Data Mining - Concepts and Techniques.

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Concepts, Taxonomies, Opportunities and Challenges toward Responsible AI

In this paper, we define and explore proofs of retrievability (PORs). A POR scheme enables an archive or back-up service (prover) to produce a concise proof that a user (verifier) can retrieve a target file F, that is, that the archive retains and reliably transmits file data sufficient for the user to recover F in its entirety.A POR may be viewed as a kind of cryptographic proof of knowledge (POK), but one specially designed to handle a large file (or bitstring) F. We explore POR protocols here in which the communication costs, number of memory accesses for the prover, and storage requirements of the user (verifier) are small parameters essentially independent of the length of F. In addition to proposing new, practical POR constructions, we explore implementation considerations and optimizations that bear on previously explored, related schemes.In a POR, unlike a POK, neither the prover nor the verifier need actually have knowledge of F. PORs give rise to a new and unusual security definition whose formulation is another contribution of our work.We view PORs as an important tool for semi-trusted online archives. Existing cryptographic techniques help users ensure the privacy and integrity of files they retrieve. It is also natural, however, for users to want to verify that archives do not delete or modify files prior to retrieval. The goal of a POR is to accomplish these checks without users having to download the files themselves. A POR can also provide quality-of-service guarantees, i.e., show that a file is retrievable within a certain time bound.

PORs: Proofs of Retrievability for Large Files

In the last years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has achieved a notable momentum that may deliver the best of expectations over many application sectors across the field. For this to occur, the entire community stands in front of the barrier of explainability, an inherent problem of AI techniques brought by sub-symbolism (e.g. ensembles or Deep Neural Networks) that were not present in the last hype of AI. Paradigms underlying this problem fall within the so-called eXplainable AI (XAI) field, which is acknowledged as a crucial feature for the practical deployment of AI models. This overview examines the existing literature in the field of XAI, including a prospect toward what is yet to be reached. We summarize previous efforts to define explainability in Machine Learning, establishing a novel definition that covers prior conceptual propositions with a major focus on the audience for which explainability is sought. We then propose and discuss about a taxonomy of recent contributions related to the explainability of different Machine Learning models, including those aimed at Deep Learning methods for which a second taxonomy is built. This literature analysis serves as the background for a series of challenges faced by XAI, such as the crossroads between data fusion and explainability. Our prospects lead toward the concept of Responsible Artificial Intelligence, namely, a methodology for the large-scale implementation of AI methods in real organizations with fairness, model explainability and accountability at its core. Our ultimate goal is to provide newcomers to XAI with a reference material in order to stimulate future research advances, but also to encourage experts and professionals from other disciplines to embrace the benefits of AI in their activity sectors, without any prior bias for its lack of interpretability.

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Concepts, Taxonomies, Opportunities and Challenges toward Responsible AI.

Internet of Things (IoT) aims to create a vast network with billions of things that can seamlessly create and exchange data, establishing intelligent interactions between people and objects around them. It is characterized with openness, heterogeneity, and dynamicity, which inevitably introduce severe security, privacy, and trust issues that hinder the widespread application of IoT. Trust management (TM) holds great promise in identifying malicious nodes, maintaining trust relationships, and enhancing system security. Traditional TM systems (TMSs) can be classified into centralized, semi-centralized, and distributed ones, all three of which suffer from critical challenges and thus are not sufficient for facilitating IoT development. Blockchain, as a disruptive technology, can help addressing the challenges of TM in IoT, thanks to its advanced features, such as decentralization, consistency, and tamper-proofing. As a result, blockchain-based TM (BC-TM) has been extensively studied in recent years to achieve decentralized TM in IoT. However, it still lacks a comprehensive survey on the current state of the arts. To fill this gap, in this article, we conduct a serious survey on BC-TM in IoT. We first propose a set of evaluation criteria that should be met by a TMS in IoT. Then, we propose a taxonomy of TMSs and continue with a thorough review on BC-TM in IoT by employing the proposed criteria. In the end, based on the review, a series of open issues are identified, and future research directions are suggested.

