Journal ArticleDOI
Cartel Overcharges: An Empirical Analysis
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In this paper, the authors evaluate the impact of cartel characteristics and market environment on the size of the overcharges imposed by cartels in different geographic markets and during six antitrust law regimes starting from the 18th century.Abstract:
Using the overcharge estimates for 406 cartel episodes, I evaluate the impact of cartel characteristics and market environment on the size of the overcharges imposed by cartels in different geographic markets and during six antitrust law regimes starting from the 18th century. I find that the average overcharge imposed by cartels in the sample is 21.88 percent with a median of 20 percent. International cartels imposed higher overcharges than domestic cartels. Overcharges imposed in the US and European markets were lower than overcharges imposed in the Asian markets and the rest of the world. Overcharges tend to decline as antitrust enforcement regimes had become stricter. As predicted by cartel theory, market structure is an important factor influencing the overcharge level. Markets where cartels have a high market share tend to have higher overcharges. If a leading firm has a high market share, the overcharges tend to decrease. As the number of cartel participants increases, the overcharges tend to fall. As cartels grow older, they manage to manipulate the market price more effectively.read more
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Book
Handbook of Industrial Organization
TL;DR: Handbook of industrial organization, Handbook of industrial organisation as mentioned in this paper, and Handbook of Industrial Organization (HIO) [1], [2] and [3] [4].
Book ChapterDOI
Price-fixing overcharges: legal and economic evidence
John M. Connor,John M. Connor +1 more
TL;DR: The authors surveys published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,040 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels and finds that the median long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 25.0:18.8% for domestic cartels and 31.0% for international cartels.
Journal ArticleDOI
Cartel contract duration: empirical evidence from inter-war international cartels
TL;DR: In this article, a sample of legal formal cartel contracts and examining their structure and durability was taken, and the empirical model tested for the importance of demand uncertainty and cartel organizational characteristics in determining cartel contract duration.
Posted Content
Handbook of Agricultural Economics
TL;DR: Evenson et al. as discussed by the authors presented a survey of the FAO Data-Based TFP Measures (R. Evenson, P. Pingali, TP. Schultz, A. Avila, L. Romano and A. McCalla).
Journal ArticleDOI
PRICE-FIXING OVERCHARGES: REVISED 2 nd EDITION
John M. Connor,John M. Connor +1 more
TL;DR: The authors surveys almost 600 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 1,517 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels, of which 8% are zero, and finds that the median long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.3%.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
What Determines Cartel Success
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the findings of these studies of cartel activity from the 1800s through the 1980s with the characteristics of a sample of international cartels from the 1990s, and present preliminary evidence on whether the stylized facts regarding industry characteristics for historical cartels also hold for contemporary cartels.
Journal ArticleDOI
The estimation of the degree of oligopoly power
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend the use of econometric production theory techniques to ageneral class of oligopolistic markets and provide a framework which enables them to estimate the conjectural variation and test various hypotheses about noncompetitive behavior.
Journal ArticleDOI
The evolution of Walrasian behavior
TL;DR: In this article, an evolutionary approach to understand Walrasian behavior is described, which avoids any considerations related to the absence of monopoly power or related notion of a large enough population.
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