Wolfgang Pesendorfer

TL;DR: In this article, a two-period model where ex ante inferior choice may tempt the decision-maker in the second period was studied, where individuals have preferences over sets of alternatives that represent second period choices.

TL;DR: In this article, the existence of a swing voter's curse is demonstrated: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless, and the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another.

TL;DR: The authors showed that the probability of acquitting an innocent defendant may actually increase with the size of the jury and that a wide variety of voting rules, including simple majority rule, lead to much lower probabilities of both kinds of error.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed two-candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters and showed that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private information goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity.

TL;DR: The authors discuss the proposed changes in methodology, together with the neuroeconomic critique of standard economics, and offer a response to the neuro economic critique of the standard economics. But they do not assess the contributions or promise of neuroeconomic research.