Machine Learning is the study of methods for programming computers to learn. Computers are applied to a wide range of tasks, and for most of these it is relatively easy for programmers to design and implement the necessary software. However, there are many tasks for which this is difficult or impossible. These can be divided into four general categories. First, there are problems for which there exist no human experts. For example, in modern automated manufacturing facilities, there is a need to predict machine failures before they occur by analyzing sensor readings. Because the machines are new, there are no human experts who can be interviewed by a programmer to provide the knowledge necessary to build a computer system. A machine learning system can study recorded data and subsequent machine failures and learn prediction rules. Second, there are problems where human experts exist, but where they are unable to explain their expertise. This is the case in many perceptual tasks, such as speech recognition, hand-writing recognition, and natural language understanding. Virtually all humans exhibit expert-level abilities on these tasks, but none of them can describe the detailed steps that they follow as they perform them. Fortunately, humans can provide machines with examples of the inputs and correct outputs for these tasks, so machine learning algorithms can learn to map the inputs to the outputs. Third, there are problems where phenomena are changing rapidly. In finance, for example, people would like to predict the future behavior of the stock market, of consumer purchases, or of exchange rates. These behaviors change frequently, so that even if a programmer could construct a good predictive computer program, it would need to be rewritten frequently. A learning program can relieve the programmer of this burden by constantly modifying and tuning a set of learned prediction rules. Fourth, there are applications that need to be customized for each computer user separately. Consider, for example, a program to filter unwanted electronic mail messages. Different users will need different filters. It is unreasonable to expect each user to program his or her own rules, and it is infeasible to provide every user with a software engineer to keep the rules up-to-date. A machine learning system can learn which mail messages the user rejects and maintain the filtering rules automatically. Machine learning addresses many of the same research questions as the fields of statistics, data mining, and psychology, but with differences of emphasis. Statistics focuses on understanding the phenomena that have generated the data, often with the goal of testing different hypotheses about those phenomena. Data mining seeks to find patterns in the data that are understandable by people. Psychological studies of human learning aspire to understand the mechanisms underlying the various learning behaviors exhibited by people (concept learning, skill acquisition, strategy change, etc.).

Machine learning

Deposits of clastic carbonate-dominated (calciclastic) sedimentary slope systems in the rock record have been identified mostly as linearly-consistent carbonate apron deposits, even though most ancient clastic carbonate slope deposits fit the submarine fan systems better. Calciclastic submarine fans are consequently rarely described and are poorly understood. Subsequently, very little is known especially in mud-dominated calciclastic submarine fan systems. Presented in this study are a sedimentological core and petrographic characterisation of samples from eleven boreholes from the Lower Carboniferous of Bowland Basin (Northwest England) that reveals a >250 m thick calciturbidite complex deposited in a calciclastic submarine fan setting. Seven facies are recognised from core and thin section characterisation and are grouped into three carbonate turbidite sequences. They include: 1) Calciturbidites, comprising mostly of highto low-density, wavy-laminated bioclast-rich facies; 2) low-density densite mudstones which are characterised by planar laminated and unlaminated muddominated facies; and 3) Calcidebrites which are muddy or hyper-concentrated debrisflow deposits occurring as poorly-sorted, chaotic, mud-supported floatstones. These

Phd by thesis

Models for the processes by which ideas and influence propagate through a social network have been studied in a number of domains, including the diffusion of medical and technological innovations, the sudden and widespread adoption of various strategies in game-theoretic settings, and the effects of "word of mouth" in the promotion of new products. Recently, motivated by the design of viral marketing strategies, Domingos and Richardson posed a fundamental algorithmic problem for such social network processes: if we can try to convince a subset of individuals to adopt a new product or innovation, and the goal is to trigger a large cascade of further adoptions, which set of individuals should we target?We consider this problem in several of the most widely studied models in social network analysis. The optimization problem of selecting the most influential nodes is NP-hard here, and we provide the first provable approximation guarantees for efficient algorithms. Using an analysis framework based on submodular functions, we show that a natural greedy strategy obtains a solution that is provably within 63% of optimal for several classes of models; our framework suggests a general approach for reasoning about the performance guarantees of algorithms for these types of influence problems in social networks.We also provide computational experiments on large collaboration networks, showing that in addition to their provable guarantees, our approximation algorithms significantly out-perform node-selection heuristics based on the well-studied notions of degree centrality and distance centrality from the field of social networks.

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Maximizing the Spread of Influence through a Social Network

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

This tutorial is concerned with a comprehensive introduction to the research area of learning to rank for information retrieval. In the first part of the tutorial, we will introduce three major approaches to learning to rank, i.e., the pointwise, pairwise, and listwise approaches, analyze the relationship between the loss functions used in these approaches and the widely-used IR evaluation measures, evaluate the performance of these approaches on the LETOR benchmark datasets, and demonstrate how to use these approaches to solve real ranking applications. In the second part of the tutorial, we will discuss some advanced topics regarding learning to rank, such as relational ranking, diverse ranking, semi-supervised ranking, transfer ranking, query-dependent ranking, and training data preprocessing. In the third part, we will briefly mention the recent advances on statistical learning theory for ranking, which explain the generalization ability and statistical consistency of different ranking methods. In the last part, we will conclude the tutorial and show several future research directions.