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ielx7/6488907/6702522/10020188.pdf

A Survey on Blockchain-Based Trust Management for Internet of Things

The Gaussian process (GP) algorithm is considered as a powerful nonparametric-learning approach, which can provide uncertainty measurements on the predictions. The standard GP requires clearly observed data, unexpected perturbations in the input may lead to learned regression model mismatching. Besides, GP also suffers from the lack of good generalization performance guarantees. To deal with data uncertainty and provide a numerical generalization performance guarantee on the unknown data distribution, this article proposes a novel robust noisy input GP (NIGP) algorithm based on the probably approximately correct (PAC) Bayes theory. Furthermore, to reduce the computational complexity, we develop a sparse NIGP algorithm, and then develop a sparse PAC-Bayes NIGP approach. Compared with NIGP algorithms, instead of maximizing the marginal log likelihood, one can optimize the PAC-Bayes bound to pursue a tighter generalization error upper bound. Experiments verify that the NIGP algorithms can attain greater accuracy. Besides, the PAC-NIGP algorithms proposed herein can achieve both robust performance and improved generalization error upper bound in the face of both uncertain input and output data.

Robust Gaussian Process Regression With Input Uncertainty: A PAC-Bayes Perspective.

Game theory is a methodology using mathematics models to analyze the strategic interactions between participants. It has been widely used to analyze the acceptance of system models under various conditions. In this paper, we review the basic knowledge of game theory. After extensive literature study, we propose a series of model requirements that should be paid attention in game theoretical analysis. Furthermore, we classify the existing work into two categories: games in information systems and games in network systems, which have been analyzed in accordance with the aforementioned requirements. The review shows that game theory is a good tool to analyze the adoption and acceptance of a system model and can be used for improving system design towards practical deployment. Moreover, we present the advantages and limitations of existing studies, and propose future research directions.

Game Theoretical Analysis on System Adoption and Acceptance: A Review

Mobile operating systems (e.g., iOS, Android, Windows Mobile, etc) are becoming powerful platforms on which various applications can be installed and run. Each mobile OS offers application store (e.g., Apple App Store, Android Play, etc) for developers to easily publish applications and earn profits. However, existing mobile platforms provide little means for mobile users to evaluate risks on allowing certain security permissions when installing mobile applications. Since mobile users may not be able to justify the risks on allowing certain permissions required by an application, mobile users may install malware with extra permissions, which leads to security risk for mobile users, e.g., private information leaked, etc. In this paper, we present process and visual User Interface for mobile users to understand and justify the risks on permissions required by mobile applications during installation. We also present two algorithms for calculating the risks.

Mechanism for Security Enhancement in Mobile Application Installation

Social networking has become very popular in recent years by serving as a medium for disseminating information and connecting like-minded people. It influences today's social culture and changes the way of modern life. The success of social networking relies on the level of trust that social group members have with each other as well as with social networking service providers. Therefore, trust evaluation in the social networking becomes an important topic that has attracted special concerns. Many trust models or schemes have been proposed to improve the security or performance in social networking. However, existing work mostly only focused on certain aspects. There still lacks a comprehensive study on trust evaluation and management in social networking. In this paper, we propose comprehensive criteria with nine aspects for trust evaluation. Related work in this area published in recent five years have been seriously surveyed and evaluated based on the criteria. We compare existing work and analyze the advantages and disadvantages of the current methods in order to figure out open research issues and motivate future research efforts.

Zheng Yan

Papers

A Survey on Blockchain-Based Trust Management for Internet of Things

Robust Gaussian Process Regression With Input Uncertainty: A PAC-Bayes Perspective.

Game Theoretical Analysis on System Adoption and Acceptance: A Review

Mechanism for Security Enhancement in Mobile Application Installation

Trust Evaluation in Social Networking: A Review