Showing papers in "Demographic Research in 2008"

Cohabitation and children's living arrangements: New estimates from the United States

Abstract: This paper uses the 1995 and 2002 waves of the National Survey of Family Growth to examine recent trends in cohabitation in the United States. We find increases in both the prevalence and duration of unmarried cohabitation. Cohabitation continues to transform children's family lives, as children are increasingly born to cohabiting mothers (18% during 1997−2001) or later experience their mother's entry into a cohabiting union. Consequently, we estimate that two-fifths of all children spend some time in a cohabiting family by age 12. Because of substantial missing data in the 2002 NSFG, we are unable to produce new estimates of divorce or of children's time in single-parent families. Nonetheless, our results point to the steady growth of cohabitation and to the evolving role of cohabitation in U.S. family life.

Overview Chapter 4: Changing family and partnership behaviour: Common trends and persistent diversity across Europe

Abstract: Following the era of the 'golden age of marriage' and the baby boom in the 1950s and 1960s, marriage has declined in importance, and its role as the main institution on which family relations are built has been eroded across Europe. Union formation most often takes place without a marriage. Family and living arrangements are currently heterogeneous across Europe, but all countries seem to be making the same shifts: towards fewer people living together as a couple, especially in marriage; an increased number of unmarried couples; more children born outside marriage; and fewer children living with their two parents. The relationship between these changing living arrangements, especially the decline of marriage, on the one hand, and the overall level of fertility, on the other, is not straightforward. In most countries, marriage rates and fertility declined simultaneously. However, the aggregate relationship between marriage and fertility indices has moved from negative (fewer marriages imply fewer births) to positive (fewer marriages imply more births). Thus, the decline of marriage, which is a part of the second demographic transition (see Overview Chapter 6), cannot be considered an important cause of the current low fertility level in many European countries. On the contrary, in European countries where the decline of marriage has been less pronounced, fertility levels are currently lower than in countries where new living arrangements have become most common. 1. Introduction Families and living arrangements in developed countries have changed dramatically since the 1960s. The major features of this change, such as the gradual decline of marriage and the growth of cohabitation, the postponement of union formation and childbearing, the rise in union instability, and the disconnection between marriage, sex, and reproduction, have been observed in all regions of Europe, and have been analysed in detail in dozens of publications and research articles (e.g., Kuijsten 1996, Lesthaeghe and Moors 2002, Billari 2005, Prioux 2006). These developments also constitute major behavioural landmarks of the second demographic transition, discussed in depth in Overview Chapter 6, and they are widely reflected in different country chapters in this volume.* Family life and the meaning of family have undergone a profound change. Intimate partnerships and sexuality, but also the relationships between parents and their children, have moved away from the realm of normative control and institutional regulation, giving rise to the new ideal of reflexive 'pure relationships' based on mutual consent and the recognition of individual autonomy (Giddens 1992). As noted in the France chapter, family has become "less of a place to reproduce generational and gender hierarchies, and more of a special space where individuals forge their identity" (Toulemon et al. 2008:524). The ongoing transformation of the family is evidenced by the spread of family forms and living arrangements other than the nuclear families of (married) couples with children. Cohabiting unions, 'living apart together' partnerships, same-sex partnerships, one-parent families, and single living have increased in prominence. The boundaries between family and non-family life have become less clear-cut; Ahlburg and de Vita (1992: 2) observed that family patterns in the United States are so fluid that "the U.S. Census Bureau has difficulty measuring family trends." Legislative changes are also beginning to reflect the new family landscape. New laws and regulations on registered partnerships (of both homosexual and heterosexual couples), same-sex marriages, and, in the case of the Netherlands, the option of a 'flash annulment' of marriage without a prior divorce procedure (see the Netherlands chapter), further contribute to the diversity in family patterns. Arguably, the perception of what constitutes a family has changed as well. Kiernan's (2004) analysis of 1998 Eurobarometer data shows that children, rather than partnership status, appear to be more salient in defining families: according to the survey results, 59 percent of respondents consider a cohabiting couple with children to be a family, whereas 48 percent consider a married couple without children as a family. …

Fertility trends by social status

Abstract: This article discusses how fertility relates to social status with the use of a new dataset, several times larger than the ones used so far. The status-fertility relation is investigated over several centuries, across world regions and by the type of status-measure. The study reveals that as fertility declines, there is a general shift from a positive to a negative or neutral status-fertility relation. Those with high income/wealth or high occupation/social class switch from having relatively many to fewer or the same number of children as others. Education, however, depresses fertility for as long as this relation is observed (from early in the 20th century).

