Data Mining - Concepts and Techniques.

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Concepts, Taxonomies, Opportunities and Challenges toward Responsible AI

In this paper, we define and explore proofs of retrievability (PORs). A POR scheme enables an archive or back-up service (prover) to produce a concise proof that a user (verifier) can retrieve a target file F, that is, that the archive retains and reliably transmits file data sufficient for the user to recover F in its entirety.A POR may be viewed as a kind of cryptographic proof of knowledge (POK), but one specially designed to handle a large file (or bitstring) F. We explore POR protocols here in which the communication costs, number of memory accesses for the prover, and storage requirements of the user (verifier) are small parameters essentially independent of the length of F. In addition to proposing new, practical POR constructions, we explore implementation considerations and optimizations that bear on previously explored, related schemes.In a POR, unlike a POK, neither the prover nor the verifier need actually have knowledge of F. PORs give rise to a new and unusual security definition whose formulation is another contribution of our work.We view PORs as an important tool for semi-trusted online archives. Existing cryptographic techniques help users ensure the privacy and integrity of files they retrieve. It is also natural, however, for users to want to verify that archives do not delete or modify files prior to retrieval. The goal of a POR is to accomplish these checks without users having to download the files themselves. A POR can also provide quality-of-service guarantees, i.e., show that a file is retrievable within a certain time bound.

PORs: Proofs of Retrievability for Large Files

In the last years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has achieved a notable momentum that may deliver the best of expectations over many application sectors across the field. For this to occur, the entire community stands in front of the barrier of explainability, an inherent problem of AI techniques brought by sub-symbolism (e.g. ensembles or Deep Neural Networks) that were not present in the last hype of AI. Paradigms underlying this problem fall within the so-called eXplainable AI (XAI) field, which is acknowledged as a crucial feature for the practical deployment of AI models. This overview examines the existing literature in the field of XAI, including a prospect toward what is yet to be reached. We summarize previous efforts to define explainability in Machine Learning, establishing a novel definition that covers prior conceptual propositions with a major focus on the audience for which explainability is sought. We then propose and discuss about a taxonomy of recent contributions related to the explainability of different Machine Learning models, including those aimed at Deep Learning methods for which a second taxonomy is built. This literature analysis serves as the background for a series of challenges faced by XAI, such as the crossroads between data fusion and explainability. Our prospects lead toward the concept of Responsible Artificial Intelligence, namely, a methodology for the large-scale implementation of AI methods in real organizations with fairness, model explainability and accountability at its core. Our ultimate goal is to provide newcomers to XAI with a reference material in order to stimulate future research advances, but also to encourage experts and professionals from other disciplines to embrace the benefits of AI in their activity sectors, without any prior bias for its lack of interpretability.

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Concepts, Taxonomies, Opportunities and Challenges toward Responsible AI.

Recent heterogeneous networks, such as LTE-A and 5G, support roaming of mobilities between multiple domains and may require communications on different channels, which brought new challenges to network security. However, existed Formal Security Methods usually abstract the communications in networking systems with one public channel, which makes the modeling of heterogeneous networks become difficult. In this article, based on the basic syntax of Applied Pi Calculus, we define a multiple channel syntax and the corresponding semantic rules for the security analysis of heterogeneous networks. We applied the proposed methods on a typical 3GPP and Non 3GPP heterogeneous structure, and the results present that the method can support the formal security evaluation of heterogeneous networks.

A Security Formal Model for Multiple Channels Communication

Calculating system damage caused by a cyberattack can help in understanding the impact and destructiveness of the attack to discover system security weaknesses. Thus, system damage calculations is important in the process of network offense-defense confrontation. However, there is little research on attack damage calculation. Current methods are unable to quantitatively evaluate the impact of an attack in a rational and accurate way. The lack of theoretical support and the complexity of both cyber systems and attacks bring tremendous challenges to attack damage calculations. In this paper, we propose a novel method called ADCaDeM to enable quantitative attack damage calculation based on a differential manifold. The damage is a negative utility produced by attack behaviors on an attacked object, which can be characterized and expressed by its attributes. We formally map the attack behaviors into a space constructed by the attributes of the attacked object in a mathematical way. Then, we propose an algorithm to construct these attributes as a differential manifold to represent their algebraic topological structure. According to the theory of tangent vectors and geodesics on the differential manifold, we can calculate attack behavioral utility in a physical way, such as computing the work done in physics. Regardless of the complexity of the dimensional structure of the attributes, the differential manifold structure can reasonably represent and calculate the damage caused by an attack. We simulate a data theft attack and a web penetration attack to test the performance of ADCaDeM and compare it with existing methods. Our experimental results illustrate ADCaDeM's advance in terms of rationality for calculating the damage caused by some typical cyberattacks. 

ADCaDeM: A Novel Method of Calculating Attack Damage Based on Differential Manifolds

Improving proximal policy optimization with alpha divergence

Aiming at the problem of low-frequency oscillation in AC/DC inter-connected system, this paper deduces the mechanism of HVDC supplementary damping controller (HVDC-SDC) to enhance the damping of power system, and establishes the low-frequency oscillation suppression scheme in AC/DC inter-connected system. By analogy with the mechanism of power system stabilizer (PSS), this paper explains the mechanism of HVDC-SDC using the change of stator current to add damping torque for the generators. The correctness and feasibility of the mechanism is verified in AC-DC inter-connected system with mechanism derivation and simulation verification. The scheme of low-frequency oscillation suppression in AC/DC inter-connected system suitable for different power flow directions is built with both advantages of PSSs and HVDC-SDC to better improve the dynamic stability of power system.

Supplementary Damping Control of PSS and HVDC-SDC for Low-Frequency Oscillation Suppression in AC/DC Inter-connected System

Trust evaluation assesses trust relationships between entities and facilitates decision-making. Machine Learning (ML) shows great potential for trust evaluation owing to its learning capabilities. In recent years, Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), as a new ML paradigm, have demonstrated superiority in dealing with graph data. This has motivated researchers to explore their use in trust evaluation, as trust relationships among entities can be modeled as a graph. However, current trust evaluation methods that employ GNNs fail to fully satisfy the dynamicity nature of trust, overlook the adverse effects of attacks on trust evaluation, and cannot provide convincing explanations on evaluation results. To address these problems, in this paper, we propose TrustGuard, a GNN-based accurate trust evaluation model that supports trust dynamicity, is robust against typical attacks, and provides explanations through visualization. Specifically, TrustGuard is designed with a layered architecture that contains a snapshot input layer, a spatial aggregation layer, a temporal aggregation layer, and a prediction layer. Among them, the spatial aggregation layer can be plugged into a defense mechanism for a robust aggregation of local trust relationships, and the temporal aggregation layer applies an attention mechanism for effective learning of temporal patterns. Extensive experiments on two real-world datasets show that TrustGuard outperforms state-of-the-art GNN-based trust evaluation models with respect to trust prediction across single-timeslot and multi-timeslot, even in the presence of attacks. In particular, TrustGuard can explain its evaluation results by visualizing both spatial and temporal views.

Zheng Yan

Papers

A Security Formal Model for Multiple Channels Communication

ADCaDeM: A Novel Method of Calculating Attack Damage Based on Differential Manifolds

Improving proximal policy optimization with alpha divergence

Supplementary Damping Control of PSS and HVDC-SDC for Low-Frequency Oscillation Suppression in AC/DC Inter-connected System

TrustGuard: GNN-based Robust and Explainable Trust Evaluation with Dynamicity Support