Showing papers in "Journal of Behavioral Decision Making in 2022"
TL;DR: This paper showed that emotional expression plays an important role in repairing intergroup relationships and in particular that expressing shame about a transgression enhances intergroup cooperation following the transgression, and that self-conscious emotions such as guilt and shame are beneficial to reconciliation.
Abstract: In interpersonal relations, it is known that expressing self-conscious emotions such as guilt and shame following a transgression is beneficial to reconciliation. In the current research, we examine whether this also applies to intergroup relations. Groups of three persons played an intergroup version of the “centipede game,” in which one party can cooperate with or exploit another party. In Study 1, two groups played six rounds of this game in each of two phases. Between phases, groups rated how much guilt, shame, and pride they experienced in relation to how they had performed in Phase 1; these ratings were shared with the opposing group. Groups expressing high levels of guilt and shame were associated with greater cooperation in Phase 2, whereas groups expressing high levels of pride were associated with lower cooperation in Phase 2. In Study 2, all groups played against a “group” programmed to behave in an exploitative way in Phase 1. This group then expressed shame, pride, or no emotion (control) about its performance. Cooperation in Phase 2 was significantly higher in the shame than in the pride condition, and altruistic punishment was highest in the pride condition and lowest in the shame condition. Between them, these studies show that emotional expression plays an important role in repairing intergroup relationships and in particular that expressing shame about a transgression enhances intergroup cooperation following a transgression.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , a new measure of cognitive reflection less related to numeracy and math anxiety than Numerical CRT was developed, which is called Verbal CRT, and it was used to investigate the generalizability of CRT in cultural contexts outside the United States/ United Kingdom and second to test the factor structure linking traditional CRT and numeracy.
Abstract: The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is one of the most popular measures of individual differences in rational thought and decision making. To overcome the issue of overlap with numeracy, a novel measure of cognitive reflection less related to numeracy and math anxiety than Numerical CRT was developed—Verbal CRT. The present research had two main aims: first to investigate the generalizability of Verbal CRT in cultural contexts outside the United States/United Kingdom and second to test the factor structure linking traditional—numerical—CRT, Verbal CRT, numeracy, and fluid intelligence. In Studies 1a and 1b, we adapted and tested the validity and psychometric properties of Polish versions of tasks and scales. Next, using a large and diverse sample of Polish adults, we tested five models of the factor structure of cognitive abilities and thinking dispositions (Study 2). The most parsimonious and best-fitted model contained three latent variables: Verbal CRT, numeracy (composed of the items from the Berlin Numeracy Test and traditional—numerical—CRT), and fluid intelligence. In line with previous research, our results show that Verbal CRT is a valid cognitive reflection measure that provides a clearer interpretation than traditional CRT, even in a different language and cultural context.
3 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors explore the lability of human risk preferences and argue that the most recent choices guide decision-making and provide a psychological tool that measures people's shift in preferences.
Abstract: Recent decision-making research provides empirical evidence that human risk preferences are constructed “on the fly” during risk elicitation, influenced by the decision-making context and the method of risk elicitation (Kusev et al., 2020). In this article, we explore the lability of human risk preferences and argue that the most recent choices guide decision-making. Accordingly, our novel proposal and experimental method provide a psychological tool that measures people's shift in preferences. Specifically, in our experiment (240 participants, registered UK users of an online survey panel), we developed and employed a two-stage risk elicitation experimental method. The results from the experiment revealed that providing participants with false feedback on their initial decisions (stage 1) changes their risk preferences at the feedback stage of the experiment in the direction of the false feedback. Moreover, participants' final decisions (stage 2) were influenced by the type of feedback (correct or false) and informed by their altered risk preferences at the feedback stage of the experiment. In conclusion, our work provides experimental evidence that human preferences are constructed “on the fly,” influenced by the decision-making context and recent decision-making experience (e.g., Kusev et al., 2020; Slovic, 1995).
3 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that participants made more attribute-based saccades when they made instructed choices compared to when they were free choices, and that the computation of subjective value is associated with alternative-based information searching, further demonstrating the effectiveness of the forward inference paradigm.
Abstract: The “subjective value” computation assumption holds that intertemporal choice is performed by computing subjective value by eliciting information searching within alternatives. Although widely accepted, this assumption has not been well tested. In the current eye tracking study, we developed a new paradigm using forward inference to examine this hypothesis. Participants were instructed to finish two types of intertemporal choice tasks. The free task resembled a standard task, in which participants were free to follow their own preference. The instructed task, on the other hand, provided a baseline whereby participants were given explicit instructions to calculate the subjective value of options according to a classic discounting model. The results of behavioral, fixation and scanpath demonstrated that participants performed the instructed task in a manner that was consistent with a discounting computation process. However, by comparing performances across the two tasks, we found that participants made more attribute-based saccades when they made instructed choices, compared to when they made free choices. These findings provide no support for the “subjective value” assumption in intertemporal choice. That is, that the computation of subjective value is associated with alternative-based information searching, further demonstrating the effectiveness of the forward inference paradigm in testing intertemporal choices models. This study also highlights the need for careful reexamination of the assumed relationship between eye movement patterns and corresponding underlying cognitive processes in intertemporal choice.
3 citations
TL;DR: In this article , the role of hope as a potential explanation of why people ride losers too long is examined, showing that people are inclined to hold on to losing (vs. not-losing) stocks because of their hope to break even.
Abstract: Investors are often inclined to keep losing stocks too long, despite this being irrational. This phenomenon is part of the disposition effect (“people ride losers too long, and sell winners too soon”). The current research examines the role of hope as a potential explanation of why people ride losers too long. Three correlational studies (1A, 1B, and 2) find that people's trait hope is positively associated with their inclination to keep losing stocks, regardless of their risk-seeking tendency (Study 2). Further, three experimental studies (3, 4, and 5) reveal that people are inclined to hold on to losing (vs. not-losing) stocks because of their hope to break even and not because of their hope to gain. Studies 4 and 5 provide process evidence confirming the role of hope and indicate potential interventions to decrease people's tendency to keep losing stocks by reducing the hope. The findings contribute to the limited empirical literature that has investigated how emotions influence the disposition effect by providing empirical evidence for the role of hope. Moreover, the findings add to the literature of hope by revealing its role in financial decision-making and show a “dark side” of this positive emotion.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors examined how time interacted with advice source (human vs. algorithm) and advisor accuracy to predict advice taking and found that when the advice was inaccurate, people tended to use algorithm advice less than human advice across the period studied.
Abstract: Research suggests that algorithms—based on artificial intelligence or linear regression models—make better predictions than humans in a wide range of domains. Several studies have examined the degree to which people use algorithms. However, these studies have been mostly cross-sectional and thus have failed to address the dynamic nature of algorithm use. In the present paper, we examined algorithm use with a novel longitudinal approach outside the lab. Specifically, we conducted two ecological momentary assessment studies in which 401 participants made financial predictions for 18 days in two tasks. Relying on the judge-advisor system framework, we examined how time interacted with advice source (human vs. algorithm) and advisor accuracy to predict advice taking. Our results showed that when the advice was inaccurate, people tended to use algorithm advice less than human advice across the period studied. Inaccurate algorithms were penalized logarithmically; the effect was initially strong but tended to fade over time. This suggests that first impressions are crucial and produce significant changes in advice taking at the beginning of the interaction, which later tends to stabilize as days go by. Therefore, inaccurate algorithms are more likely to accrue a negative reputation than inaccurate humans, even when having the same level of performance.
2 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that people are more likely to initiate and persist in search for prospective financial gains than losses, and for unknown than known financial outcomes, even though confirming any given outcome is effectively useless.
Abstract: Prior research shows that investors check their portfolios less frequently when they believe negative returns on investments are likely. This so-called ostrich effect is accounted for by belief-based utility theories that suggest that information demand is determined by the potential of information to evoke or maintain pleasant beliefs. An alternative is that information matters as there are more courses of action that investors would take with positive than negative portfolio returns. Across three experiments, we adapt a non-instrumental sampling paradigm to verify whether people are more likely to seek out information when expecting small gains as compared to losses when the instrumental utility of outcome information is 0. We also explore whether the effect can be attenuated by making outcome information easier to find. Our findings suggest that people are more likely to initiate and persist in search for prospective financial gains than losses, and for unknown than known financial outcomes, even though confirming any given outcome is effectively useless. The magnitude of the ostrich effect increased with increased certainty of a financial gain and loss. Making outcome information easier to find increased the likelihood that an outcome would be discovered but did not strongly modify intent to seek it out or moderate ostrich effects. We discuss how the findings are consistent with non-instrumental utility frameworks for information demand, inconsistent with literature showing greater attention to financial loss than gain outcome information, and propose testable hypotheses for resolving the discrepancy.
2 citations
TL;DR: In this paper , a decoy-dependent allocation of attention was found to increase the dominant option preference at the choice stage, which is consistent with previous connectionist theories of the attraction effect.
Abstract: Context effects in decision making refer to any influence on options evaluation resulting from its relational properties with other available alternatives. Over the last 40 years, a large corpus of research showed that decision makers are sensitive to irrelevant options and tend to modify their preferences depending on choice architecture. The attraction effect is a well-known example of context effect, which describes an increase in preferences for an option when a dominated alternative is inserted in the choice set. Sequential sampling models (SSM) interpret decision biases as the result of a dynamic comparative process between the available options that alters subjective values attribution. Recently, SSM received empirical support from eye-tracking studies that documented a decoy-dependent allocation of attention. In this study, we integrate previous process-tracing results using a new hidden-attribute protocol, in which decision makers have to explore products' attributes, keep in mind their values, and deliberately compare the options. This new methodology allows this study to offer additional evidence on the role of decoys in the dynamic process of choice. In a consumer-choice task, the addition of an asymmetrically dominated decoy first focused the attention on the target during attributes exploration, which in turn led to an increase in the dominant option preferences at the choice stage. This suggests that adding irrelevant options affects the information sampling procedures, insofar as the comparative process is influenced by the dominance relationship of the alternatives. These results are consistent with past eye-tracking studies and verify previous connectionist theories of the attraction effect.
2 citations
2 citations
TL;DR: The authors found that the direction of this effect is not evoked by high versus low probabilities, but by the directionality of verbal probability expressions, regardless of the probability equivalents of the expressions.
Abstract: Recent research has shown that when people combine verbal probabilistic forecasts from two sources, they are not simply averaged but can reinforce each other; so when two advisors both said an event was “ rather likely, ” some listeners concluded that the event was “ quite likely ” . Conversely, when both said the event was “ rather unlikely, ” people concluded that it was “ quite unlikely. ” The present studies demonstrate that the direction of this effect is not evoked by high versus low probabilities, but by the directionality of verbal probability expressions. Some phrases are affirma-tive, directed towards occurrences ( “ there is a chance ” ), whereas others are negations, pointing to the possibility that the event might not occur ( “ it is not certain ” ). Two positive phrases are perceived to reinforce each other, even when they convey low probabilities, resulting in a higher combined probability estimate, whereas two negative phrases do the opposite, regardless of the probabilities they convey. We show that this effect occurs both for equal and unequal verbal phrases, regardless of the probability equivalents of the expressions. We also found a positive, but weaker, reinforcement effect of numerical probabilities.
2 citations
TL;DR: This paper showed that using a sad-faced image reduces attitude toward the advertising campaign because the mediating effect of inference of manipulative intent tends to be larger than the mediation effect of sympathy in absolute size.