Overview Chapter 6: The diverse faces of the second demographic transition in Europe.

Abstract: This chapter discusses the concept of the second demographic transition (SDT) and its relevance for explaining the ongoing changes in family and fertility patterns across Europe. It takes a closer look at the shifts in values and attitudes related to family reproduction and children and their representation in different chapters in this collection. It re-examines the link between the second demographic transition and fertility highlights its strong positive association with fertility at later childbearing ages and suggests that the transition does not necessarily lead to subreplacement fertility levels. Subsequently it provides an extensive discussion on the progression of the SDT behind the former Iron Curtain. To explain some apparent contradictions in this process it employs a conceptual model of readiness willingness and ability (RWA) advocated by Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft (2001). It also explores the multifaceted nature of the second demographic transition between different social groups and points out an apparent paradox: whereas lower educated individuals often embrace values that can be characterised as rather traditional they also frequently manifest family behaviour associated with the transition such as non-marital childbearing high partnership instability and high prevalence of long-term cohabitation. This suggests that there may be two different pathways of the progression of the second demographic transition. The concluding section points out the role of structural constraints for the diffusion of the transition among disadvantaged social strata highlights the importance of the gender revolution for the SDT trends and discusses the usefulness of the SDT framework. (authors)

Overview Chapter 7: The rising importance of migrants for childbearing in Europe

Abstract: This contribution looks at the influence of immigration on childbearing trends in the countries of Western Northern and Southern Europe which have received relatively large numbers of immigrants during the last decades. It analyses the contribution of migrants to the total number of births and compares fertility rates of migrant women with the fertility rates of native women pointing out huge diversity between migrant groups. It also discusses the evidence regarding the progressive assimilation in migrants fertility to the local fertility patterns and analyses the net impact of migrants on period fertility rates. This review reveals that migrant women typically retain substantially higher levels of period fertility than the native populations but this difference typically diminishes over time and with the duration of their stay in a country. Immigrants contribute substantially to the total number of births and their share of total births has increased in the last decade exceeding in somecountries one fifth of the recorded live births. However the net effect of the higher fertility of migrants on the period total fertility of particular countries remains relatively small typically between 0.05 and 0.10 in absolute terms. (authors)

Gender equity and fertility intentions in Italy and the Netherlands

Abstract: Fertility levels have fallen drastically in most industrialized countries. Diverse theoretical and empirical frameworks have had difficulty in explaining these unprecedented low levels of fertility. More recently, however, attention has turned from classic explanations, such as women’s increased labour market participation, to gender equity as the essential link to understand this phenomenon. The increase in women’s labour market participation did not prompt an increase in men’s domestic duties, which is often referred to women’s ‘dual burden’ or ‘second shift’. Institutions and policies within countries also facilitate or constrain the combination of women’s employment with fertility. This paper provides an empirical test of gender equity theory by examining whether the unequal division of household labour leads to lower fertility intentions of women in different institutional contexts. Italy constitutes a case of high gender inequity, low female labour market participation and the lowest-low fertility. The Netherlands has moderate to low gender inequity, high part-time female labour market participation and comparatively higher fertility. Using data from the 2003 Italian Multipurpose Survey - Family and Social Actors and the 2004/5 Dutch sample from the European Social Survey, a series of logistic regression models test this theory. A central finding is that the unequal division of household labour only has a significant impact on women’s fertility intentions when they already carry the load of high paid work hours or children, a finding that is particularly significant for working women in Italy.

Overview Chapter 1: Fertility in Europe: Diverse delayed and below replacement.