/pdf/learning-to-rank-for-information-retrieval-2q6t3viyug.pdf

Learning to Rank for Information Retrieval

Influence maximization is the problem of finding a small subset of nodes (seed nodes) in a social network that could maximize the spread of influence. In this paper, we study the efficient influence maximization from two complementary directions. One is to improve the original greedy algorithm of [5] and its improvement [7] to further reduce its running time, and the second is to propose new degree discount heuristics that improves influence spread. We evaluate our algorithms by experiments on two large academic collaboration graphs obtained from the online archival database arXiv.org. Our experimental results show that (a) our improved greedy algorithm achieves better running time comparing with the improvement of [7] with matching influence spread, (b) our degree discount heuristics achieve much better influence spread than classic degree and centrality-based heuristics, and when tuned for a specific influence cascade model, it achieves almost matching influence thread with the greedy algorithm, and more importantly (c) the degree discount heuristics run only in milliseconds while even the improved greedy algorithms run in hours in our experiment graphs with a few tens of thousands of nodes.Based on our results, we believe that fine-tuned heuristics may provide truly scalable solutions to the influence maximization problem with satisfying influence spread and blazingly fast running time. Therefore, contrary to what implied by the conclusion of [5] that traditional heuristics are outperformed by the greedy approximation algorithm, our results shed new lights on the research of heuristic algorithms.

/pdf/efficient-influence-maximization-in-social-networks-379jwsrwvk.pdf

Efficient influence maximization in social networks

Influence maximization, defined by Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos (2003), is the problem of finding a small set of seed nodes in a social network that maximizes the spread of influence under certain influence cascade models. The scalability of influence maximization is a key factor for enabling prevalent viral marketing in large-scale online social networks. Prior solutions, such as the greedy algorithm of Kempe et al. (2003) and its improvements are slow and not scalable, while other heuristic algorithms do not provide consistently good performance on influence spreads. In this paper, we design a new heuristic algorithm that is easily scalable to millions of nodes and edges in our experiments. Our algorithm has a simple tunable parameter for users to control the balance between the running time and the influence spread of the algorithm. Our results from extensive simulations on several real-world and synthetic networks demonstrate that our algorithm is currently the best scalable solution to the influence maximization problem: (a) our algorithm scales beyond million-sized graphs where the greedy algorithm becomes infeasible, and (b) in all size ranges, our algorithm performs consistently well in influence spread --- it is always among the best algorithms, and in most cases it significantly outperforms all other scalable heuristics to as much as 100%--260% increase in influence spread.

/pdf/scalable-influence-maximization-for-prevalent-viral-2fu2dhmbzx.pdf

Scalable influence maximization for prevalent viral marketing in large-scale social networks

Influence maximization is the problem of finding a small set of most influential nodes in a social network so that their aggregated influence in the network is maximized. In this paper, we study influence maximization in the linear threshold model, one of the important models formalizing the behavior of influence propagation in social networks. We first show that computing exact influence in general networks in the linear threshold model is #P-hard, which closes an open problem left in the seminal work on influence maximization by Kempe, Kleinberg, and Tardos, 2003. As a contrast, we show that computing influence in directed a cyclic graphs (DAGs) can be done in time linear to the size of the graphs. Based on the fast computation in DAGs, we propose the first scalable influence maximization algorithm tailored for the linear threshold model. We conduct extensive simulations to show that our algorithm is scalable to networks with millions of nodes and edges, is orders of magnitude faster than the greedy approximation algorithm proposed by Kempe et al. and its optimized versions, and performs consistently among the best algorithms while other heuristic algorithms not design specifically for the linear threshold model have unstable performances on different real-world networks.

/pdf/scalable-influence-maximization-in-social-networks-under-the-2sclrttq2k.pdf

Scalable Influence Maximization in Social Networks under the Linear Threshold Model

The problem of identifying rumors is of practical importance especially in online social networks, since information can diffuse more rapidly and widely than the offline counterpart. In this paper, we identify characteristics of rumors by examining the following three aspects of diffusion: temporal, structural, and linguistic. For the temporal characteristics, we propose a new periodic time series model that considers daily and external shock cycles, where the model demonstrates that rumor likely have fluctuations over time. We also identify key structural and linguistic differences in the spread of rumors and non-rumors. Our selected features classify rumors with high precision and recall in the range of 87% to 92%, that is higher than other states of the arts on rumor classification.

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/uploads/prod/2016/06/icdm13-rumors.pdf

Prominent Features of Rumor Propagation in Online Social Media

In many real-world situations, different and often opposite opinions, innovations, or products are competing with one another for their social influence in a networked society. In this paper, we study competitive influence propagation in social networks under the competitive linear threshold (CLT) model, an extension to the classic linear threshold model. Under the CLT model, we focus on the problem that one entity tries to block the influence propagation of its competing entity as much as possible by strategically selecting a number of seed nodes that could initiate its own influence propagation. We call this problem the influence blocking maximization (IBM) problem. We prove that the objective function of IBM in the CLT model is submodular, and thus a greedy algorithm could achieve 1 − 1/e approximation ratio. However, the greedy algorithm requires Monte-Carlo simulations of competitive influence propagation, which makes the algorithm not efficient. We design an efficient algorithm CLDAG, which utilizes the properties of the CLT model, to address this issue. We conduct extensive simulations of CLDAG, the greedy algorithm, and other baseline algorithms on real-world and synthetic datasets. Our results show that CLDAG is able to provide best accuracy in par with the greedy algorithm and often better than other algorithms, while it is two orders of magnitude faster than the greedy algorithm.

/pdf/influence-blocking-maximization-in-social-networks-under-the-1424s08phy.pdf

Wei Chen

Papers

Efficient influence maximization in social networks

Scalable influence maximization for prevalent viral marketing in large-scale social networks

Scalable Influence Maximization in Social Networks under the Linear Threshold Model

Prominent Features of Rumor Propagation in Online Social Media

Influence Blocking Maximization in Social Networks under the Competitive Linear Threshold Model.