Showing papers in "Harvard Business Review in 1993"

Building a learning organization.

Abstract: Continuous improvement programs are proliferating as corporations seek to better themselves and gain an edge. Unfortunately, however, failed programs far outnumber successes, and improvement rates remain low. That's because most companies have failed to grasp a basic truth. Before people and companies can improve, they first must learn. And to do this, they need to look beyond rhetoric and high philosophy and focus on the fundamentals. Three critical issues must be addressed before a company can truly become a learning organization, writes HBS Professor David Garvin. First is the question of meaning: a well-grounded, easy-to-apply definition of a learning organization. Second comes management: clearer operational guidelines for practice. Finally, better tools for measurement can assess an organization's rate and level of learning. Using these "three Ms" as a framework, Garvin defines learning organizations as skilled at five main activities: systematic problem solving, experimentation with new approaches, learning from past experience, learning from the best practices of others, and transferring knowledge quickly and efficiently throughout the organization. And since you can't manage something if you can't measure it, a complete learning audit is a must. That includes measuring cognitive and behavioral changes as well as tangible improvements in results. No learning organization is built overnight. Success comes from carefully cultivated attitudes, commitments, and management processes that accrue slowly and steadily. The first step is to foster an environment conducive to learning. Analog Devices, Chaparral Steel, Xerox, GE, and other companies provide enlightened examples.

Putting the balanced scorecard to work

Abstract: In this article Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton report on the Balance Scorecard. Before the Balanced Scorecard companies have used various measurement systems that have made incremental improvements and concentrated mostly on the company's financials. The Balanced Scorecard shows you four different perspectives in which to choose measures that can redefine a company's processes measurement system so short term and long term objectives are in balance with each other. When using the Balanced Scorecard a company is no longer needs to worry about small incremental improvements, but a new processes measurement system that will allow a company to get where it wants to go.

From value chain to value constellation: designing interactive strategy

Abstract: In today's fast-changing competitive environment, strategy is no longer a matter of positioning a fixed set of activities along that old industrial model, the value chain. Successful companies increasingly do not just add value, they reinvent it. The key strategic task is to reconfigure roles and relationships among a constellation of actors - suppliers, partners, customers - in order to mobilize the creation of value by new combinations of players. What is so different about this new logic of value? It breaks down the distinction between products and services and combines them into activity-based "offerings" from which customers can create value for themselves. But as potential offerings grow more complex, so do the relationships necessary to create them. As a result, a company's strategic task becomes the ongoing reconfiguration and integration of its competencies and customers. The authors provide three illustrations of these new rules of strategy. IKEA has blossomed into the world's largest retailer of home furnishings by redefining the relationships and organizational practices of the furniture business. Danish pharmacies and their national association have used the opportunity of health care reform to reconfigure their relationships with customers, doctors, hospitals, drug manufacturers, and with Danish and international health organizations to enlarge their role, competencies, and profits. French public-service concessionaires have mastered the art of conducting a creative dialogue between their customers - local governments in France and around the world - and a perpetually expanding set of infrastructure competencies.

Predators and prey: a new ecology of competition.

Abstract: Much has been written about networks, strategic alliances, and virtual organizations. Yet these currently popular frameworks provide little systematic assistance when it comes to out-innovating the competition. That's because most managers still view the problem in the old way: companies go head-to-head in an industry, battling for market share. James Moore sets up a new metaphor for competition drawn from the study of biology and social systems. He suggests that a company be viewed not as a member of a single industry but as a part of a business ecosystem that crosses a variety of industries. In a business ecosystem, companies "co-evolve" around a new innovation, working cooperatively and competitively to support new products and satisfy customer needs. Apple Computer, for example, leads an ecosystem that covers personal computers, consumer electronics, information, and communications. In any larger business environment, several ecosystems may vie for survival and dominance, such as the IBM and Apple ecosystems in personal computers or Wal-Mart and K mart in discount retailing. In fact, it's largely competition among business ecosystems, not individual companies, that's fueling today's industrial transformation. Managers can't afford to ignore the birth of new ecosystems or the competition among those that already exist. Whether that means investing in the right new technology, signing on suppliers to expand a growing business, developing crucial elements of value to maintain leadership, or incorporating new innovations to fend off obsolescence, executives must understand the evolutionary stages all business ecosystems go through and, more important, how to direct those changes.

Loyalty-based management.