Abstract: Early in the 21st century three-quarters of Europes population lived in countries with fertility considerably below replacement. This general conclusion is arrived at irrespective of whether period or cohort fertility measures are used. In Western and Northern Europe fertility quantum was slightly below replacement. In Southern Central and Eastern Europe fertility quantum as measured by the period total fertility rate (TFR) and its tempo-adjusted version was markedly below replacement; in many countries it was around 1.5 and in some populations it was as low as 1.3 to 1.4 births per woman. Throughout Europe a historic transformation of childbearing patterns characterised by a pronounced delay of entry into parenthood has been taking place. This secular trend towards later childbearing has greatly contributed to the decline and fluctuations in period fertility rates. Delayed births were being recuperated especially among childless women but the extent of recuperation differs by country andregion. All in all despite a recent upward trend in the period TFR European fertility early in the 21st century was at its lowest point since the Second World War. (authors)

Poland: Fertility decline as a response to profound societal and labour market changes?

Abstract: This article opens with a review of the main trends in family-related behaviour, i.e. fertility decline and changes in fertility patterns, a decreasing propensity to marry, postponement of marriage ...

Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition

Abstract: The demographic transition in Russia was accelerated by several social cataclysms during the "Soviet type" modernization. Frequent changes in the timing of births and marriages engendered a mass "abortion culture". Contraceptive devices of poor quality were produced on a limited scale. The Soviet regime promulgated pronatalism and considered contraception to contradict this ideology. There have been two waves of government policy interventions. In the 1930s and 1940s restrictive and propaganda measures prevailed. These failed to yield serious effects. In the 1980s, policies aimed at lessening the tension between full-time employment and maternal roles. These generated shifts in birth timing, namely shorter birth intervals and earlier second and third births, however increase in completed cohort fertility was minimal. A third wave started in 2007. Preoccupied with continuous depopulation, authorities intend to boost births by substantially increasing benefits. The mid-1990s was a turning point in the change of fertility and nuptiality models. The 1970s birth cohorts marry and become parents later. They delay first and second births and increasingly begin partnerships with cohabitation. Contraception is replacing abortion. New attitudes and perceptions about family, partnership, childbearing, and family planning are emerging. A major transformation typical for developed countries, the Second Demographic Transition, is underway. Nevertheless, many neo-traditional features of fertility and nuptiality remain. These distinguish Russia from most European countries and will persist in the near future. Completed fertility, however, hardly differs from the average European level.

Overview Chapter 5: Determinants of family formation and childbearing during the societal transition in Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract: Societal conditions for early and high rates of childbearing were replaced by conditions generating late and low levels of fertility common in Western countries. Central among factors shaping the latter behaviour (job insecurity unstable partnership relationships expensive housing and profound changes in norms values and attitudes) were the following: increasing proportions of young people were acquiring advanced education a majority of women were gainfully employed yet women were performing most household maintenance and childrearing duties. Two theories prevailed to explain what caused changes in family formation and fertility trends. One argues that the economic and social crises were the principal causes. The other considered the diffusion of western norms values and attitudes as the prime factors of change. Neither reveals the root cause: the replacement of state socialist regimes with economic and political institutions of contemporary capitalism. The extraordinarily low period TFRs around 2000 were the result of low fertility of older women born around 1960 overlapping with low fertility of young women born during the 1970s. (authors)

The Modal Age at Death and the Shifting Mortality Hypothesis

Abstract: The modal age at death is used to study the shifting mortality scenario experienced by low mortality countries. The relations of the life table functions at the modal age are analyzed using mortality models. In the models the modal age increases over time, but there is an asymptotic approximation towards a constant number of deaths and standard deviation from the mode. The findings are compared to changes observed in populations with historical mortality data. As shown here the shifting mortality scenario is a process that might be expected if the current mortality changes maintain their pace. By focusing on the modal age at death, a new perspective on the analysis of human longevity is revealed. (ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.) 1. Introduction Lexis (1878) considered that the distribution of deaths consisted of three parts: a decrease in the high number of deaths with age after birth to account for infant mortality; deaths centred around the late modal age at death (referred to hereafter as modal age at death), accounting for senescent mortality; and premature deaths that occur infrequently at young ages between the high infant mortality and senescent deaths. Life expectancy, or the mean of the life table distribution of deaths, is the indicator most frequently used to describe this distribution. In a regime with a high level of infant mortality, life expectancy will be within the age range of premature deaths, even when most deaths occur around ages zero and the modal age at death. The early stages of the epidemiological transition (Omran 1971) are characterized by a reduction in infant mortality. These changes in infant mortality have been captured very accurately with the rapid increase in life expectancy over time. However, an alternative perspective is to study the age where most of the deaths are occurring, that is the modal age at death. Currently, mortality is concentrated at older ages in most countries. Life expectancy has slowed down its rapid increase and is now moving at a similar pace as the late modal age at death. Studying the modal age at death provides an opportunity to have a different perspective of the changes in the distribution of deaths and to explain the change in mortality at older ages (Kannisto 2000, Kannisto 2001, Robine 2001, Cheung et al. 2005, Canudas-Romo 2006, Cheung and Robine 2007, Canudas-Romo and Wilmoth 2007). This study describes the important role of the modal age at death in populations experiencing mortality decline. The aim of this article is to study the shifting mortality hypothesis by assessing the changes in the late modal age at death. The shifting mortality hypothesis suggests a shifting force of mortality schedule which retains its shape over time as mortality falls (Bongaarts and Feeney 2002, 2003). Bongaarts (2005) furthers this idea by describing the shifting mortality regime as one where adult mortality is assumed to shift to higher ages over time. These characteristics of the shifting hypothesis can be observed in any of the life table functions: the hazard function, the survival function and the density function describing the distribution of deaths. The interrelations of these three curves imply that changes in one will be carried on to the others (Wilmoth 1997). Under the shifting mortality regime a shift in the density function describing the distribution of deaths implies that the hazard function declines but retains its shape, and that the survival function increases as the curve moves further to the right. In the present study, these three functions are analyzed together with the changes that occur in the modal age at death. The debate on "How long do we live?" initiated by Bongaarts and Feeney has been focused on the study of life expectancy at birth (Barbi et al. 2008, Feeney 2006, Goldstein 2006, Guillot 2006, Horiuchi 2005, Rodriguez 2006, Schoen and Canudas-Romo 2005, Vaupel 2005, Wachter 2005,Wilmoth 2005). …

Sweden: Combining childbearing and gender equality

Abstract: Sweden is the forerunner of the Second Demographic Transition. Fertility trends have fluctuated greatly since the 1960s, and the 1990s showed both European-highest and lowest-ever-in-Sweden levels, while the cohort pattern has been relatively stable. Period fluctuations have been accompanied by a postponement of entering committed partnerships and parenthood as well as an increasing instability of family relationships. The awareness and the availability of effective contraceptives have been extensive since the mid-1970s, the year the liberal abortion law was introduced. Post-modern values are dominant in this highly secularized society, but ideal family size is among the highest in the European Union, and childlessness has remained at a relatively low level. Ethnic diversification has increased over time, with about one-fifth of the population having a 'foreign background' in the early 2000s. The level of female labor-force participation is the highest in Europe (although mothers of pre-schoolers often work part-time), and young women are just as highly educated as men. Family policies, based on the principle of equality across social groups and gender, seem to play an important role in keeping fertility relatively high. In combination with other factors, family policies also play a role in the fluctuations of fertility rates, as eligibility to parental-leave and benefits as well as the availability of public childcare are linked to parents' labor-force attachment. 1. Introduction Sweden is well-known as the forerunner of the so-called Second Demographic Transition characterized by the dramatic transformation of family patterns towards less committed and more fragile couple relationships, by the later and less likely transition to parenthood, and by the sharp reduction of higher-order births currently taking place in Europe and European-origin populations (Lesthaeghe 1995). It may seem contradictory that Sweden, as a 'pioneer' of the Second Demographic Transition, commonly associated with low fertility, also exhibits one of the highest fertility levels in Europe, with a completed fertility close to replacement. This is an issue that has puzzled many researchers and continues to do so. In this chapter, we aim to shed some light on some of the crucial features of Sweden's demographic and socio-economic landscape, hopefully increasing our understanding of this apparent paradox. Sweden is the largest country in Scandinavia, both in terms of land area and population size - currently about 9.1 million. Period fertility has strongly fluctuated below the replacement level since the late 1960s along with a relatively stable cohort pattern of about two children per woman for women born in the 20th century. High rates of non-marital cohabitation, extramarital childbearing, and partnership break-up have accompanied this trend. The infant mortality rate is low and average life expectancy is high, even by international comparison, with 82.8 years for women and 78.4 years for men in 2005. Up to the 1930s, the country saw negative net migration, but following the Second World War Sweden became a land of immigration. In 1960, 4% of the population (ca. 300 000 people) was foreign-born, but this share increased to 12 % (over one million people) by the early 2000s. Including individuals born in Sweden with both parents born abroad, the proportion of those with a foreign background equals 16 % of the population in 2005 (SCB 2004a, 2006a). Because of immigration, the population growth rate has remained positive, unlike the growth rate in some other European countries. However, Sweden is among the five countries with the highest percentage of elderly aged 65+ in the population, displaying one of the highest dependency ratios in Europe (Council of Europe 2005). Thus, population aging, which is the result of long-term below replacement fertility and low mortality, is a major concern of policy makers owing to the challenges it imposes on the welfare state. …

France: High and stable fertility

Abstract: The current total fertility rate in France is around 19 children per woman This is a relatively high level by current European standards and makes France an outlier, despite the fact that its other demographic trends, especially conjugal behaviour, and social and economic trends are not very different from other Western European countries France can serve as a counterfactual test case for some of the hypotheses advanced to explain the current low level of fertility in most European countries (delay in fertility, decline in marriage, increased birth control, greater economic uncertainty) France’s fertility level can be partly explained by its active family policy introduced after the Second World War, and adapted in the 1980s to accommodate women’s entry into the labour force This policy is the result of a battle, fuelled by pro-natalism, between the conservative supporters of family values and the promoters of state-supported individual equality French family policy thus encompasses a wide range of measures based on varying ideological backgrounds, and it is difficult to classify in comparison to the more precisely focused family policies of other European welfare states The active family policy seems to have created especially positive attitudes towards two- or three child families in France

Postponement and childlessness: Evidence from two British cohorts

Abstract: This paper starts by reviewing existing projections of childlessness among British men and women. Low current fertility implies high eventual childlessness unless the postponement of parenthood is taken into account. Such re-timing of first births appears to be occurring differentially across social groups. Exploiting the disaggregated evidence of two British cohort studies, the 1958 National Child Development Study and the 1970 British Cohort Survey, this paper investigates the extent of postponement across cohorts and projects its impact on eventual levels of childlessness. Men and women are considered separately in our models of a population stratified by educational attainment. We find the most striking postponement occurring among graduate men. Among graduate women, after taking family building intentions into account, we estimate that about a quarter of 1970 born graduate women will remain childless, rather than something nearer 40 per cent as had been conjectured elsewhere.

An integrated approach to cause-of-death analysis: cause-deleted life tables and decompositions of life expectancy.

Abstract: This article integrates two methods that analyze the implications of various causes of death for life expectancy. One of the methods attributes changes in life expectancy to various causes of death; the other method examines the effect of removing deaths from a particular cause on life expectancy. This integration is accomplished by new formulas that make clearer the interactions among causes of death in determining life expectancy. We apply our approach to changes in life expectancy in the United States between 1970 and 2000. We demonstrate, and explain analytically, the paradox that cancer is responsible for more years of life lost in 2000 than in 1970 despite the fact that declines in cancer mortality contributed to advances in life expectancy between 1970 and 2000.

Religious affiliation religiosity and male and female fertility.

Abstract: Religious studies of fertility typically focus on the effect of religious affiliation on fertility; the role of religiosity in determining fertility remains overlooked. Meanwhile most studies focus on studying female fertility; whether religion and religiosity have significantly different impacts on mens and womens fertility rarely has been examined. To fill these gaps this study uses data from the 2002 NSFG Cycle 6 on religious affiliation religiosity and children ever born (CEB) for both men and women to investigate the effects of religious affiliation and religiosity on male and female fertility. A series of hypotheses which aim to demonstrate the critical role of religiosity particularly the importance of religious beliefs in peoples daily life in shaping peoples fertility behavior are tested. The findings show a shrinking pattern of fertility differentials among religious groups. However religiosity particularly religious beliefs shows a substantially positive effect on fertility.The gender interaction terms are not significant which indicates that the effects of religion and religiosity on fertility do not vary by gender. (authors)

Perturbation analysis of nonlinear matrix population models

Abstract: Perturbation analysis examines the response of a model to changes in its parameters. It is commonly applied to population growth rates calculated from linear models but there has been no general approach to the analysis of nonlinear models. Nonlinearities in demographic models may arise due to density-dependence frequency-dependence (in 2-sex models) feedback through the environment or the economy and recruitment subsidy due to immigration or from the scaling inherent in calculations of proportional population structure. This paper uses matrix calculus to derive the sensitivity and elasticity of equilibria cycles ratios (e.g. dependency ratios) age averages and variances temporal averages and variances life expectancies and population growth rates for both age-classified and stage-classified models. Examples are presented applying the results to both human and non-human populations. (authors)

Men's childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century

Abstract: The development of modern family patterns of the past decades has been accompanied by substantial changes in social norms, values and gender relations. There is theoretical support for the assumption that the persistence of low fertility levels across Europe is likely to be linked to the incomplete gender revolution, more specifically to the lack of, or only limited changes in the male gender role as opposed to the women's role. In order to have a deeper understanding of the development of fertility, we aim to shed more light on the impact of men's role orientation on their fertility intentions in this study. Our analyses include men aged 20-44 years in eight countries: Austria, Estonia, East Germany, West Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland. The data are extracted from the Population Policy Acceptance Study of the early 2000s. Examining within-country differences, we find that men with egalitarian attitudes seem to have higher fertility aspirations than their traditional counterparts in contemporary Europe. This is supported by both the descriptive and the multivariate analyses. The picture is somewhat less conclusive though when we focus on country-rankings by intended family size and by the prevalence of egalitarian versus traditional attitudes. 1. Introduction Since the onset of the Second Demographic Transition in the 1960s, family patterns have changed substantially in Europe along with the norms and attitudes regarding family life and childbearing (Frejka et al. 2008). High marriage and birth rates at relatively young ages, as well as low divorce rates and rareness of non-traditional family forms belong to the past. The present, the early 21st century shows a different picture. Fertility rates are below the replacement level, having declined in a number of countries to previously unimaginable lowest-low levels (Kohler, Billari, Ortega 2002). Postponement of, or even refrainment from parenthood, and the growing proportion of out-of-wedlock births are another important features of childbearing trends (Frejka, Sobotka 2008). Less committing forms of couple relationships, such as cohabitation and LAT-relationships, have become more and more common in the past decades. The prevalence of marriages decreased and they are formed at later ages, while divorce and separation rates, even among couples with children, increased dramatically. As a result, an ever-growing proportion of children have experiences of living with a single parent, usually the mother, or with a stepparent (Sobotka, Toulemon 2008). The development of modern family patterns has been accompanied by dramatic changes in gender relations, also known as the gender revolution (Goldscheider 2000). Women entered the public sphere, approaching participation rates of men in education, even at higher levels, and in the labour market. As their horizons expanded anticipating a long and continuous work life, and their bargaining position within the family improved, the role of the economic provider has become part of women's identity (Goldin 2006). At the same time, there have been few signs from men's side to acquire a share of family responsibilities, i.e. childcare and domestic tasks that would equal that of women (Bernhardt 2004; Neuwirth, Wernhart 2008). Thus, gender relations within the family have changed very little (Blossfeld, Drobnic 2001). This has led to incoherence in the levels of gender equity in what McDonald (2000) calls the individual-oriented institutions of the public sphere and family-oriented institutions of the private sphere. As a result, fertility declined and has remained at the present low levels. Substantial changes in norms and values have also facilitated the spread of new family patterns. Individualisation of the life course has opened the way for low fertility. As self-fulfilment and self-realisation have been increasingly emphasised, parenthood has become one of many possible but competing choices, which may be passed upon without any sanctions (van de Kaa 1987, 2004). …

Overview Chapter 2: Parity distribution and completed family size in Europe: Incipient decline of the two-child family model?

Abstract: By the end of the 20th century the two-child family became the norm throughout Europe. Between 40 and over 50 percent of women in the 1950s and 1960s cohorts had two children. There were some incipient signs that shares of two-child families were declining especially in Central and Eastern and Southern Europe. An increase in childlessness among recent generations was an almost universal trend. The increase in proportions of one-child families was prominent in CEE and in SE. Wherever shares of childless women and of women with one child continue to grow the obvious result will be entrenched below replacement fertility. Much depends on progression ratios to first and to second births. In CEE mainly the progression ratios to second births are declining. In the Nordic countries progression ratios to first and to second births were relatively stable and even more so in France. Altogether most people opt for two children very few for three or more the frequency of the one-child family is increasingas are the proportions of people remaining childless. The latter trends were more pronounced in Southern Central and Eastern Europe and not so much in Northern and Western countries. (authors)

Czech Republic: A rapid transformation of fertility and family behaviour after the collapse of state socialism.

Abstract: Following the swift demise of the state-socialist regime in 1989 a profound transformation of family and fertility patterns has taken place in the Czech Republic. Family formation has been postponed and period fertility rates have fallen to very low levels especially among young adults. Unmarried cohabitation has become relatively widespread and marriages have been progressively delayed or even foregone. These rapid shifts in family-related behaviour were primarily driven by a period change and resulted in a sharp discontinuity in cohort patterns of union formation and childbearing. We argue that the rapid change in family-related behaviour after 1990 was driven by a fundamental shift in the constraints and incentives for childbearing which was conducive to later and more carefully planned family formation. The rapidity of observed changes can be explained as the outcome of a simultaneous occurrence of several factors especially the expansion of higher education the emergence of new opportunities competing with family life increasing job competition rising economic uncertainty in young adulthood and changing partnership behaviour. (authors)

The modal age at death and the shifting mortality hypothesis.

Abstract: The modal age at death is used to study the shifting mortality scenario experienced by low mortality countries. The relations of the life table functions at the modal age are analyzed using mortality models. In the models the modal age increases over time but there is an asymptotic approximation towards a constant number of deaths and standard deviation from the mode. The findings are compared to changes observed in populations with historical mortality data. As shown here the shifting mortality scenario is a process that might be expected if the current mortality changes maintain their pace. By focusing on the modal age at death a new perspective on the analysis of human longevity is revealed. (authors)

Trends in living arrangements in Europe: Convergence or divergence?

Abstract: This article uses data from the Labour Force Surveys to examine trends in the living arrangements of European men and women aged 20 to 75 between 1987 and 2002. Some trends, like the decline in mean household size and the increase in living as a lone mother have occurred all across Europe. Other trends have been more pronounced or have even been limited to specific parts of Europe. In combination, it appears that the differences in living arrangements across Europe might have grown larger in the last fifteen to twenty years. Large differences in living arrangements remain along geographical divides.

High Suburban Fertility : Evidence from Four Northern European Countries

Abstract: While numerous studies have compared urban and rural fertility rates across Europe, virtually no studies have distinguished suburbs as a distinct residential context. This study examines fertility ...

Summary and general conclusions: Childbearing Trends and Policies in Europe

Abstract: European fertility early in the 21st century was at its lowest level since the Second World War. This study explores contemporary childbearing trends and policies in Europe, and gives detailed atte ...

Beyond denomination: The relationship between religion and family planning in rural Malawi

Abstract: Despite the centrality of religion and fertility to life in rural Africa, the relationship between the two remains poorly understood. The study presented here uses unique integrated individual and congregational level data from rural Malawi to examine religious influences on contraceptive use. In this religiously diverse population, we find evidence that the particular characteristics of a congregation—leader’s positive attitudes toward family planning and discussion of sexual morality, which do not fall along broad denominational lines—are more relevant than denominational categories for predicting women’s contraceptive use. We further find evidence for a relationship between religious socialization and contraceptive behavior.

