Showing papers in "Biology and Philosophy in 1986"

Assessing evolutionary epistemology

Abstract: There are two interrelated but distinct programs which go by the name “evolutionary epistemology” One attempts to account for the characteristics of cognitive mechanisms in animals and humans by a straightforward extension of the biological theory of evolution to those aspects or traits of animals which are the biological substrates of cognitive activity, eg, their brains, sensory systems, motor systems, etc (EEM program) The other program attempts to account for the evaluation of ideas, scientific theories and culture in general by using models and metaphors drawn from evolutionary biology (EET program) The paper begins by distinguishing the two programs and discussing the relationship between them The next section addresses the metaphorical and analogical relationship between evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary biology Section IV treats the question of the locus of the epistemological problem in the light of an evolutionary analysis The key questions here involve the relationship between evolutionary epistemology and traditional epistemology and the legitimacy of evolutionary epistemology as epistemology Section V examines the underlying ontological presuppositions and implications of evolutionary epistemology Finally, section VI, which is merely the sketch of a problem, addresses the parallel between evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics

From icons to symbols: Some speculations on the origins of language

Abstract: This paper is divided into three sections In the first section we offer a retooling of some traditional concepts, namely icons and symbols, which allows us to describe an evolutionary continuum of communication systems The second section consists of an argument from theoretical biology In it we explore the advantages and disadvantages of phenotypic plasticity We argue that a range of the conditions that selectively favor phenotypic plasticity also favor a nongenetic transmission system that would allow for the inheritance of acquired characters The first two sections are independent, the third depends on both of them In it we offer an argument that human natural languages have just the features required of an ideal transmission mechanism under the conditions described in section 2

Cognitive neurobiology: a computational hypothesis for laminar cortex

Abstract: This paper outlines the functional capacities of a novel scheme for cognitive representation and computation, and it explores the possible implementation of this scheme in the massively parallel organization of the empirical brain. The suggestion is that the brain represents reality by means of positions in suitably constitutes phase spaces; and the brain performs computations on these representations by means of coordinate transformations from one phase space to another. This scheme may be implemented in the brain in two distinct forms: (1) as a “phase-space sandwich”, which may explain certain laminar structures, such as cerebral cortex and the superior colliculus; and (2) as a “neural matrix”, which may explain other structures, such as the beautifully orthogonal architecture of the cerebellum.

Colleagues in conflict: An ‘in vivo’ analysis of the sociobiology controversy

Abstract: Edward O. Wilson's forays into human sociobiology have been the target of persistent, vehement attack by his Harvard colleague in evolutionary biology, Richard C. Lewontin. Through examination of existing “documents in the case”, together with in-depth personal interviews of Wilson, Lewontin, and other biologists, the reasons for Wilson's stance and Lewontin's criticisms are uncovered. It is argued that the dispute is not primarily personally or politically motivated, but involves a conflict between long-term scientific-cum-moral agendas, with the “reductionist program” as a key issue. It is concluded that it is in the interest of both disputants to keep the controversy alive.

Entropy in evolution

Abstract: Daniel R. Brooks and E. O. Wiley have proposed a theory of evolution in which fitness is merely a rate determining factor. Evolution is driven by non-equilibrium processes which increase the entropy and information content of species together. Evolution can occur without environmental selection, since increased complexity and organization result from the likely “capture” at the species level of random variations produced at the chemical level. Speciation can occur as the result of variation within the species which decreases the probability of sharing genetic information. Critics of the Brooks-Wiley theory argue that they have abused terminology from information theory and t thermodynamics. In this paper I review the essentials of the theory, and give an account of hierarchical physical information systems within which the theory can be interpreted. I then show how the major conceptual objections can be answered.

