Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), established in 1945, is a UN specialized agency that provides global data and expertise on agri­ culture and nutrition, fisheries, forestry, and other food and agriculture– related issues. FAO is the UN system’s largest autonomous agency, with headquarters in Rome, 78 country offices and 15 regional, sub–regional, and liaison offices, including one located in Washington, D.C. FAO’s highest policy–making body, the biennial General Conference, comprises all 183 FAO member countries plus the European Commission. The General Conference determines FAO policy and approves FAO’s reg­ ular program of work and budget. The 31st Conference, meeting in November 1999, re–elected Director–General Jacques Diouf (Senegal) to a second six–year term through December 2005. Each biennial Confer­ ence elects a 49–member Council that meets semi–annually to make rec­ ommendations to the General Conference on budget and policy issues. The North America region, which comprises the United States and Can­ ada, is allocated two seats on the Council and one seat each on FAO’s Program, Finance, and Constitutional and Legal Matters (CCLM) Com­ mittees. The United States holds the North American seats on the Finance and Joint Staff Pension Committees through December 2003. Canada holds the North American seat on the CCLM and Program Committees through December 2003. The United States participated at the World Food Summit: Five Years Later meeting held at FAO headquarters June 10–13, 2002, to discuss progress towards attaining the 1996 World Food Summit target of reduc­ ing the world’s number of hungry and malnourished by half by 2015. The United States presented new initiatives to improve agriculture productivity as a significant contribution toward meeting that goal. U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman, leading the U.S. delegation, joined other min­ isters and heads of state and government in adopting a Declaration, “The International Alliance Against Hunger,” which reiterated the goals of the 1996 World Food Summit and stated, inter alia, “we are committed to

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jve1997/7/2/7_2_107/_pdf

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) ホームページの活用法

One of the most striking aspects of the recent recession is the collapse in international trade. This paper uses disaggregated data on U.S. imports and exports to shed light on the anatomy of this collapse. The paper finds that the recent reduction in trade relative to overall economic activity is far larger than in previous downturns. Information on quantities and prices of both domestic absorption and imports reveals a 40 percent shortfall in imports, relative to what would be predicted by a simple import demand relationship. In a sample of imports and exports disaggregated at the 6-digit NAICS level, the paper finds that sectors used as intermediate inputs experienced significantly higher percentage reductions in both imports and exports. It also finds support for compositional effects: sectors with larger reductions in domestic output had larger drops in trade. By contrast, the paper finds no support for the hypothesis that trade credit played a role in the recent trade collapse.

/pdf/the-collapse-of-international-trade-during-the-2008-2009-10c0k0lz48.pdf

The Collapse of International Trade During the 2008-2009 Crisis: In Search of the Smoking Gun

Handbook of industrial organization , Handbook of industrial organization , کتابخانه دانشگاه امام صادق(ع)

Handbook of Industrial Organization

Privatization of local government services is assumed to deliver cost savings, but empirical evidence for this from around the world is mixed. We conduct a meta-regression analysis of all econometric studies examining privatization of water distribution and solid waste collection services and find no systematic support for lower costs with private production. Differences in study results are explained by differences in time period of the analyses, service characteristics, and policy environment. We do not find a genuine empirical effect of cost savings resulting from private production. The results suggest that to ensure cost savings, more attention be given to the cost characteristics of the service, the transaction costs involved, and the policy environment stimulating competition, rather than to the debate over public versus private delivery of these services. © 2010 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

/pdf/is-private-production-of-public-services-cheaper-than-public-2lpdjhlyy9.pdf

Is Private Production of Public Services Cheaper Than Public Production? A Meta-Regression Analysis of Solid Waste and Water Services.

The cornerstone of cartel enforcement in the United States and elsewhere is a commitment to the lenient prosecution of early confessors. A burgeoning game theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency. I develop a theoretical model of cartel behavior that provides empirical predictions and moment conditions, and apply the model to the complete set of indictments and information reports issued over a 20-year span. Statistical tests are consistent with the notion that leniency enhances deterrence and detection capabilities. The results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime. (JEL D43, L12, L13, K21) In 1993, the Department of Justice (DOJ) introduced a new leniency program, with the intent of destabilizing existing cartels and deterring new cartels. The program commits the DOJ to the lenient prosecution of early confessors. In particular, it guarantees complete amnesty from federal prosecution to the first confessor from each cartel, provided that an investigation into the confes sor's cartel is not already underway. It also offers discretionary penalty reductions to conspirators who confess when an investigation is already ongoing. The new leniency program has become the cornerstone of cartel enforcement efforts in the United States (e.g., Scott D. Hammond 2004) and recently has inspired antitrust authorities in Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere to introduce similar programs (OECD 2002, 2003). This paper tests the efficacy of the new leniency program. The results have implications for market efficiency and enforcement efforts against cartels and other forms of organized crime. A burgeoning game-theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the impacts of leniency. A common finding is that leniency may destabilize cartels because conspirators can simultane

/pdf/strategic-leniency-and-cartel-enforcement-1bs3fnhs4i.pdf

Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement

The article presents a unique regression analysis of social-science estimates of the size of cartel overcharges. More than 800 overcharge rates were collected from a variety of published sources that have appeared in the literature during the last 125 years. A meta-analysis of overcharges from 395 cartel episodes finds that duration, legal environment, and organizational characteristics of cartels explain the variation on overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of overcharge analysis. In particular, overcharges are significantly higher for durable international cartels and are declining as antitrust enforcement regimes have stiffened. Historical case studies and government reports calculate lower overcharges, whereas antitrust authorities arrive at relatively high rates.

Cartel Overcharges: Survey and Meta-Analysis

https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/public_studies_fr28902/remedies_pdf/Connor050615.pdf

Cartel overcharges: survey and meta-analysis

The impact of collusion on price behavior: empirical results from two recent cases

Using the overcharge estimates for 406 cartel episodes, I evaluate the impact of cartel characteristics and market environment on the size of the overcharges imposed by cartels in different geographic markets and during six antitrust law regimes starting from the 18th century. I find that the average overcharge imposed by cartels in the sample is 21.88 percent with a median of 20 percent. International cartels imposed higher overcharges than domestic cartels. Overcharges imposed in the US and European markets were lower than overcharges imposed in the Asian markets and the rest of the world. Overcharges tend to decline as antitrust enforcement regimes had become stricter. As predicted by cartel theory, market structure is an important factor influencing the overcharge level. Markets where cartels have a high market share tend to have higher overcharges. If a leading firm has a high market share, the overcharges tend to decrease. As the number of cartel participants increases, the overcharges tend to fall. As cartels grow older, they manage to manipulate the market price more effectively.

Cartel Overcharges: An Empirical Analysis

Using overcharge estimates for 395 cartel episodes from the 18th to the 21st century, we evaluate the impact of cartel characteristics on the size of overcharges imposed by cartels across several geographic regions and antitrust law regimes. The results of our study have important policy implications. We find that the average overcharge imposed by cartels in our sample is 19 percent with the median of 16 percent of the selling price. Food industry cartels achieve lower overcharges than domestic cartels. Longer cartel episodes generate higher levels of overcharges. Cartels that were found or pled guilty achieve approximately the same levels of overcharges as legal cartels. [JEL classifications: L1, L2, L4, L6]. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 23: 17–33, 2007.

Yuliya Bolotova

Papers

Cartel Overcharges: Survey and Meta-Analysis

Cartel overcharges: survey and meta-analysis

The impact of collusion on price behavior: empirical results from two recent cases

Cartel Overcharges: An Empirical Analysis

Factors influencing the magnitude of cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis of food-industry cartels