Showing papers in "Constellations in 2003"

Social Acceleration: Ethical and Political Consequences of a Desynchronized High–Speed Society

Abstract: In 1999, James Gleick, exploring everyday life in contemporary American society, noted the “acceleration of just about everything”: love, life, speech, politics, work, TV, leisure, etc. 1 With this observation he certainly is not alone. In popular as well as scientific discourse about the current evolution of Western societies, acceleration figures as the single most striking and important feature. 2 But although there is a noticeable increase in the discourse about acceleration and the shortage of time in recent years, the feeling that history, culture, society, or even ‘time itself’ in some strange way acceleratesis not new at all; it rather seems to be a constitutive trait of modernity as such. As historians like Reinhart Koselleck have persuasively argued, the general sense of a “speed-up” has accompanied modern society at least since the middle of the eighteenth century. 3 And indeed, as many have observed and empirical evidence clearly suggests, the history of modernity seems to be characterized by a wide-ranging speed-up of all kinds of technological, economic, social, and cultural processes and by a picking up of the general pace of life. In terms of its structural and cultural impact on modern society, this change in the temporal structures and patterns of modernity appears to be just as pervasive as the impact of comparable processes of individualization or rationalization. Just as with the latter, it seems, social acceleration is not a steady process but evolves in waves (most often brought about by new technologies or forms of socio-economic organization), with each new wave meeting considerable resistance as well as partial reversals. Most often, a wave of acceleration is followed by a rise in the ‘discourse of acceleration,’ in which cries for deceleration in the name of human needs and values are voiced but eventually die down. 4

February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe

Abstract: It is the wish of Jacques Derrida and Jurgen Habermas to be co-signatories of what is both an analysis and an appeal. They regard it as necessary and urgent that French and German philosophers lift their voices together, whatever disagreements may have separated them in the past. The following text was composed by Jurgen Habermas, as will be readily apparent. Though he would have liked to very much, due to personal circumstances Jacques Derrida was unable to compose his own text. Nevertheless, he suggested to Jurgen Habermas that he be the co-signatory of this appeal, and shares its definitive premises and perspectives: the determination of new European political responsibilities beyond any Eurocentrism; the call for a renewed confirmation and effective transformation of international law and its institutions, in particular the UN; a new conception and a new praxis for the distribution of state authority, etc., according to the spirit, if not the precise sense, that refers back to the Kantian tradition.

From Discipline to Flexibilization? Rereading Foucault in the Shadow of Globalization

Abstract: Michel Foucault was the great theorist of the fordist mode of social regulation. Writing at the zenith of the postwar Keynesian welfare state, he taught us to see the dark underside of even its most vaunted achievements. Viewed through his eyes, social services became disciplinary apparatuses, humanist reforms became panoptical surveillance regimes, public health measures became deployments of biopower, and therapeutic practices became vehicles of subjection. From his perspective, the components of the postwar social state constituted a carceral archipelago of disciplinary domination, all the more insidious because self-imposed. Granted, Foucault did not himself understand his project as an anatomy of fordist regulation. Positing a greater scope for his diagnosis, he preferred to associate disciplinary power with “modernity” simpliciter. And most of his readers, including me, followed suit. As a result, the ensuing debates turned on whether the Foucauldian picture of modernity was too dark and one-sided, neglecting the latter’s emancipatory tendencies. 1 Today, however, circumstances warrant a narrower reading. If we now see ourselves as standing on the brink of a new, postfordist epoch of globalization, then we should reread Foucault in that light. No longer an interpreter of modernity per se, he becomes a theorist of the fordist mode of social regulation, grasping its inner logic, like the Owl of Minerva, at the moment of its historical waning. From this perspective, it is significant that his great works of social analysis – Madness and Civilization, The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality, volume one – were written in the 1960s and 1970s, just as the OECD countries abandoned Bretton Woods, the international financial framework that undergirded national Keynesianism and thus made possible the welfare state. In other words, Foucault mapped the contours of the disciplinary society just as the ground was being cut out from under it. And although it is only now with hindsight becoming clear, this was also the moment at which discipline’s successor was struggling to be born. The irony is plain: whether we call it postindustrial society or neoliberal globalization, a new regime oriented to “deregulation” and “flexibilization” was about to take shape just as Foucault was conceptualizing disciplinary normalization. Of course, to read Foucault in this way is to problematize his relevance to the present. If he theorized fordist regulation, then how does his diagnosis relate to

Why the Net is not a Public Sphere

Abstract: What is the relation between the idea of the public sphere and computer-mediated interaction? I argue that the notion of the public sphere is not only inapplicable to the Net, but also and more importantly, that it is damaging to practices of democracy under conditions of contemporary technoculture, conditions Manuel Castells theorizes as capitalism in the information mode of development and which I refer to as communicative capitalism.1 As an alternative to the public sphere, I consider the potential of a political architecture rooted in a notion of networks. To the extent that such an architecture can center democratic practice in conflict and contestation, so can it open up the democratic imagination in the networked societies of communicative capitalism.

Jürgen Habermas's Theory of Cosmopolitanism

Abstract: In this paper we explore the sustained and multifaceted attempt of Jurgen Habermas to reconstruct Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right for our own times. In a series of articles written in the post-1989 period, Habermas has argued that the challenge posed both by the catastrophes of the twentieth century, and by social forces of globalization, has given new impetus to the idea of cosmopolitan justice that Kant first expressed. He recognizes that today we cannot simply repeat Kant's eighteenth-century vision: that if we are to grapple with the complexities of present-day problems, it is necessary to iron out certain inconsistencies in Kant's thinking, radicalize it where its break from the old order of nation-states is incomplete, socialize it so as to draw out the connections between perpetual peace and social justice, and modernize it so as to comprehend the “differences both in global situation and conceptual framework that now separate us from him.”1 His basic intuition, however, is that Kant's idea of cosmopolitan right is as relevant to our times as it was to Kant's own. If it was Kant's achievement to formulate the idea of cosmopolitanism in a modern philosophical form, Habermas takes up the challenge posed by Karl-Otto Apel: to “think with Kant against Kant” in reconstructing this idea. What follows is a critical assessment of Habermas's response to this challenge. We focus here on the dilemmas he faces in grounding his normative commitment to cosmopolitan politics and in reconciling his cosmopolitanism with the national framework in which he developed his ideas of constitutional patriotism and deliberative democracy.

Toward a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent

Abstract: In this article I want to outline an argument for a New Critical Theory with a cosmopolitan intent. Its main purpose is to undermine one of the most powerful beliefs of our time concerning society and politics. This belief is the notion that “modern society” and “modern politics” are to be understood as society and politics organized around the nation-state, equating society with the national imagination of society. There are two aspects to this body of beliefs: what I call the “national perspective” (or “national gaze”) of social actors, and the “methodological nationalism” of scientific observers. The distinction between these two perspectives is important because there is no logical co-implication between them, only an interconnected genesis and history.

A critical analysis of the self-determination of peoples: a cosmopolitan perspective

Abstract: Over the last few years, the demand for the self-determination of peoples has once more acquired considerable force. In consolidated states no less than in states that are falling apart, more or less dominant political groups have appealed to self-determination to support their own political projects. Statistics on the issue tell us that at the beginning of 2003 there are 22 ongoing armed conflicts for self-determination, 51 groups using conventional political means to pursue selfdetermination, and 29 groups using militant strategies short of armed violence. 1 Such demands have pursued a variety of goals, ranging from multilinguism to greater tolerance for the religions, habits, and customs of minorities, and even the review of borders and the setting up of new states. Different, often contradictory aspirations have thus been grouped under the single banner of self-determination. If we take a closer look at such demands, we find that “the right to selfdetermination” spans three very different categories. The first is the selfdetermination of colonial peoples, which is how the term is used in the United Nations Charter and in many other sources of international law. The entire world political community supports this meaning, bar a few exceptions. The second meaning, associated with secession, encompasses the demands of minorities which intend to break away from the state they belong to, and has been the most in vogue since the end of the Cold War and also the one most directly associated with the armed conflicts and civil wars of the last decade. It is the second meaning, in particular, that clashes with the concept of state sovereignty. The third meaning, finally, refers to certain ethnic or cultural groups which, although intending to remain part of the state they belong to, wish to achieve certain collective rights. This latter is the most innovative meaning and, in democratic states especially, has triggered a fierce debate. Albeit all theoretically and politically valid, the three meanings hide political and intellectual pitfalls. In all three, self-determination is a subjective right which fails as yet to be precisely matched by a body of law. The thesis I argue here is that to be put into full effect, the right to self-determination cannot be selfassessed by conflicting political communities. If it is, the outcome will likely reflect the power of the contending parties rather than the interest of the peoples. In order to retain its validity, the concept of self-determination should be fitted