Justification through biological faith: A rejoinder

Abstract: A philosopher is often more fortunate in his critics than in his supporters.Though I have not found enough of the latter to test out this bromide, Iam sensible of the value bestowed by colleagues who have taken suchexacting care in analyzing my arguments. While their incisive observationand hard objections threaten to leave an extinct theory, I hope the readerwill rather judge it one strengthened by adversity.Let me initially expose the heart of my argument so as to make obviousthe shocks it must endure. I ask the reader to grant that altruistic behaviorcan be empirically justified, that is, to allow that we have evolved underthe aegis of kin and group selection (or comparably effective mechanisms)to heed the community welfare, to be moved to aid the distressed even atcost to ourselves, and to approve of altruistic behavior in others. Grantedthis empirical account, I then attempt to show how ethical propositions,that is moral 'ought'-propositions and appraisals, can be justified withoutcommitting any fallacy. My strategy is to reveal that any ethical frameworkthat might be urged on us depends on a variety of empirical assumptions. Iattempt to show, for instance, that philosophers who argue for theadoption of any normative framework - even that of modern logic -employ a common strategy, namely to justify the adoption by showing thatthe framework sanctions certain empirical descriptions that are deemedwell confirmed. This leads me to reject the common belief that inferringvalues from facts is ipso facto fallacious.I then mount several justifications, moral justifications, for the conclu-sion that one ought to act altruistically. The first justification, whichWilliam Hughes has correctly isolated, is suggested in my discussion of therole of empirical considerations in ethical reasoning. There I illustrate howindividuals might validly derive moral conclusions from factual premises.That argument can be further elaborated. First, it must be granted thathuman beings have evolved not only to reason theoretically according tocertain logical rules (e.g., modus ponens), but also to reason practicallyaccording to certain moral rules (e.g., "From 'Action x enhances thecommunity good,' conclude 'I ought to perform x' "). If that is so, then nofallacy is committed when someone reasons from the fact that a child isdrowning to the conclusion "I ought to try saving this child." The rule of

On the semiotic dimension of ecological theory: The case of island biogeography

Abstract: The Macarthur-Wilson equilibrium theory of island biogeography has had a contradictory role in ecology. As a lasting contribution, the theory has created a new way of viewing insular environments as dynamical systems. On the other hand, many of the applications of the theory have reduced to mere unimaginative curve-fitting. I analyze this paradox in semiotic terms: the theory was mainly equated with the simple species-area relationship which became a ‘signifier’ of interesting island ecology. The theory is, however, better viewed as a theoretical framework that suggests specific hypotheses on the ecology of colonization of insular environments. This paradox is inherent in the use of simplifying analytic models. Analytic models are necessary and fruitful in the work of ecologists, but they ought to be supplemented with a broader, pluralistic appreciation of the role of theories in general.

Natural selection without survival of the fittest

Abstract: Susan Mills and John Beatty proposed a propensity interpretation of fitness (1979) to show that Darwinian explanations are not circular, but they did not address the critics' chief complaint that the principle of the survival of the fittest is either tautological or untestable. I show that the propensity interpretation cannot rescue the principle from the critics' charges. The critics, however, incorrectly assume that there is nothing more to Darwin's theory than the survival of the fittest. While Darwinians all scoff at this assumption, they do not agree about what role, if any, this principle plays in Darwin's theory of natural selection. I argue that the principle has no place in Darwin's theory. His theory does include the idea that some organisms are fitter than others. But greater reproductive success is simply inferred from higher fitness. There is no reason to embody this inference in the form of a special principle of the survival of the fittest.

Evolution as a Cognition Process: Towards an Evolutionary Epistemology

Abstract: Recently, biologist and philosophers have been much attracted by an evolutionary view of knowledge, so-called evolutionary epistemology. Developing this insight, the present paper argues that our cognitive abilities are the outcome of organic evolution, and that, conversely, evolution itself may be described as a cognition process. Furthermore, it is argued that the key to an adequate evolutionary epistemology lies in a system-theoretical approach to evolution which grows from, but goes beyond, Darwin's theory of natural selection.

