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Yevgeniy Dodis

Bio: Yevgeniy Dodis is an academic researcher from New York University. The author has contributed to research in topic(s): Encryption & Cryptography. The author has an hindex of 69, co-authored 260 publication(s) receiving 17941 citation(s). Previous affiliations of Yevgeniy Dodis include Massachusetts Institute of Technology & IBM.
Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
Yevgeniy Dodis1, Leonid Reyzin2, Adam Smith3Institutions (3)
02 May 2004
TL;DR: This work provides formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for turning biometric information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and reliably and securely authenticating biometric data.
Abstract: We provide formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for turning biometric information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and reliably and securely authenticating biometric data.

1,630 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Abstract: We provide formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for turning noisy information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and, in particular, reliably and securely authenticating biometric data. Our techniques apply not just to biometric information, but to any keying material that, unlike traditional cryptographic keys, is (1) not reproducible precisely and (2) not distributed uniformly. We propose two primitives: a fuzzy extractor reliably extracts nearly uniform randomness $R$ from its input; the extraction is error-tolerant in the sense that $R$ will be the same even if the input changes, as long as it remains reasonably close to the original. Thus, $R$ can be used as a key in a cryptographic application. A secure sketch produces public information about its input $w$ that does not reveal $w$ and yet allows exact recovery of $w$ given another value that is close to $w$. Thus, it can be used to reliably reproduce error-prone biometric inputs without incurring the security risk inherent in storing them. We define the primitives to be both formally secure and versatile, generalizing much prior work. In addition, we provide nearly optimal constructions of both primitives for various measures of “closeness” of input data, such as Hamming distance, edit distance, and set difference.

1,191 citations


Book ChapterDOI
14 Aug 2005
TL;DR: It is shown that the current design principle behind hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD5 — the (strengthened) Merkle-Damgard transformation — does not satisfy a new security notion for hash-functions, stronger than collision-resistance.
Abstract: The most common way of constructing a hash function (e.g., SHA-1) is to iterate a compression function on the input message. The compression function is usually designed from scratch or made out of a block-cipher. In this paper, we introduce a new security notion for hash-functions, stronger than collision-resistance. Under this notion, the arbitrary length hash function H must behave as a random oracle when the fixed-length building block is viewed as a random oracle or an ideal block-cipher. The key property is that if a particular construction meets this definition, then any cryptosystem proven secure assuming H is a random oracle remains secure if one plugs in this construction (still assuming that the underlying fixed-length primitive is ideal). In this paper, we show that the current design principle behind hash functions such as SHA-1 and MD5 — the (strengthened) Merkle-Damgard transformation — does not satisfy this security notion. We provide several constructions that provably satisfy this notion; those new constructions introduce minimal changes to the plain Merkle-Damgard construction and are easily implementable in practice.

537 citations


Book ChapterDOI
Jee Hea An, Yevgeniy Dodis1, Tal Rabin2Institutions (2)
02 May 2002
TL;DR: It is shown that gCCA2-security suffices for all known uses of CCA2-secure encryption, while no longer suffering from the definitional shortcomings of the latter.
Abstract: We formally study the notion of a joint signature and encryption in the public-key setting. We refer to this primitive as signcryption, adapting the terminology of [35]. We present two definitions for the security of signcryption depending on whether the adversary is an outsider or a legal user of the system. We then examine generic sequential composition methods of building signcryption from a signature and encryption scheme. Contrary to what recent results in the symmetric setting [5, 22] might lead one to expect, we show that classical "encryptthen-sign" (?tS) and "sign-then-encrypt" (St?) methods are both secure composition methods in the public-key setting.We also present a new composition method which we call "commit-thenencrypt-and-sign" (Ct?&S). Unlike the generic sequential composition methods, Ct?&S applies the expensive signature and encryption operations in parallel, which could imply a gain in efficiency over the StE and EtS schemes. We also show that the new Ct?&S method elegantly combines with the recent "hash-sign-switch" technique of [30], leading to efficient on-line/off-line signcryption.Finally and of independent interest, we discuss the definitional inadequacy of the standard notion of chosen ciphertext (CCA2) security. We suggest a natural and very slight relaxation of CCA2-security, which we call generalized CCA2-security (gCCA2). We show that gCCA2-security suffices for all known uses of CCA2-secure encryption, while no longer suffering fromthe definitional shortcomings of the latter.

517 citations


Book ChapterDOI
02 May 2002
Abstract: Cryptographic computations (decryption, signature generation, etc.) are often performed on a relatively insecure device (e.g., a mobile device or an Internet-connected host) which cannot be trusted to maintain secrecy of the private key. We propose and investigate the notion of key-insulated security whose goal is to minimize the damage caused by secret-key exposures. In our model, the secret key(s) stored on the insecure device are refreshed at discrete time periods via interaction with a physically-secure - but computationally-limited - device which stores a "master key". All cryptographic computations are still done on the insecure device, and the public key remains unchanged. In a (t, N)-key-insulated scheme, an adversary who compromises the insecure device and obtains secret keys for up to t periods of his choice is unable to violate the security of the cryptosystem for any of the remaining N-t periods. Furthermore, the scheme remains secure (for all time periods) against an adversary who compromises only the physically-secure device. We focus primarily on key-insulated public-key encryption. We construct a (t, N)-key-insulated encryption scheme based on any (standard) publickey encryption scheme, and give a more efficient construction based on the DDH assumption. The latter construction is then extended to achieve chosen-ciphertext security.

