or ignore these processes, or at least relegate them to the realm of the nonmental As a cognitive scientist with a design background, Goel is in a unique position to challenge cognitive science on its own territory He introduces design problem solving as a domain of cognition that illustrates these inarticulate, nondiscursive thought processes at work through the symbol system of sketching He argues not that such thoughts must remain noncomputational but that our current notions of computation and representation are not rich enough to capture them Along the way, Goel makes a number of significant and controversial interim points He shows that there is a principled distinction between design and nondesign problems, that there are standard stages in the solution of design problems, that these stages correlate with the use of different types of external symbol systems; that these symbol systems are usefully individuated in Nelson Goodman's syntactic and semantic terms, and that different cognitive processes are facilitated by different types of symbol systems

Sketches of thought

The structure of design problem spaces

Nine normal volunteers performed a 'theory of mind' task while their regional brain blood flow pattern was recorded using the PET [15O]H2O technique. Control conditions induced subjects to attend to the visual and semantic attributes of known objects. In a third condition, subjects had to infer the function of an unfamiliar object from its form. In the 'theory of mind' condition, subjects had to infer function based on the form of both familiar and unfamiliar objects and in addition, model the knowledge and rationality of another mind about the function of these objects. Performance during the 'theory of mind' condition evoked the activation of a distributed set of neural networks with prominent activation of the left medial frontal lobe (Brodmann area 9) and left temporal lobe (Brodmann areas 21, 39/19, 38). This result suggests that when inferential reasoning depends on constructing a mental model about the beliefs and intentions of others, the participation of the prefrontal cortex is required. When access to such knowledge is affected by central nervous system dysfunction, such as that found in autism, modeling other minds may prove difficult.

Modeling other minds.

Are the frontal lobes implicated in “planning” functions? Interpreting data from the Tower of Hanoi

http://www.yorku.ca/vgoel/reprints/Goel_Cognition_03.pdf

Vinod Goel

Papers

Sketches of thought

The structure of design problem spaces

Modeling other minds.

Are the frontal lobes implicated in “planning” functions? Interpreting data from the Tower of Hanoi

Explaining modulation of reasoning by belief.