Comment on Nancy Fraser: Rereading Foucault in the Shadow of Globalization

Abstract: Nancy Fraser’s interpretation of Foucault as theorist of fordist discipline is surprising for at least two reasons. First, Foucault clearly wrote not only about power and discipline, but also about different experiences, discourses, episteme, and technologies of the self – all central concepts at different points of his theoretical work. Moreover, his historical analyses concentrated on an era that came long before fordism: aside from his last works, Foucault’s investigations were confined to the period from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the thesis can of course be supported that fordism is a kind of inner reference point of Foucauldian theory. A number of examples and good arguments can be brought forth for this. Nancy Fraser has presented some of them. I do not wish to arouse the impression here of having at my disposal the one and only correct interpretation of Foucault, against which to juxtapose the one suggested by Fraser. This would in the end be a tedious endeavor. The question that interests me here is rather, which reading of Foucault opens up his ideas for the analysis of contemporary social and political transformations? Which theoretical instruments from his much-cited toolkit can still be used to explain present forms of domination and exploitation? In my view this is not a matter of a philological search for Foucault’s correct theory, but rather of a political critique or, in Foucault’s own words, of a “new politics of truth”. Here I come to the second point – or, better, the second reason – why Fraser’s characterization of Foucault as theorist of fordism surprised me. When we abandon the question

Cosmopolitan political community : why does it feel so right?

Abstract: Identification with a national community is typically associated with “hot” emotions, and opposed to “cool” cosmopolitanism as an ideal. This paper will consider neo-Kantian understandings of cosmopolitan citizenship to be realised through human rights in which “hot” national feeling and “cool” cosmopolitanism are implicitly opposed in this way. I will argue that the dichotomy makes it difficult to see how “warm” cosmopolitanism is actually developing in political communities organised by Western states, in less rationalist ways than is suggested by neo-Kantians and in association with, rather than in opposition to, national feeling. Human rights are developing in part through humanitarian intervention that is of questionable legitimacy in democratic terms. It is less likely to be judged “right” (or wrong) according to reasoned normative principles with which cosmopolitanism is associated in neo-Kantianism, and more likely to be consented to on the basis of sentimental “popular cosmopolitanism” that feels right.

Europe: Vanishing Mediator

Abstract: Being invited by the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin to give this year’s first public George L. Mosse Lecture is one of the greatest honors that I have received. It is also for me a moving opportunity to return to Berlin and meet dear friends and excellent colleagues. Finally, it gives me the possibility to present before you some hypotheses on the function that European intellectuals can perform and the ideas that they should advocate in the current international situation, where the very project of a European community of nations and citizens is challenged. For all these generous gifts I want to thank you very sincerely.

Are National Conflicts Reconcilable? Discourse Theory and Political Accommodation in Northern Ireland

Abstract: Questions of identity and difference appear to be ubiquitous in the landscape of contemporary political theory. Debates among egalitarian liberals, libertarians, socialists, and Marxists about the appropriate distributive arrangements in modern societies have, for better or worse, been overshadowed of late by the challenge of a politics of identity. 1 The impulse for this form of politics has been articulated in theories that are inspired by communitarian, feminist, and poststructuralist concerns and the shift of emphasis from conflicts of material interest to conflicts of identity has brought the issue of incommensurability to center-stage in current debates. Is there any shared standard that might allow us to achieve political reconciliation among social groups whose identities appear to conflict? Is rational progress possible in regulating such conflicts or are we faced with competing and irreconcilable rationalities? Is communal ‘war’ of some form inevitable or can differences be sorted out through reasoned agreement? These issues are clearly urgent in contemporary politics at a global level and they continue to demand urgent attention at national level. Conflicts of national identity typically call into question the legitimacy of the state, the justice of its key institutions and the inclusiveness of the ethos in which those institutions are embedded. When the state and its territorial boundaries, or the fit between citizenship and national identity, are at stake the threat of incommensurability looms large. I want to address pertinent theoretical issues with reference to one of the most intractable national conflicts of the recent past: the dispute about the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. I will first clarify the issues at stake by classifying into two teams those contemporary theorists who address such matters. My argument is that if theory is to have a critical role in the analysis of such conflicts then it should be used to indicate how political reconciliation might be achieved in a manner that is fair to all. One theoretical source for such a form of analysis can be found in the discourse theory of democracy defended by Jürgen Habermas, particularly when the institutional dimensions of this approach are given their due. Having outlined briefly some apposite features of the discourse theoretical approach, I will indicate how this theoretical framework might be put to use in analyzing the national conflict in Northern Ireland and the ongoing attempts to