Abstract: Despite a flurry of activities aimed at serving customers better, few companies have systematically revamped their operations with customer loyalty in mind. Instead, most have adopted improvement programs ad hoc, and paybacks haven't materialized. Building a highly loyal customer base must be integral to a company's basic business strategy. Loyalty leaders like MBNA credit cards are successful because they have designed their entire business systems around customer loyalty--a self-reinforcing system in which the company delivers superior value consistently and reinvents cash flows to find and keep high-quality customers and employees. The economic benefits of high customer loyalty are measurable. When a company consistently delivers superior value and wins customer loyalty, market share and revenues go up, and the cost of acquiring new customers goes down. The better economics mean the company can pay workers better, which sets off a whole chain of events. Increased pay boosts employee moral and commitment; as employees stay longer, their productivity goes up and training costs fall; employees' overall job satisfaction, combined with their experience, helps them serve customers better; and customers are then more inclined to stay loyal to the company. Finally, as the best customers and employees become part of the loyalty-based system, competitors are left to survive with less desirable customers and less talented employees. To compete on loyalty, a company must understand the relationships between customer retention and the other parts of the business--and be able to quantify the linkages between loyalty and profits. It involves rethinking and aligning four important aspects of the business: customers, product/service offering, employees, and measurement systems.

Customer intimacy and other value disciplines

Abstract: How was Dell Computer able to charge out of nowhere and outmaneuver Compaq and other leaders of the personal computer industry? Why are Home Depot’s competitors losing market share to this fast-growing retailer of do-it-yourself supplies when they are all selling similar goods? How did Nike, a start-up company with no reputation behind it, manage to run past Adidas, a longtime solid performer in the sport-shoe market?

Informal networks: the company behind the chart

Abstract: A glance at an organizational chart can show who's the boss and who reports to whom. But this formal chart won't reveal which people confer on technical matters or discuss office politics over lunch. Much of the real work in any company gets done through this informal organization with its complex networks of relationships that cross functions and divisions. According to consultants David Krackhardt and Jeffrey Hanson, managers can harness the true power in their companies by diagramming three types of networks: the advice network, which reveals the people to whom others turn to get work done; the trust network, which uncovers who shares delicate information; and the communication network, which shows who talks about work-related matters. Using employee questionnaires, managers can generate network maps that will get to the root of many organizational problems. When a task force in a computer company, for example, was not achieving its goals, the CEO turned to network maps to find out why. He discovered that the task force leader was central in the advice network but marginal in the trust network. Task force members did not believe he would look out for their interests, so the CEO used the trust map to find someone to share responsibility for the group. And when a bank manager saw in the network map that there was little communication between tellers and supervisors, he looked for ways to foster interaction among employees of all levels. As companies continue to flatten and rely on teams, managers must rely less on their authority and more on understanding these informal networks. Managers who can use maps to identify, leverage, and revamp informal networks will have the key to success.

Strategy as stretch and leverage

Abstract: Global competition is not just product versus product or company versus company. It is mind-set versus mind-set. Driven to understand the dynamics of competition, we have learned a lot about what makes one company more successful than another. But to find the root of competitiveness--to understand why some companies create new forms of competitive advantage while others watch and follow--we must look at strategic mind-sets. For many managers, "being strategic" means pursuing opportunities that fit the company's resources. This approach is not wrong, Gary Hamel and C.K. Prahalad contend, but it obscures an approach in which "stretch" supplements fit and being strategic means creating a chasm between ambition and resources. Toyota, CNN, British Airways, Sony, and others all displaced competitors with stronger reputations and deeper pockets. Their secret? In each case, the winner had greater ambition than its well-endowed rivals. Winners also find less resource-intensive ways of achieving their ambitious goals. This is where leverage complements the strategic allocation of resources. Managers at competitive companies can get a bigger bang for their buck in five basic ways: by concentrating resources around strategic goals; by accumulating resources more efficiently; by complementing one kind of resource with another; by conserving resources whenever they can; and by recovering resources from the market-place as quickly as possible. As recent competitive battles have demonstrated, abundant resources can't guarantee continued industry leadership.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

Tailored logistics: the next advantage.

Abstract: How many top executives have ever visited with managers who move materials from the factory to the store? How many still reduce the costs of logistics to the rent of warehouses and the fees charged by common carriers? To judge by hours of senior management attention, logistics problems do not rank high. But logistics have the potential to become the next governing element of strategy. Whether they know it or not, senior managers of every retail store and diversified manufacturing company compete in logistically distinct businesses. Customer needs vary, and companies can tailor their logistics systems to serve their customers better and more profitably. Companies do not create value for customers and sustainable advantage for themselves merely by offering varieties of goods. Rather, they offer goods in distinct ways. A particular can of Coca-Cola, for example, might be a can of Coca-Cola going to a vending machine, or a can of Coca-Cola that comes with billing services. There is a fortune buried in this distinction. The goal of logistics strategy is building distinct approaches to distinct groups of customers. The first step is organizing a cross-functional team to proceed through the following steps: segmenting customers according to purchase criteria, establishing different standards of service for different customer segments, tailoring logistics pipelines to support each segment, and creating economics of scale to determine which assets can be shared among various pipelines. The goal of establishing logistically distinct businesses is familiar: improved knowledge of customers and improved means of satisfying them.

How to make reengineering really work

Abstract: Companies often squander their energies on attractive-looking projects that fail to produce bottom-line results A study of reengineering projects in over 100 companies reveals how difficult these projects are to plan and implement and, more important, how often they fail to achieve real business-unit impact. The study identified two factors -- breadth and depth -- that are critical in translating short-term, narrow-focus process improvements into long-term profits. Successful projects at Banca di America e di Italia, Siemens Nixdorf Service, and ATT measurements and incentives; organizational structure; information technology; shared values; and skills. Successful reengineering projects in diverse industries and locations demonstrate how companies can expand the dimensions of their reengineering projects. Senior executives at Banca di America e di Italia (BAI), AT&T, and Siemens Nixdorf Service, for example, set broad goals, from creating a paperless bank at BAI to becoming the most customer-responsive and skilled computer-servicing company at Siemens Nixdorf. They then completely restructured all organizational elements -- anything from the layout of BAI's branch offices to the skills required of AT&T's salespeople -- in order to implement the new designs successfully. Ultimately, however, a reengineering project -- like any major change program -- can produce lasting results only if senior executives invest their time and energy. As the experiences of BAI, AT&T, and Siemens Nixdorf reveal, large-scale reengineering exacts extraordinary effort at all levels of an organization. Without strong leadership from top management, the psychological and political disruptions that accompany such radical change can sabotage the project. …

What's the matter with business ethics?

Abstract: The more business ethics secures its status in campuses across the country, the more bewildering it appears to actual managers. It's not that managers dislike the idea of doing the right thing. As University of Toronto Assistant Professor Andrew Stark argues, far too many business ethicists just haven't offered them the practical advice they need. Before business ethics became a formal discipline, advocates of corporate social responsibility claimed that the market would ultimately reward ethical behavior. But ethics and interests did not always intersect so fruitfully in the real world. And when they did not, managers were left in the dark to grope for the right ethical course. In the 1970s, the brand-new field of business ethics came onto the scene to address this issue. Critical of the "ethics pays" approach, academics held that ethics and interests can and do conflict. Still, scholars took an equally unrealistic line. To them, a manager's motivation could be either altruistic or self-interested, but never both. In short, ethicists still weren't addressing the difficult moral dilemmas that managers face on a day-to-day basis, and only recently have they begun to do so. After some initial stumbles, ethicists are getting their hands dirty and seriously considering the costs of doing the right thing. Finally, a new business ethics is emerging that acknowledges and accepts the messy world of mixed motives. As a result, novel concepts are springing up: moderation, pragmatism, minimalism, among others.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)

How Continental Bank outsourced its "crown jewels.".

Abstract: No industry relies more on information than banking does, yet Continental, one of America's largest banks, outsources its information technology. Why? Because that's the best way to service the customers that form the core of the bank's business, says vice chairman Dick Huber. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Continental participated heavily with Penn Square Bank in energy investments. When falling energy prices burst Penn Square's bubble in 1982, Continental was stuck with more than $1 billion in bad loans. Eight years later when Dick Huber came on board, Continental was working hard to restore its once solid reputation. Executives had made many tough decisions already, altering the bank's focus from retail to business banking and laying off thousands of employees. Yet management still needed to cut costs and improve services to stay afloat. Regulators, investors, and analysts were watching every step. Continental executives, eager to focus on the bank's core mission of serving business customers, decided to outsource one after another in-house service--from cafeteria services to information technology. While conventional wisdom holds that banks must retain complete internal control of IT, Continental bucked this argument when it entered into a ten-year, multimillion-dollar contract with Integrated Systems Solutions Corporation. Continental is already reaping benefits from outsourcing IT. Most important, Continental staffers today focus on their true core competencies: intimate knowledge of customers' needs and relationships with customers.

How architecture wins technology wars.

Abstract: Signs of revolutionary transformation in the global computer industry are everywhere. A roll call of the major industry players reads like a waiting list in the emergency room. The usual explanations for the industry's turmoil are at best inadequate. Scale, friendly government policies, manufacturing capabilities, a strong position in desktop markets, excellent software, top design skills--none of these is sufficient, either by itself or in combination, to ensure competitive success in information technology. A new paradigm is required to explain patterns of success and failure. Simply stated, success flows to the company that manages to establish proprietary architectural control over a broad, fast-moving, competitive space. Architectural strategies have become crucial to information technology because of the astonishing rate of improvement in microprocessors and other semiconductor components. Since no single vendor can keep pace with the outpouring of cheap, powerful, mass-produced components, customers insist on stitching together their own local systems solutions. Architectures impose order on the system and make the interconnections possible. The architectural controller is the company that controls the standard by which the entire information package is assembled. Microsoft's Windows is an excellent example of this. Because of the popularity of Windows, companies like Lotus must conform their software to its parameters in order to compete for market share. In the 1990s, proprietary architectural control is not only possible but indispensable to competitive success. What's more, it has broader implications for organizational structure: architectural competition is giving rise to a new form of business organization.

How Bell Labs creates star performers.

Abstract: How can managers increase the productivity of professionals when most of their work goes on inside their heads? Robert Kelley and Janet Caplan believe that defining the difference between star performers and average workers is the answer. Many managers assume that top performers are just smarter. But the authors' research at the Bell Laboratories Switching Systems Business Unit (SSBU) has revealed that the real difference between stars and average workers is not IQ but the ways top performers do their jobs. Their study has led to a training program based on the strategies of star performers. The SSBU training program, known as the Productivity Enhancement Group (PEG), uses an expert model to demystify productivity. The star engineers selected to develop the expert model identified and ranked nine work strategies, such as taking initiative, networking, and self-management. Middle performers were also asked what makes for top-quality work, but their definitions and ranking of the strategies differed significantly from those of the top performers. Taking initiative, for example, meant something very different to an average worker than it did to a star. And for the middle performers, the ability to give good presentations was a core strategy, while it was peripheral for the top engineers. Once PEG got underway, respected engineers ran the training sessions, which included case studies, work-related exercises, and frank discussion. The benefits of the program were striking: participants and managers reported substantial productivity increases in both star and average performers. The PEG program may not be a blueprint for other companies, but its message is clear: managers must focus on people, not on technology, to increase productivity in the knowledge economy.

Made in U.S.A.: a renaissance in quality.

Abstract: In the opinion of some journalists and business leaders, Japan's preeminence in product quality is a direct consequence of lectures delivered 40 years ago in Tokyo by two Americans--W. Edwards Deming and Joseph M. Juran. According to Dr. Juran, this view is pure chauvinist nonsense. Despite the shoddiness of Japanese consumer goods before the war, the Japanese did have a quality tradition in the superb workmanship of certain ancient crafts and in the design and manufacture of their military hardware, which, at the outset of the war, was highly competitive with our own. It was just that the Japanese had never devoted engineering expertise, capital, or management attention to the quality of exportable consumer goods. The shock of losing the war changed that mind-set. When Dr. Juran first lectured in Japan in 1954, his audience consisted of 140 CEOs. He had given the very same lectures dozens of times in the United States, but never to top management. American CEOs concentrated their attention on financial reports. Quality was a discipline that they delegated to engineers and special quality departments. In Japan, senior executives took personal charge of managing for quality; trained their managers, engineers, and employees in quality methods; developed quality measurements; pursued quality change at a revolutionary pace; and kept at it year after year until, by the mid-1970s, Japan had passed the United States in quality manufacturing. The unsung heroes of the Japanese quality revolution were Japanese managers, not American experts. Now Dr. Juran sees the beginnings of a quality revolution in the United States as global competition drives managers to focus on their nondelegable responsibilities in quality management.

Crisis prevention: how to gear up your board.

Abstract: Today's critics of corporate boardrooms have plenty of ammunition. The two crucial responsibilities of boards-oversight of long-term company strategy and the selection, evaluation, and compensation of top management--were reduced to damage control during the 1980s. Walter Salmon, a longtime director, notes that while boards have improved since he began serving on them in 1961, they haven't kept pace with the need for real change. Based on over 30 years of boardroom experience, Salmon recommends against government reform of board practices. But he does prescribe a series of incremental changes as a remedy. To begin with, he suggests limiting the size of boards and increasing the number of outside directors on them. In fact, according to Salmon, only three insiders belong on a board: the CEO, the COO, and the CFO. Changing how committees function is also necessary for gearing up today's boards. The audit committee, for example, can periodically review "high-exposure areas" of a business, perhaps helping to prevent embarrassing drops in future profits. Compensation committees can structure incentive compensation for executives to emphasize long-term rather than short-term performance. And nominating committees should be responsible for finding new, independent directors--not the CEO. In general, boards as a whole must spot problems early and blow the whistle, exercising what Salmon calls, "constructive dissatisfaction." On a revitalized board, directors have enough confidence in the process to vigorously challenge one another, including the company's chief executive.