416 citations


Cited by
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Journal ArticleDOI

[...]

08 Dec 2001-BMJ
TL;DR: There is, I think, something ethereal about i —the square root of minus one, which seems an odd beast at that time—an intruder hovering on the edge of reality.
Abstract: There is, I think, something ethereal about i —the square root of minus one. I remember first hearing about it at school. It seemed an odd beast at that time—an intruder hovering on the edge of reality. Usually familiarity dulls this sense of the bizarre, but in the case of i it was the reverse: over the years the sense of its surreal nature intensified. It seemed that it was impossible to write mathematics that described the real world in …

30,199 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Richard Lathe1Institutions (1)
01 Apr 1988-Nature
Abstract: Deposits of clastic carbonate-dominated (calciclastic) sedimentary slope systems in the rock record have been identified mostly as linearly-consistent carbonate apron deposits, even though most ancient clastic carbonate slope deposits fit the submarine fan systems better. Calciclastic submarine fans are consequently rarely described and are poorly understood. Subsequently, very little is known especially in mud-dominated calciclastic submarine fan systems. Presented in this study are a sedimentological core and petrographic characterisation of samples from eleven boreholes from the Lower Carboniferous of Bowland Basin (Northwest England) that reveals a >250 m thick calciturbidite complex deposited in a calciclastic submarine fan setting. Seven facies are recognised from core and thin section characterisation and are grouped into three carbonate turbidite sequences. They include: 1) Calciturbidites, comprising mostly of highto low-density, wavy-laminated bioclast-rich facies; 2) low-density densite mudstones which are characterised by planar laminated and unlaminated muddominated facies; and 3) Calcidebrites which are muddy or hyper-concentrated debrisflow deposits occurring as poorly-sorted, chaotic, mud-supported floatstones. These

9,394 citations


Proceedings ArticleDOI
Craig Gentry1Institutions (1)
31 May 2009
TL;DR: This work proposes a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt, and describes a public key encryption scheme using ideal lattices that is almost bootstrappable.
Abstract: We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme -- i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result -- that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitrary circuits, it suffices to construct an encryption scheme that can evaluate (slightly augmented versions of) its own decryption circuit; we call a scheme that can evaluate its (augmented) decryption circuit bootstrappable.Next, we describe a public key encryption scheme using ideal lattices that is almost bootstrappable.Lattice-based cryptosystems typically have decryption algorithms with low circuit complexity, often dominated by an inner product computation that is in NC1. Also, ideal lattices provide both additive and multiplicative homomorphisms (modulo a public-key ideal in a polynomial ring that is represented as a lattice), as needed to evaluate general circuits.Unfortunately, our initial scheme is not quite bootstrappable -- i.e., the depth that the scheme can correctly evaluate can be logarithmic in the lattice dimension, just like the depth of the decryption circuit, but the latter is greater than the former. In the final step, we show how to modify the scheme to reduce the depth of the decryption circuit, and thereby obtain a bootstrappable encryption scheme, without reducing the depth that the scheme can evaluate. Abstractly, we accomplish this by enabling the encrypter to start the decryption process, leaving less work for the decrypter, much like the server leaves less work for the decrypter in a server-aided cryptosystem.

4,940 citations


Proceedings ArticleDOI
30 Oct 2006
TL;DR: This work develops a new cryptosystem for fine-grained sharing of encrypted data that is compatible with Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE), and demonstrates the applicability of the construction to sharing of audit-log information and broadcast encryption.
Abstract: As more sensitive data is shared and stored by third-party sites on the Internet, there will be a need to encrypt data stored at these sites. One drawback of encrypting data, is that it can be selectively shared only at a coarse-grained level (i.e., giving another party your private key). We develop a new cryptosystem for fine-grained sharing of encrypted data that we call Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE). In our cryptosystem, ciphertexts are labeled with sets of attributes and private keys are associated with access structures that control which ciphertexts a user is able to decrypt. We demonstrate the applicability of our construction to sharing of audit-log information and broadcast encryption. Our construction supports delegation of private keys which subsumesHierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE).

3,765 citations


Book ChapterDOI
Cynthia Dwork1Institutions (1)
10 Jul 2006
Abstract: In 1977 Dalenius articulated a desideratum for statistical databases: nothing about an individual should be learnable from the database that cannot be learned without access to the database. We give a general impossibility result showing that a formalization of Dalenius' goal along the lines of semantic security cannot be achieved. Contrary to intuition, a variant of the result threatens the privacy even of someone not in the database. This state of affairs suggests a new measure, differential privacy, which, intuitively, captures the increased risk to one's privacy incurred by participating in a database. The techniques developed in a sequence of papers [8, 13, 3], culminating in those described in [12], can achieve any desired level of privacy under this measure. In many cases, extremely accurate information about the database can be provided while simultaneously ensuring very high levels of privacy

3,356 citations


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Performance
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Author's H-index: 69

No. of papers from the Author in previous years
YearPapers
20216
20204
20197
20188
20178
20166