Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

By tracing the identity of large shareholders, we group China’s listed companies into those controlled by state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprises (SOEs) affiliated to the central government (SOECGs), SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELGs), and Private investors. We argue that these distinct types of owners have different objectives and motivations and this will affect how they exercise their control rights over the firms they invest in. In particular, we contend that private ownership of listed firms in China is not necessarily superior to certain types of state ownership. To test our arguments we investigate the relative efficiency of state versus private ownership of listed firms and the efficiency of various forms of state ownership. The empirical results indicate that the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies varies across the type of controlling shareholder. SOECG controlled firms perform best and SAMB and Private controlled firms perform worst. SOELG controlled firms are in the middle. The results are consistent with our predictions.

Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China's listed companies

Ownership, two-tier board structure, and the informativeness of earnings – Evidence from China

Allen, Qian and Qian (2005, Journal of Financial Economics) explores the role of alternative financing channels (e.g., trade credits and private credit agencies) and governance mechanisms, such as those based on reputation and relationship, in explaining the growth of the private sector in China. We complement their study by examining how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market and are behaving more like their western counterparts. On top of this, however, we find that having a state minority ownership helps firms obtain bank loans, which suggest that political connections still play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.

/pdf/inside-the-black-box-bank-credit-allocation-in-china-s-siekzsc3i4.pdf

Inside the Black Box: Bank Credit Allocation in China’s Private Sector

This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.

/pdf/inside-the-black-box-bank-credit-allocation-in-china-s-2n94pbmg11.pdf

Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China's private sector

We investigate performance effects for China's listed firms when there is a change in the controlling shareholder. These changes include ownership transfers from one state entity to another state entity and from a state entity to a private entity. We find positive performance effects when control is passed to a private entity. In contrast, when the transfer is made to another branch of the state, there is little change in performance. The stock market responds positively to a change in control, with the largest effect observed for private transfers. Our results suggest the Chinese government should continue to sell down its share ownership in listed firms as the transfer of control to private owners enhances corporate profitability and efficiency. Moreover, to help ownership reform, China should encourage an active market for corporate control.

Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency Gains in China's Listed Companies

This study examines the relationship between returns and trading vol- ume of four actively traded commodity futures contracts in China. Correlation analyses and Granger causality tests are used to investigate contemporaneous and lead-lag relationships between trading volume and both signed and absolute return. We find that the contemporaneous correlations between return and trading volume are not significantly different from zero, and there is no linearly significant causality following from trading volume to return or from return to trading vol- ume. However, the contemporaneous correlations between absolute return and trading volume are significantly positive in all futures markets, and there is a sig- nificant relationship of causality following from absolute return to trading vol- ume, which contradicts the mixture of distributions hypothesis and supports the sequential information arrival hypothesis in all of the futures markets examined except for aluminum futures. We also find a significant causality following from trading volume to absolute settlement-to-settlement return in the copper (subsample 1) futures market, but not in the copper (subsample 2) futures market. In the early 1980s, China set about reforming its stagnant economy and this involved, among other things, the adoption of market-oriented solutions to its economic reform. During the first ten years of the reform, China saw signifi- cant growth in output and some modernization of its industries. An obvious impediment to further sustainable growth was the lack of markets for finan- cial assets and commodities. To remedy this shortcoming, China set up its first stock market and its first commodities exchange in late 1990. The ensu- ing decade has witnessed many developments in these markets as investors

The Price-Volume Relationship in China's Commodity Futures Markets

This study investigates the efficiency of the Chinese metal futures (i. e. copper and aluminum) traded on China's Shanghai Futures Exchange. First, we thoroughly analyze the development of China's commodity futures markets, which provides a fundamental background. Then we examine the random walk and unbiasedness hypotheses for two metal futures during 1999–2004. Based on the empirical evidence, we argue that China's copper and aluminum futures markets are efficient, and that they aid the process of price discovery because futures prices can be considered as unbiased predictors of future spot prices. We attribute this efficiency to the regulatory changes made in 1999 and the increased financial skills and acumen of the participants in the market.



Edited by Xiaoming Feng

The Efficiency of the Chinese Commodity Futures Markets: Development and Empirical Evidence

This paper empirically investigates the relation between uncertainty and investment among China's listed companies, and analyzes the influence of government control on the investment-uncertainty relation. We find that there is a negative relation between total firm uncertainty and investment in China's listed companies. However, this holds only for privately controlled firms. Among privately controlled listed firms, investment is negatively related to firm-specific uncertainty, whereas among government-controlled ones, investment is positively related to market uncertainty. We also find that the risk-taking preference of government-controlled listed companies is greater among those firms with fewer investment opportunities. Finally, among financially distressed firms, the negative relation between investment and uncertainty becomes nonsignificant because of risk shifting, which is more serious among government-controlled listed companies. We conclude that government control leads to state interference and weak corporate governance, which, in turn, distorts investment decision making among listed companies.

Government Control, Uncertainty, and Investment Decisions in China's Listed Companies

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are both the economic and political bases of the Chinese Communist Party (the Party) and the Chinese state. The overarching principle of SOE reform is to firmly implement the Party’s leadership and the modern enterprise system. This principle creates a political governance system in China’s SOEs—a Party-dominated governance system characterized by Party leadership, state ownership, Party cadre management, Party participation in corporate decision-making, and intra-Party supervision. This survey explains the logic of political governance in China’s SOEs, presents the evolution and current practices of each element of the system, and discusses findings from both academic research and the field. 

Yu Xin

Papers

Control Transfers, Privatization, and Corporate Performance: Efficiency Gains in China's Listed Companies

The Price-Volume Relationship in China's Commodity Futures Markets

The Efficiency of the Chinese Commodity Futures Markets: Development and Empirical Evidence

Government Control, Uncertainty, and Investment Decisions in China's Listed Companies

Political governance in China’s state-owned enterprises