International Game Theory Review 

About: International Game Theory Review is an academic journal published by World Scientific. The journal publishes majorly in the area(s): Nash equilibrium & Repeated game. It has an ISSN identifier of 0219-1989. Over the lifetime, 723 publications have been published receiving 6825 citations.

A generic approach to coalition formation

Abstract: We propose an abstract approach to coalition formation that focuses on simple merge and split rules transforming partitions of a group of players. We identify conditions under which every iteration of these rules yields a unique partition. The main conceptual tool is a specific notion of a stable partition. The results are parametrized by a preference relation between partitions of a group of players and naturally apply to coalitional TU-games, hedonic games and exchange economy games.

The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation

Abstract: This paper explores the way in which assortative matching can maintain cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics. If encounters are random, then in Prisoner's Dilemma games, defectors necessarily get higher payos than cooperators and thus will eventually prevail. But if matching is assortative, the cost of cooperating may be repaid by higher probabilities of playing against a cooperating opponent. This paper shows that a simple index of assortativity allows a unifying treatment of the evolutionary dynamics in a wide variety of models of social encounters. In Prisoner's Dilemma, everyone gets a higher payo from playing defect than from playing cooperate, but everyone gets a higher payo from playing against a cooper- ator than against a defector. If meetings between the two types are \random", then defectors will on average get higher payos than cooperators. But if matching is assortative, so that cooperators are more likely to meet cooperators than are defec- tors, then it may be that the cost of cooperating is repaid by a higher probability of playing against a cooperating opponent. This paper explores the quantitative relation between non-random, assortative matching and the maintenance of cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynam- ics. We consider a population of individuals who are \hard-wired" to play either cooperate or defect. They meet other individuals according to some random process and play their programmed strategy in a game of Prisoner's Dilemma. The type that gets the higher expected payo reproduces more rapidly. We dene an index of assortativity of encounters and develop an \algebra of assortative encounters". In one set of applications, we calculate the index of assortativity for games between relatives with either cultural or genetic inheritance and we show the logical con- nection between the index of assortativity and Hamilton's theory of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964). We also apply the index of assortativity to determine the popu- lation dynamics when players select their partners, using partially informative cues about each others' types.

Rational dynamics and epistemic logic in games

Abstract: Game-theoretic solution concepts describe sets of strategy profiles that are optimal for all players in some plausible sense. Such sets are often found by recursive algorithms like iterated removal of strictly dominated strategies in strategic games, or backward induction in extensive games. Standard logical analyses of solution sets use assumptions about players in fixed epistemic models for a given game, such as mutual knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we propose a different perspective, analyzing solution algorithms as processes of learning which change game models. Thus, strategic equilibrium gets linked to fixed-points of operations of repeated announcement of suitable epistemic statements. This dynamic stance provides a new look at the current interface of games, logic, and computation.

Equilibrium Concepts for Social Interaction Models

Abstract: This paper describes the relationship between two different binary choice social interaction models. The Brock and Durlauf (2001) model is essentially a static Nash equilibrium model with random utility preferences. In the Blume (2003) model is a population game model similar to Blume (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). We show that the equilibria of the Brock–Durlauf model are steady states of a differential equation which is a deterministic approximation of the sample-path behavior of Blume's model. Moreover, the limit distribution of this model clusters around a subset of the steady states when the population is large.

Stackelberg leadership in a marketing channel

Abstract: This paper provides an answer to the question who should, if any, lead a marketing channel? We consider a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer where each player controls his advertising rate and margin. Supposing that advertising has a carry over effect on demand, we adopt a dynamic model. Nash and Stackelberg equilibria are characterised and outcomes compared with an efficient coordinated solution. Our findings suggest that manufacturer's leadership reduces inefficiency in a channel and is more beneficial to the consumer.