Journal ArticleDOI
Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting
TLDR
The authors showed that the probability of acquitting an innocent defendant may actually increase with the size of the jury and that a wide variety of voting rules, including simple majority rule, lead to much lower probabilities of both kinds of error.Abstract:
It is often suggested that requiring juries to reach a unanimous verdict reduces the probability of convicting an innocent defendant while increasing the probability of acquitting a guilty defendant. We construct a model that demonstrates how strategic voting by jurors undermines this basic intuition. We show that the unanimity rule may lead to a high probability of both kinds of error and that the probability of convicting an innocent defendant may actually increase with the size of the jury. Finally, we demonstrate that a wide variety of voting rules, including simple majority rule, lead to much lower probabilities of both kinds of error.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Level-k auctions : Can a nonequilibrium model of strategic thinking explain the winner's curse and overbidding in private-value auctions?
TL;DR: In this paper, a structural nonequilibrium model of initial responses to incomplete-information games based on "level-k" thinking is proposed, which generalizes many insights from equilibrium auction theory.
Book
The Handbook of Organizational Economics
Robert Gibbons,John Roberts +1 more
TL;DR: The Handbook of Organizational Economics as mentioned in this paper surveys the major theories, evidence, and methods used in the field of organizational economics, including the roles of individuals and groups in organizations, organizational structures and processes, the boundaries of the firm, contracts between and within firms, and more.
Journal ArticleDOI
Epistemic democracy : generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem
Christian List,Robert E. Goodin +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that given suitably systematic, however slight, deviations from an impartial culture situation, the probability of a cycle converges either to zero (more typically) or to one (less typically) as the number of individuals increases.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Robust Beauty of Majority Rules in Group Decisions
Reid Hastie,Tatsuya Kameda +1 more
TL;DR: An original evaluation of 9 group decision rules based on their adaptive success in a simulated test bed environment supports the popularity of majority and plurality rules in truth-seeking group decisions.
Journal ArticleDOI
Committee Design with Endogenous Information
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the arrangements for collective decision making in a world where agents must be motivated to acquire information and identify some basic forces shaping the design of panels of decision makers-referees, managers, jurors, etc.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
TL;DR: The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that majorities are more likely than any single individual to select the "better" of two alternatives when there exists uncertainty about which of the two alternatives is in fact preferred as discussed by the authors.
Posted Content
The Swing Voter's Curse
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of a swing voter's curse is demonstrated: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless, and the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another.
Condorcet's theory of voting
TL;DR: Condorcet resolut ce probleme en utilisant une forme d'estimation par le maximum de vraisemblance, a procedure qu'il en a tiree peut aussi etre justifiee a partir d'une perspective axiomatique moderne as mentioned in this paper.
Journal ArticleDOI
Condorcet's theory of voting
TL;DR: Kemeny's rule as discussed by the authors is the unique social welfare function that satisfies a variant of independence of irrelevant alternatives together with several other standard properties, and is the most likely ranking of the alternatives.
Journal ArticleDOI
Voting behavior and information aggregation in elections with private information
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed two-candidate elections in which voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters and showed that the fraction of voters whose vote depends on their private information goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity.