Showing papers in "Foreign Affairs in 2002"

Climate change 2001: the scientific basis

Abstract: Summary for policymakers Technical summary 1. The climate system - an overview 2. Observed climate variability and change 3. The carbon cycle and atmospheric CO2 4. Atmospheric chemistry and greenhouse gases 5. Aerosols, their direct and indirect effects 6. Radiative forcing of climate change 7. Physical climate processes and feedbacks 8. Model evaluation 9. Projections of future climate change 10. Regional climate simulation - evaluation and projections 11. Changes in sea level 12. Detection of climate change and attribution of causes 13. Climate scenario development 14. Advancing our understanding Glossary Index Appendix.

Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India

Abstract: Acknowledgments ix Abbreviations xv PART ONE: THE "INVENTION" OF CASTE 1 One: Introduction: The Modernity of Caste 3 Two: Homo Hierarchicus: The Origins of an Idea 19 Three: The Ethnographic State 43 PART TWO: COLONIZATION OF THE ARCHIVE 61 Four: The Original Caste: Social Identity in the Old Regime 63 Five: The Textualization of Tradition: Biography of an Archive 81 Six: The Imperial Archive: Colonial Knowledge and Colonial Rule 107 PART THREE: THE ETHNOGRAPHIC STATE 125 Seven: The Conversion of Caste 127 Eight: The Policing of Tradition: Colonial Anthropology and the Invention of Custom 149 Nine: The Body of Caste: Anthropology and the Criminalization of Caste 173 Ten: The Enumeration of Caste: Anthropology as Colonial Rule 198 PART FOUR: RECASTING INDIA: CASTE, COMMUNITY, AND POLITICS 229 Eleven: Toward a Nationalist Sociology of India: Nationalism and Brahmanism 231 Twelve: The Reformation of Caste: Periyar, Ambedkar, and Gandhi 255 Thirteen: Caste Politics and the Politics of Caste 275 Fourteen: Conclusion: Caste and the Postcolonial Predicament 297 Coda: The Burden of the Past: On Colonialism and the Writing of History 303 Notes 317 Index 359

The emergence of private authority in global governance

Abstract: Part I. Introduction: Theorizing Private Authority: 1. The emergence of private authority in the international system Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker 2. Private regimes and inter-firm cooperation A. Claire Cutler Part II. Market Authority: Globalization and 'Globaloney': 3. Economic governance in an electronically networked global economy Stephen J. Kobrin 4. Global markets, national authority and the problem of legitimation: the case of finance Louis W. Pauly 5. The state and globalization Saskia Sassen Part III. Moral Authority: Global Civil Society and Transnational Religious Movements: 6. 'Regulation for the rest of us?' Global civil society and the privatisation of transnational regulation Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Cathleen Fogel 7. The global dimensions of religious terrorism Mark Juergensmeyer Part IV. Illicit Authority: Mafias and Mercenaries: 8. Transnational organized crime and the state Phil Williams 9. The return of the dogs of war? The privatisation of security in Africa Bernadette Methuen and Ian Taylor Part V. Conclusions and Directions: 10. Private authority as global governance Thomas J. Biersteker and Rodney Bruce Hall.

The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone

Abstract: From the Publisher: "What role should America play in the world? What key challenges face us in the 21st century, and how should we define our national interests? These questions have been given electrifying new significance in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001." Not since Rome has any nation had so much economic, cultural, and military power, but that power does not allow us to solve global problems like terrorism, environmental degradation, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction without involving other nations. In The Paradox of American Power, Joseph S. Nye Jr. focuses on the rise of these and other new challenges and explains clearly why America must adopt a more cooperative engagement with the rest of the world.

All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization

Abstract: How does regional interdependence influence the prospects for conflict, integration, and democratization? Some researchers look at the international system at large and disregard the enormous regional variations Others take the concept of sovereignty literally and treat each nation-state as fully independent Kristian Skrede Gleditsch looks at disparate zones in the international system to see how conflict, integration, and democracy have clustered over time and space He argues that the most interesting aspects of international politics are regional rather than fully global or exclusively national Differences in the local context of interaction influence states' international behavior as well as their domestic attributes In All International Politics Is Local, Gleditsch clarifies that isolating the domestic processes within countries cannot account for the observed variation in distribution of political democracy over time and space, and that the likelihood of transitions is strongly related to changes in neighboring countries and the prior history of the regional context Finally, he demonstrates how spatial and statistical techniques can be used to address regional interdependence among actors and its implications

The Cold War and the color line : American race relations in the global arena

Abstract: Preface Prologue 1. Race and Foreign Relations before 1945 2. Jim Crow's Coming Out 3. The Last Hurrah of the Old Color Line 4. Revolutions in the American South and Southern Africa 5. The Perilous Path to Equality 6. The End of the Cold War and White Supremacy Epilogue Notes Archives and Manuscript Collections Index

Human Frontiers, Environments and Disease: Past Patterns, Uncertain Futures

Abstract: This compelling account charts the relentless trajectory of humankind, and its changing survival and disease patterns, across place and time from when our ancient ancestors roamed the African Savannah to today's populous, industrialised, globalising world. This expansion of human frontiers - geographic, climatic, cultural and technological - has encountered frequent setbacks from disease, famine and dwindling resources. The social and environmental transformations wrought by agrarianism, industrialisation, fertility control, social modernisation, urbanisation and mass consumption have profoundly affected patterns of health and disease. Today, as life expectancies rise, the planet's ecosystems are being damaged by the combined weight of population size and intensive economic activity. Global warming, stratospheric ozone depletion and loss of biodiversity pose large-scale hazards to human health and survival. Recognising this, can we achieve a transition to sustainability? This and other profound questions underlie this chronicle of expansive human activity, social change, environmental impact and their health consequences.

Failed States in a World of Terror

Abstract: IN THE WAKE of September 1i, the threat of terrorism has given the problem of failed nation-states an immediacy and importance that transcends its previous humanitarian dimension. Since the early 199os, wars in and among failed states have killed about eight million people, most of them civilians, and displaced another four million. The number of those impoverished, malnourished, and deprived of fundamental needs such as security, health care, and education has totaled in the hundreds of millions. Although the phenomenon of state failure is not new, it has become much more relevant and worrying than ever before. In less interconnected eras, state weakness could be isolated and kept distant. Failure had fewer implications for peace and security. Now, these states pose dangers not only to themselves and their neighbors but also to peoples around the globe. Preventing states from failing, and resuscitating those that do fail, are thus strategic and moral imperatives. But failed states are not homogeneous. The nature of state failure varies from place to place, sometimes dramatically. Failure and weak ness can flow from a nation's geographical, physical, historical, and

America's Imperial Ambition

Abstract: IN THE SHADOWS of the Bush administration's war on terrorism, sweeping new ideas are circulating about U.S. grand strategy and the restructuring oftoday's unipolar world. They call for American unilateral and preemptive, even preventive, use of force, facilitated if possible by coalitions of the willing-but ultimately unconstrained by the rules and norms ofthe international community. At the extreme, these notions form a neoimperial vision in which the United States arrogates to itself the global role of setting standards, determining threats, using force, and meting out justice. It is a vision in which sovereignty becomes more absolute for America even as it becomes more conditional for countries that challenge Washington's standards of internal and external behavior. It is a vision made necessary-at least in the eyes of its advocates-by the new and apocalyptic character of contemporary terrorist threats and by America's unprecedented global dominance. These radical strategic ideas and impulses could transform today's world order in a way that the end of the Cold War, strangely enough, did not. The exigencies of fighting terrorism in Afghanistan and the debate over intervening in Iraq obscure the profundity of this geopolitical challenge. Blueprints have not been produced, and Yalta-style summits have not been convened, but actions are afoot to dramatically alter the political order that the United States has built with its partners since the 1940s. The twin new realities of our age-catastrophic terrorism

Spreading the Wealth

Abstract: ONE OF THE MAIN CLAIMS of the antiglobalization movement is that globalization is widening the gap between the haves and the have-nots. It benefits the rich and does little for the poor, perhaps even making their lot harder. As union leader Jay Mazur put it in these pages, "globalization has dramatically increased inequality between and within nations" ("Labor's New Internationalism," January/February 2000). The problem with this new conventional wisdom is that the best evidence available shows the exact oppo site to be true. So far, the current wave of globalization, which started around 1980, has actually promoted economic equality and reduced poverty. Global economic integration has complex effects on income, culture, society, and the environment. But in the debate over globalization's merits, its impact on poverty is particularly important. If international trade and investment primarily benefit the rich, many people will feel that restricting trade to protect jobs, culture, or the environment is worth the costs. But if restricting trade imposes further hardship on poor people in the developing world, many of the same people will think otherwise. Three facts bear on this question. First, a long-term global trend toward greater inequality prevailed for at least 200 years; it peaked around 1975. But since then, it has stabilized and possibly even reversed. The chief reason for the change has been the accelerated growth of two large and initially poor countries: China and India.

Transforming the Military

Abstract: JUST BEFORE Christmas last year, I traveled to Afghanistan and the neighboring countries, where I had the opportunity to spend time with American troops in the field. Among the many I met was an extraordinary group of men: the special forces who had been involved in the attack on Mazar-i-Sharif. From the moment they landed in Afghanistan, these troops began adapting to the circumstances on the ground. They sported beards and traditional scarves and rode horses trained to run into machine gun fire. They used pack mules to transport equipment across some of the roughest terrain in the world, riding at night, in darkness, near minefields and along narrow mountain trails with drops so sheer that, as one soldier put it, "it took me a week to ease the death-grip on my horse." Many had never been on horseback before. As they linked up and trained with anti-Taliban forces, they learned from their new allies about the realities of war on Afghan soil and assisted them with weapons, food, supplies, tactics, and training. And they planned the assault on Mazar-i-Sharif. On the appointed day, one of the special forces teams slipped in and hid well behind enemy lines, ready to call in the air strikes. The bomb blasts would be the signal for the others to charge. When the moment came, they signaled their targets to coalition aircraft and looked at their watches. "Two minutes." "Thirty seconds." "Fifteen seconds." Then, out of nowhere, a hail of precision-guided bombs began to land on Taliban and al Qaeda positions. The explosions were deafening, and the timing so precise that, as the soldiers described it, hundreds

American Primacy in Perspective

Abstract: MORE THAN A DECADE AGO, political columnist Charles Krauthammer proclaimed in these pages the arrival of what he called a "unipolar moment," a period in which one superpower, the United States, stood clearly above the rest of the international community ("The Unipolar Moment," America and the World 19go/91). In the following years the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia's economic and military decline accelerated, and Japan stagnated, while the United States experienced the longest and one of the most vigorous economic expansions in its history. Yet toward the close of the century readers could find political scientist Samuel Huntington arguing here that unipolarity had already given way to a "uni-multipolar" structure, which in turn would soon become unambiguously multipolar ("The Lonely Superpower," March/April 1999). And despite the boasting rhetoric of American officials, Huntington was not alone in his views. Polls showed that more than 40 percent of Americans had come to agree that the United States was now merely one of several leading powers a number that had risen steadily for several years. Why did the unipolarity argument seem less persuasive to many even as U.S. power appeared to grow? Largely because the goal posts were moved. Krauthammer's definition of unipolarity, as a system with only one pole, made sense in the immediate wake of a Cold War

The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire

Abstract: Lawrence Summers, the dominant professor-politician of the Clinton years, used to say that the United States is history's only nonimperialist superpower. But is this claim anything to boast about today? The war on terrorism has focused attention on the chaotic states that provide profit and sanctuary to nihilist outlaws, from Sudan and Afghanistan to Sierra Leone and Somalia. When such power vacuums threatened great powers in the past, they had a ready solution: imperial ism. But since World War II, that option has been ruled out. After more than two millennia of empire, orderly societies now refuse to impose their own institutions on disorderly ones. This anti-imperialist restraint is becoming harder to sustain, however, as the disorder in poor countries grows more threatening. Civil wars have grown nastier and longer. In a study of 52 conflicts since 1960, a recent World Bank study found that wars started after 1980 lasted three times longer than those beginning in the preceding two decades. Because wars last longer, the number of countries embroiled in them is growing. And the trend toward violent disorder may prove self sustaining, for war breeds the conditions that make fresh conflict likely. Once a nation descends into violence, its people focus on immediate survival rather than on the longer term. Saving, investment, and wealth creation taper off; government officials seek spoils for their cronies rather than designing policies that might build long-term prosperity. A cycle of poverty, instability, and violence emerges. There is another reason why state failures may multiply. Violence and social disorder are linked to rapid population growth, and this demographic pressure shows no sign of abating. In the next 20 years, the world's population is projected to grow from around six billion to eight billion, with nearly all of the increase concentrated in poor countries. Some of the sharpest demographic stresses will be concentrated in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Palestinian territories-all Islamic societies with powerful currents of anti-Western extremism. Only sub-Saharan Africa

Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food

Abstract: Table of Contents - Metaphor and Matrix Representations of Power Parameters of The Political Alternative Causalities Matrix I-The Father-Chief - Rights and Responsibilities Matrix II-Gender and Generation - Women, the Paternal Order, and the Alternation of Power Democracy and the Logic of Legitimacy

Soldiers and civilians : the civil-military gap and American national security

Abstract: Soldiers and Civilians analyzes the emerging civil-military "gap" in the United States, drawing on a major survey of military officers, civilian leaders, and the general public. The book's contributors, leading scholars of defense policy, find that numerous schisms have undermined civil-military cooperation and harmed military effectiveness.

Clash of Globalizations

Abstract: What is the state of international relations today? In the 1990s, specialists concentrated on the partial disintegration of the global order’s traditional foundations: states. During that decade, many countries, often those born of decolonization, revealed themselves to be no more than pseudostates, without solid institutions, internal cohesion, or national consciousness. The end of communist coercion in the former Soviet Union and in the former Yugoslavia also revealed long-hidden ethnic tensions. Minorities that were or considered themselves oppressed demanded independence. In Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Haiti, rulers waged open warfare against their subjects. These wars increased the importance of humanitarian interventions, which came at the expense of the hallowed principles of national sovereignty and nonintervention. Thus the dominant tension of the decade was the clash between the fragmentation of states (and the state system) and the progress of economic, cultural, and political integration -in other words, globalization.

You've Got Dissent!: Chinese Dissident Use of the Internet and Beijing's Counter-Strategies

Abstract: Chinese dissents are increasingly communicating via the Internet, but Beijing still has the upper hand.

Smart sanctions : targeting economic statecraft

Abstract: Chapter 1 Introduction Chapter 2 Targeted Financial Sanctions: Smart Sanctions that Do Work Chapter 3 Targeted Financial Sanctions: The U.S. Model Chapter 4 Targeted Financial Sanctions: Harmonizing National Legislation and Regulatory Practices Chapter 5 European Union Sanctions against the Federal Republic of yugoslavia from 1998 to 2000: A Special Exercise in Targeting Chapter 6 Arms Embargoes: In Name Only? Chapter 7 Putting More Teeth in the UN Arms Embargoes Chapter 8 The UN Experience with Travel Sanctions: Selected Cases and Conclusions Chapter 9 Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions Chapter 10 United Nations Economic Sanctions: Minimizing Adverse Effects on Nontarget States Chapter 11 Smart Sanctions in Iraq: Policy Options Chapter 12 Appendix A Chapter 13 Appendix B

Is Southeast Asia the Second Front

Abstract: PHASE 1.5 IN LATE JANUARY 2002, the Bush administration sent 66o U.S. troops to the Philippines, deploying them in the south ofthe archipelago to assist in hostage rescue and counterinsurgency operations. The move was widely heralded as the opening of a second front in Wash ington's war on terrorism. And that perception was understandable: after all, the deployment followed hard on the heels of the arrests of dozens of alleged al Qaeda operatives in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. With the Taliban in Afghanistan having been routed, Southeast Asia-home to radical Islamist groups such as the Jemaah Islamiah (ji), Abu Sayyaf, and the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM)-was starting to seem like the new home base for the terrorist movement that had brought down the World Trade Center. Whether or not this is actually the case, September ii and its after math have already transformed U.S. relations with many Southeast Asian nations. America's previously chilly interactions with Muslim majority Malaysia have thawed considerably; Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad has won plaudits from Washington for supporting the U.S. war on terrorism. Indonesia, meanwhile, has come in for heavy American criticism for failing to be similarly cooperative and crack down on its own extremists (although the United States has softened its tone on this issue in recent months). At the same time, many U.S.

Humanitarianism in Crisis

Abstract: THE HUMANITARIAN WORLD emerged from the 1990S both sad dened and chastened. Again and again nonprofit and UN personnel had been overwhelmed by the magnitude of particular crises-as when 2 million people crossed from Rwanda into Zaire in 1994, or when 8oo,ooo Kosovar Albanians were forcibly deported from the province by Serb forces in the spring of 1999. Even more unnerving was the sense that, often despite the relief groups' own best efforts, the moral dilemmas attendant on their actions had only grown more acute over the course of the decade. Even so, humanitarians did not give up. Nongovernmental organizations (NGos) and UN agencies multiplied their efforts to refine their operations in light of the lessons of Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Still, by the beginning of the twenty first century, experienced relief workers had come to accept the new conventional wisdom that there are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems. From this simple truth, however, diametrically opposing conclusions can be drawn about what humanitarian action should involve. Many persistent advocates of humanitarianism, including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, see it as one of a number of "pillars" supporting a promising new liberal world order. Such an order, they seem to believe, can be constructed to fill the vacuum created by globalization's undermining of the idea of state sovereignty. It will also be built on

The future of AIDS.

Abstract: In the decades ahead the center of the global HIV/AIDS pandemic is set to shift from Africa to Eurasia The death toll in that regions three pivotal countries--Russia India and China--could be staggering This will assuredly be a humanitarian tragedy but it will be much more than that The disease will alter the economic potential of the regions major states and the global balance of power Moscow New Delhi and Beijing could take steps to mitigate the disaster--but so far they have not (authors)

The Future of Conservation

Abstract: IF YOU WANT TO SEE wild nature, your options are declining. Within a few decades, orangutans, Asian elephants, Sumatran tigers, Chilean flamingos, Amur leopards, and many other well-known species will likely disappear from the wild. The problems are not limited to large, charismatic animals. Untouched wild places have now shrunk to one sixth of the Earth's land surface. Virtually all of the world's fisheries are distressed, and oceans have been depleted of predator fish, marine mammals, and birds. Tropical forests may still be dense with trees, but thanks to excessive hunting they no longer contain all the key animals needed to sustain their value to the Earth. Wild nature is in deep distress, and whatever their occasional protes tations, the international institutions charged with Earth's care are not managing it with an eye on "sustainability." Rising to that challenge will test the limits of diplomacy and development. It will also demand strategies in the private sector to rescue conservation from development and poverty alleviation from ecological degradation. Global losses in biodiversity and wild places are not the stuff of environmental alarmism; they describe our world today, as detailed in volumes of hard scientific evidence. The long-term impact can be calculated in economic terms, but in truth, it represents much more. In the foreseeable future, most of the world's population will not know nature in any direct way. The cultural traditions and languages of peoples dependent on large natural ecosystems will disappear. Great animal assemblages and unique ecological events like those that have

China in the World Market: Chinese Industry and International Sources of Reform in the Post-Mao Era

Abstract: 1. China as a latecomer in world industrial markets 2. The outside world as an impetus for change in China 3. Tailor to the world: China's emergence as a global power in textiles 4. Beating the system with industrial restructuring: China's response to the multifiber arrangement (MFA) 5. China looms large: reform and rationalization in the textile industry 6. Industrial change in the shadow of the MFA: the role of top-level strategy, mid-level intervention, and low-level demand in China's textile industry 7. Chinese shipbuilding: the modest origins of an emerging industrial giant 8. Dangerous currents: navigating boom and bust cycles in international shipbuilding 9. Chinese shipbuilding and global surplus capacity: making a virtue out of necessity 10. Market-oriented solutions for industrial adjustment: the changing pattern of state intervention in Chinese shipbuilding 11. Who did what to whom?: making sense of the reform process in China's shipbuilding industry 12. External shocks, state capacity, and national responses for economic adjustment: explaining industrial change in China 13. China in the contemporary international political economy Appendix: contours of the research effort.