Charles Darwin's theory of evolution: A review of our present understanding

Abstract: The paper characterizes Darwin's theory, providing a synthesis of recent historical investigations in this area. Darwin's reading of Malthus led him to appreciate the importance of population pressures, and subsequently of natural selection, with the help of the “wedge” metaphor. But, in itself, natural selection did not furnish an adequate account of the origin of species, for which a principle of divergence was needed. Initially, Darwin attributed this to geographical isolation, but later, following his work on barnacles which underscored the significance of variation, and arising from his work on “botanical arithmetic,” he supposed that diversity allowed more “places” to be occupied in a given region. So isolation was not regarded as essential. Large regions with intense competition, and with ample variation spread by blending, would facilitate speciation. The notion of “place” was different from “niche,” and it is questioned whether Darwin's views on ecology were as modern as is commonly supposed. Two notions of “struggle” are found in Darwin's theory; and three notions of “variation.” Criticisms of his theory led him to emphasize the importance of “variation” over a range of forms. Hence the theory was “populational” rather than “typological.” The theory required a “Lamarckian” notion of inheritable changes initiated by the environment as a source of variation. Also, Darwin deployed a “use/habit” theory; and the notion of sexual selection. Selection normally acted at the level of the individual, though “kin selection” was possible. “Group selection” was hinted at for man. Darwin's thinking (and also the exposition of his theory) was generally guided by the domestic-organism analogy, which satisfied his methodological requirement of a vera causa principle.

Teleology and reduction in biology

Abstract: The main claim in this paper is that because organisms have teleological constitutions, the reduction of biology to physical science is not possible. It is argued that the teleology of organisms is intrinsic and not merely projected onto them. Many organic phenomena are end-oriented and reference to ends is necessary for explaining them. Accounts in terms of functions or goals are appropriate to organic parts and processes. siis is because ends as systemic requirements for survival and health have explanatory significance with respect to the processes that contribute to and constitute them. Reductionism cannot accommodate this sort of higher-level to lower-level explanation and so cannot account for why lower-level phenomena are as they are. Reductionism, it is claimed, is ultimately descriptive and not explanatory because it cannot regard teleological requirements as themselves basic. In seeking to explain them away it forfeits explanatory power.

Necessitarianism and teleology in Aristotle's biology

Abstract: In Aristotle's biological works, there is an apparent conflict between passages which seem to insist that only hypothetical necessity (anagkē ex hypotheseōs) operates in the sublunary world, and passages in which some biological phenomena are explained as simply (haplōs) necessary. Parallel to this textual problem lies the claim that explanations in terms of simple necessity render teleological explanations (in some of which Aristotle puts hypothetical necessity to use) superfluous. I argue that the textual conflict is only apparent, and that Aristotle's notion of coincidental sameness allows him to avoid the superfluity problem.

Genes or culture? A Marxist perspective on humankind

Abstract: Intense interest has long been shown in the nature of humankind. Are we the products of genes? Are we the products of culture? Or are we something in between? The Marxist position, stressing the dominant significance of social methods for studying humans, is sketched. Then, a number of Western, biologically influenced views are discussed and criticised. Although there are important insights in the writings of the holders of these views, ultimately they produce only a “semiscience”.

Life, the Universe and Ethics

Abstract: Biophilia is a personal book. It begins with Wilson's description of the sense of wonder he felt when, twenty-five years ago, he stood on a patch of alien ground in Surinam and marvelled at all the forms of life within a few centimeters around him: the mosquitoes, cockroaches, carpenter ants and all the unseen microscopic organisms living and dying each second in the patch of earth at his feet. Then his imagination drifted along the footpath leading through the trees towards the Saramacca River and, eventually, the Orinoco and Amazon basins. From this richly desciptive opening Wilson is led to reflect on our fascination with all life, which he sees as an innate tendency in human beings. He presents the reader with a smorgasbord of National Geographic style descriptions of his own travels and observations, including the leaf-cutting ants of the South American jungles, the New Guinea Birds of Paradise, and the snakes of Northern Florida, which Wilson spent much of his spare time catching when a schoolboy. The book then returns to Surinam for an appropriate epilogue. So Biophilia is neither biology nor philosophy in any strict sense of these terms. It would be wrong to review it as if it were defending, by the usual standards of scholarly argument, some thesis in either of these fields. Nevertheless, the book does contain observations and reflections which bear on the relationship between biology and philosophy, particularly ethics. Coming as they do from the author of Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975) and On Human Nature (1978), these remarks are bound to attract attention, and they do, in any case, provide an opportunity for discussion of an important topic. That we should have an innate tendency to focus on life is hardly a startling thesis. For an explanation, we should only have to look at our diet, and more generally at what we need to survive, and at what threatens our survival. But Wilson's idea of biophilia goes well beyond such a pragmatic interest in life. It extends to a deep desire to investigate and understand other life forms, a point at which the book may be more