The Politics of Culture in Northern Ireland

Abstract: In Northern Ireland, culture is one of many terrains on which political struggles are waged. The orientation of much of politics around a single axis has meant that issues which might elsewhere be regarded as ‘merely’ cultural acquire here an intense political significance. Culture is seen as one battlefield on which the broader political struggle can be fought, the interests of one’s own national community advanced, and those of the other retarded. Nor is anything in Northern Ireland ‘merely’ symbolic: in this region, symbols mark territory, reinforce identities, and perpetuate political divisions. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that both unionists and nationalists see the conflict over culture as a zero-sum game: any gain for one side must entail a loss for the other. If the insti

Two Kinds of Practice: On the Relation between Social Discipline and the Aesthetics of Existence

Abstract: The commonality of the disciplinary and the aesthetic-existential conceptions of the subject consists in taking the subject as essentially practical. This is implied by their starting-point in the phenomenon of practice. Practices aim at the acquisition of skills and capacities: through practices we gain an ability. A misunderstanding of this determination must be avoided from the beginning. The objection that an aesthetics of existence directs against processes of normalization does not entail a critique of normativity in general. In the objection to such a teleological predominance of the conduct of life lies at the same time one reason why Foucault speaks of an aesthetics of existence. The success of aesthetic activities requires overstepping any previously established aim: they succeed precisely when they lead to something other than what was decided at the beginning. The normative opposition between the practices of an aesthetics of existence and those of disciplinary power is thus as minimal as it is decisive.

Beyond the Message in a Bottle: The Other Critical Theory

Abstract: Book reviewed in this article: Alex Demirovic, Der nonkonformistische Intellektuelle. Die Entwicklung der Kritischen Theorie zur Frankfurter Schule

Sleepwalking Democrats and American Public Support for President Bush's Attack on Iraq

Abstract: Since the threat posed by Saddam Hussein became the leading issue in American politics and international relations in late summer 2002, American public opinion has been out of step with public opinion in other western democracies. In the months leading up to the war, compared with citizens elsewhere, fewer Americans felt that war in Iraq was unjustified, fewer felt that UN-endorsement was necessary before a war could begin, and more Americans were willing to support unilateral action by the US. Why were Americans more supportive of a pre-emptive war in Iraq? There were many reasons, but in what follows, I blame the Democrats in Congress. I focus on the Democrats because other factors shaping public opinion – such as the obvious reality that September 11 occurred in the United States and nowhere else – do less to distinguish America from other countries than did the behavior of our political elites in the months leading up to war. And I “blame” the Democrats because they lacked the courage to debate the merits of President Bush’s foreign policy. Had they opened a debate, American public attitudes toward the Iraq issue would likely have been quite different, and much closer to those of our allies. This would have made it more difficult for President Bush to proceed with a war that lacked the legitimacy of broad international support of the sort seen in the first Iraq war, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. And it would have given Americans the opportunity to weigh competing visions of how to protect their physical and economic security in the post-9/11 world. Failing to articulate a clear response to President Bush’s security policy on Iraq was a mistake for the Democrats. The mistake may have rested on false assumptions about national security – something we will never know because the only world we will observe is the one that’s seen a controversial preemptive war unfold in the face of broad international opposition. And the mistake almost certainly rested on false assumptions about optimal electoral strategy for the Democrats. Indeed, at a time when the core Republican supporters are a fragile coalition of extremists – whose opinions are much further from the average American’s than are the opinions of core Democratic supporters – the leaders of the Democratic Party are tripping over each other to avoid confrontation with President Bush on the issues that are most important to Americans. This should stop. The Democrats must collectively articulate a coherent set of security principles that provide a

Thoughts on the Fetishization of Cyberspeech and the Turn from “Public” to “Private” Law

Abstract: In this paper I critically examine recent developments in intellectual property law. In particular, from a point of view informed primarily by Marx and Foucault, I study (a) the rhetoric surrounding the Metallica lawsuit against Napster; (b) a pair of conflicting trademark cases surrounding the ownership of a word on the Internet; and (c) the software industry's move to win approval for "shrink-wrap" or "click here" licenses. I conclude that these developments indicate a new form of disciplinary power, where people are individuated ex ante as consumers. Despite the celebrations of market cyberlibertarians, this move actually masks an increase in overt state power as the state apparatus is invoked to force individuals to agree to behave as disciplined consumers and accede to the system in the first place.