Italy: Delayed adaptation of social institutions to changes in family behaviour

Abstract: Considering its very low fertility and high age at childbearing Italy stands alone in the European context and can hardly be compared with other countries even those in the Southern region. The fertility decline occurred without any radical change in family formation. Individuals still choose (religious) marriage for leaving their parental home and rates of marital dissolution and subsequent step-family formation are low. Marriage is being postponed and fewer people marry. The behaviours of young people are particularly alarming. There is a delay in all life cycle stages: end of education entry into the labour market exit from the parental family entry into union and managing an independent household. Changes in family formation and childbearing are constrained and slowed down by a substantial delay (or even failure) with which the institutional and cultural framework has adapted to changes in economic and social conditions in particular to the growth of the service sector the increase in female employment and the female level of education. In a Catholic country that has been led for almost half a century by a political party with a Catholic ideology the paucity of attention to childhood and youth seems incomprehensible. Social policies focus on marriage-based families already formed and on the phases of life related to pregnancy delivery and the first months of a newborns life while forming a family and childbearing choices are considered private affairs and neglected. (authors)

Overview Chapter 8: The impact of public policies on European fertility

Abstract: This chapter outlines the positions in the current debate about the possibility of using public policies to influence fertility. We note the polarization between, on the one hand, those who view pu ...

Germany: Family Diversity with Low Actual and Desired Fertility

Abstract: Germany is a low-fertility country with a rapidly ageing population and will remain so for the foreseeable future. There are several reasons for this trend. Germany is among the countries with the highest rates of childlessness in the world and childlessness has become widely accepted. This is illustrated by changes in living arrangements. A broad range of living arrangements has been added to the basic model of marriage with children; namely single living non-marital cohabitation lone parenthood patchwork families and living apart together. A culture of individualism has spread in Germany which forms the basis for widespread decisions against family formation. The desired number of children has become low and family policy is considered to be a failure in terms of its influence on fertility. German family policy has had a traditional orientation centred on monetary support to families and on the promotion of the male breadwinner model. Women have been largely forced to choose between familyand work and leave the labour market when a child is born. The still prevailing concept of family policy does not help to reduce the pressure to choose between work and family life and thus makes it easier to decide not to have children especially for highly educated women. A change in family policy is needed which will enable couples to choose between the breadwinner-housewife and the reconciliation model. Gradually this change is starting to take place. (authors)

Ukraine: On the border between old and new in uncertain times.

Abstract: This chapter provides an overview of the demographic situation in Ukraine, including explanations for the decline to very low fertility and changes in family policy. Drawing on official statistics, survey data, and focus group interviews, the analysis shows that the country’s decline to lowest-low fertility is primarily due to the postponement of or the reduction in second births, as opposed to the postponement of first births. The chapter includes a discussion on the link between low fertility and changing marriage patterns, contraceptive prevalence, and abortion. The author then reviews the evidence for the leading explanations of fertility decline in Ukraine, including economic uncertainty, social anomie, the Second Demographic Transition, and unequal gender relations. In addition, the author proposes unexplored factors that may lead to fertility limitation, such as the increasing difficulty of combining work and childrearing, insufficient housing, changes in intergenerational support, and the deterioration of health lifestyles and marital relations.

England and Wales: Stable fertility and pronounced social status differences

Abstract: For nearly three decades, the total fertility rate in England and Wales has remained high relative to other European countries, and stable at about 1.7 births per woman. In this chapter, we examine trends in both period and cohort fertility throughout the twentieth century, and demonstrate some important differences across demographic and social groups in the timing and quantum of fertility. Breaking with a market-oriented and laissez-faire approach to work and family issues, the last 10 years have seen the introduction of new social and economic policies aimed at providing greater support to families with children. However, the effect of the changes is likely to be limited to families on the lower end of the income scale. Rather than facilitating work and parenthood, some policies create incentives for a traditional gendered division of labour. Fertility appears to have remained stable despite, rather than because of, government actions.