Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Fog is an emergent architecture for computing, storage, control, and networking that distributes these services closer to end users along the cloud-to-things continuum. It covers both mobile and wireline scenarios, traverses across hardware and software, resides on network edge but also over access networks and among end users, and includes both data plane and control plane. As an architecture, it supports a growing variety of applications, including those in the Internet of Things (IoT), fifth-generation (5G) wireless systems, and embedded artificial intelligence (AI). This survey paper summarizes the opportunities and challenges of fog, focusing primarily in the networking context of IoT.

Fog and IoT: An Overview of Research Opportunities

Formally we have arrived at the middle of the book. So you may need a pause for recovering, a pause which we want to fill up by some fixed point theorems supplementing those which you already met or which you will meet in later chapters. The first group of results centres around Banach’s fixed point theorem. The latter is certainly a nice result since it contains only one simple condition on the map F, since it is so easy to prove and since it nevertheless allows a variety of applications. Therefore it is not astonishing that many mathematicians have been attracted by the question to which extent the conditions on F and the space Ω can be changed so that one still gets the existence of a unique or of at least one fixed point. The number of results produced this way is still finite, but of a statistical magnitude, suggesting at a first glance that only a random sample can be covered by a chapter or even a book of the present size. Fortunately (or unfortunately?) most of the modifications have not found applications up to now, so that there is no reason to write a cookery book about conditions but to write at least a short outline of some ideas indicating that this field can be as interesting as other chapters. A systematic account of more recent ideas and examples in fixed point theory should however be written by one of the true experts. Strange as it is, such a book does not seem to exist though so many people are puzzling out so many results.

Fixed Point Theory

หนงสอ Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction เขยนโดย Colin F. Camerer มวตถประสงคเพอนำเสนอหลกฐานเชงประจกษจากผลการวจยจำนวนมากมายทยนยนอทธพลของปจจยทางจตวทยาทมผลตอการตดสนใจตามทฤษฎเกม หนงสอ เลมนไดนำเสนอแนวคดทฤษฎทเพมความสามารถในการอธบายพฤตกรรมการตดสนใจตามทฤษฎเกม (Game theory) ซง von Neumann; & Morgenstern ไดเสนอไวในป ค.ศ. 1944 โดยชใหเหนวา ปจจยทางจตวทยามอทธพลทำใหการตดสนใจทเกดขนจรงคลาดเคลอนจากการคาดการณของทฤษฎเกม

Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction

Analogous to the way humans use the Internet, devices will be the main users in the Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystem. Therefore, device-to-device (D2D) communication is expected to be an intrinsic part of the IoT. Devices will communicate with each other autonomously without any centralized control and collaborate to gather, share, and forward information in a multihop manner. The ability to gather relevant information in real time is key to leveraging the value of the IoT as such information will be transformed into intelligence, which will facilitate the creation of an intelligent environment. Ultimately, the quality of the information gathered depends on how smart the devices are. In addition, these communicating devices will operate with different networking standards, may experience intermittent connectivity with each other, and many of them will be resource constrained. These characteristics open up several networking challenges that traditional routing protocols cannot solve. Consequently, devices will require intelligent routing protocols in order to achieve intelligent D2D communication. We present an overview of how intelligent D2D communication can be achieved in the IoT ecosystem. In particular, we focus on how state-of-the-art routing algorithms can achieve intelligent D2D communication in the IoT.

Intelligent Device-to-Device Communication in the Internet of Things

Thanks to the convergence of pervasive mobile communications and fast-growing online social networking, mobile social networking is penetrating into our everyday life. Aiming to develop a systematic understanding of mobile social networks, in this paper we exploit social ties in human social networks to enhance cooperative device-to-device (D2D) communications. Specifically, as handheld devices are carried by human beings, we leverage two key social phenomena, namely social trust and social reciprocity, to promote efficient cooperation among devices. With this insight, we develop a coalitional game-theoretic framework to devise social-tie-based cooperation strategies for D2D communications. We also develop a network-assisted relay selection mechanism to implement the coalitional game solution, and show that the mechanism is immune to group deviations, individually rational, truthful, and computationally efficient. We evaluate the performance of the mechanism by using real social data traces. Simulation results corroborate that the proposed mechanism can achieve significant performance gain over the case without D2D cooperation.

Exploiting social ties for cooperative D2D communications: a mobile social networking case

Recently, smart cities, healthcare system, and smart vehicles have raised challenges on the capability and connectivity of state-of-the-art Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, especially for the devices in hotspots area. Multiaccess edge computing (MEC) can enhance the ability of emerging resource-intensive IoT applications and has attracted much attention. However, due to the time-varying network environments, as well as the heterogeneous resources of network devices, it is hard to achieve stable, reliable, and real-time interactions between edge devices and their serving edge servers, especially in the 5G ultradense network (UDN) scenarios. Ultradense edge computing (UDEC) has the potential to fill this gap, especially in the 5G era, but it still faces challenges in its current solutions, such as the lack of: 1) efficient utilization of multiple 5G resources (e.g., computation, communication, storage, and service resources); 2) low overhead offloading decision making and resource allocation strategies; and 3) privacy and security protection schemes. Thus, we first propose an intelligent UDEC (I-UDEC) framework, which integrates blockchain and artificial intelligence (AI) into 5G UDEC networks. Then, in order to achieve real-time and low overhead computation offloading decisions and resource allocation strategies, we design a novel two-timescale deep reinforcement learning (2Ts-DRL) approach, consisting of a fast-timescale and a slow-timescale learning process, respectively. The primary objective is to minimize the total offloading delay and network resource usage by jointly optimizing computation offloading, resource allocation, and service caching placement. We also leverage federated learning (FL) to train the 2Ts-DRL model in a distributed manner, aiming to protect the edge devices’ data privacy. Simulation results corroborate the effectiveness of both the 2Ts-DRL and FL in the I-UDEC framework and prove that our proposed algorithm can reduce task execution time up to 31.87%.

When Deep Reinforcement Learning Meets Federated Learning: Intelligent Multitimescale Resource Management for Multiaccess Edge Computing in 5G Ultradense Network

Thanks to the convergence of pervasive mobile communications and fast-growing online social networking, mobile social networking is penetrating into our everyday life. Aiming to develop a systematic understanding of the interplay between social structure and mobile communications, in this paper we exploit social ties in human social networks to enhance cooperative device-to-device communications. Specifically, as hand-held devices are carried by human beings, we leverage two key social phenomena, namely social trust and social reciprocity, to promote efficient cooperation among devices. With this insight, we develop a coalitional game theoretic framework to devise social-tie based cooperation strategies for device-to-device communications. We also develop a network assisted relay selection mechanism to implement the coalitional game solution, and show that the mechanism is immune to group deviations, individually rational, and truthful. We evaluate the performance of the mechanism by using real social data traces. Numerical results show that the proposed mechanism can achieve up-to 122% performance gain over the case without D2D cooperation.

http://informationnet.asu.edu/pub/mobihoc13xu.pdf

Social trust and social reciprocity based cooperative D2D communications

This paper studies optimal bandwidth and power allocation in a cognitive radio network where multiple secondary users (SUs) share the licensed spectrum of a primary user (PU) under fading channels using the frequency division multiple access scheme. The sum ergodic capacity of all the SUs is taken as the performance metric of the network. Besides the peak/average transmit power constraints at the SUs and the peak/average interference power constraint imposed by the PU, total bandwidth constraint of the licensed spectrum is also taken into account. Optimal bandwidth allocation is derived in closed-form for any given power allocation. The structures of optimal power allocations are also derived under all possible combinations of the aforementioned power constraints. These structures indicate the possible numbers of users that transmit at nonzero power but below their corresponding peak powers, and show that other users do not transmit or transmit at their corresponding peak powers. Based on these structures, efficient algorithms are developed for finding the optimal power allocations.

Optimal Bandwidth and Power Allocation for Sum Ergodic Capacity Under Fading Channels in Cognitive Radio Networks

The fusion of edge computing and artificial intelligence (AI) technology is a key enabler for the smart Internet of Things (IoT). However, these two emerging paradigms face many issues for their integration, such as data storage structure, model generation algorithms, and cloud-edge collaboration mechanisms. Moreover, edge computing is not ready for supporting AI and can be enabled to support AI via some basic network functions related to Quality of Experience (QoE), such as passive computation offloading and content caching. In this article, we present an intelligent cooperative edge (ICE) computing in IoT networks to achieve a complementary integration of AI and edge computing. The AI-related modules of edge computing are redesigned for distributing AI’s core functions from the cloud to the edge. IoT-generated data are differentiated as user-private data preserved locally in IoT devices, edge-private data isolated on the edge and public data uploaded to the cloud. Therefore, a cloud-scale machine learning model can be generated, followed by privacy-preserving transfer learning running on each edge, which also has data updated more frequently that enables the model’s incremental learning. The model distribution is accomplished through lightweight deployment pipelines consisting of cloud compression and edge reconstruction. Conversely, some key issues of edge computing, such as the computation offloading and content caching, achieve a better solution using the localized AI. We perform the prototype-based evaluation, which indicates that the ICE computing architecture enables a benign combination of AI and edge computing.

Xiaowen Gong

Papers

Exploiting social ties for cooperative D2D communications: a mobile social networking case

When Deep Reinforcement Learning Meets Federated Learning: Intelligent Multitimescale Resource Management for Multiaccess Edge Computing in 5G Ultradense Network

Social trust and social reciprocity based cooperative D2D communications

Optimal Bandwidth and Power Allocation for Sum Ergodic Capacity Under Fading Channels in Cognitive Radio Networks

Intelligent Cooperative Edge Computing in Internet of Things