Abstract: In charitable advertisements, organizations often display the image of a person in need with different facial emotional expressions. Prior research showed the positive effect of using a sad- (vs. happy- or neutral-) faced image in evoking sympathy from viewers. Across five studies (N = 2141), we demonstrate that a sad-faced image evokes not only sympathy but also an inference about the organization's manipulative intent. Moreover, we show that inference of manipulative intent and sympathy simultaneously mediate the effects of facial expression on donation and on attitude toward the advertising campaign, but in opposing directions. While greater sympathy leads to larger donation, greater inference of manipulative intent lowers donation, together contributing to a null effect of facial expression on donation. In contrast, using a sad-faced image reduces attitude toward the advertising campaign because the mediating effect of inference of manipulative intent tends to be larger than the mediating effect of sympathy in absolute size. The negative effect of a sad-faced image on attitude toward the advertising campaign is attenuated when the prominence of the image is low (vs. high). Finally, we show that these effects also emerge in the cause-related marketing advertising context.
TL;DR: This article examined how moral decision-making is influenced by previous decisions in the same narrative, especially whether people tend to stay consistent or to reconsider within a morally challenging situation, and concluded that prior choices within the same setting significantly influence decision making.
Abstract: Previous studies have investigated moral decision-making by using moral dilemmas that involve a single decision. This article extends this paradigm, introducing two-stage scenarios to examine how moral decision-making is influenced by previous decisions in the same narrative—especially whether people tend to stay consistent or to reconsider within a morally challenging situation. It further compares decision-making between two-stage and one-stage scenarios. In Study 1 (N = 239), participants read scenarios requiring two successive decisions of harming one person to spare multiple people (utilitarian action), or vice versa (deontological action), within the same narrative. Second decisions were mostly found to be consistent with first decisions. Remarkably, inconsistent responding (switching) was robustly observed in about 29% of cases. Study 2 (N = 63), using one-stage scenarios, showed that having made a previous decision in the same narrative generally decreased utilitarian responding. Potential explanations for these phenomena are discussed. The present article concludes that prior choices within the same setting significantly influence decision-making. It also reveals the potential of gaining new insights using multiple-stage scenarios in moral decision-making research.
TL;DR: This paper found evidence that non-instrumental information seeking is driven by a general aversion to uncertainty rather than by an attempt to regulate specific future emotions such as regret, regret, or rejoice.
Abstract: Standard theories suggest that humans should seek information only when it can help them make better decisions. However, recent work suggests that people choose to seek information even when it cannot influence the outcome of a choice. Across three experiments, we examined how this preference for non-instrumental information was related to the risk, regret, and rejoice associated with different choices. Experiment 1 examined how risk preference informed the appetite for non-instrumental information and tested how risk and information preference in a gamble-task related to the desire for knowledge across a range of hypothetical real-world scenarios. In Experiment 2, we tested how risk, operationalized as variance, related to non-instrumental information seeking when allowing participants to mentally simulate the potential outcomes of gambles. In Experiment 3, we provided explicit feedback about forgone options, intending to make the potential for regret or rejoice more salient. Taken together, our results show a consistent appetite for information that was robust to changes across all experimental manipulations. We found some evidence of a positive correlation between the desire for knowledge and the level of anticipated regret (Experiment 1), but overall, our data appear more consistent with the idea that non-instrumental information seeking is driven by a general aversion to uncertainty than by an attempt to regulate specific future emotions.
TL;DR: This article used generalizability theory to identify and quantify the variance components in perceived risk and benefit ratings that are attributable to differences between cultures, across raters within cultures, and across risk domains.
Abstract: To what extent do countries and people within countries vary in their perceptions about the risks and benefits of engaging in risky activities? And to what extent are these variations influenced by risk domains? We used generalizability theory to identify and quantify the variance components in perceived risk and benefit ratings that are attributable to differences between cultures, across raters within cultures, and across risk domains. Our results, based on two archival datasets from the United States and Japan, revealed that, although there is nontrivial variability in risk and benefit perceptions between American and Japanese raters, the amount of variability was smaller between cultures compared with across raters within cultures. Moreover, investment risk perceptions and gambling benefit perceptions were predominantly influenced by differences across raters within cultures, and hence, large numbers of raters would be needed to properly represent ratings of the corresponding populations. Our findings suggest that variability in risk and benefit judgments across raters from different cultures should not be simply attributed to pure cultural differences. Rather, a multi-faceted approach, where multiple sources of variance are simultaneously considered, should be adopted to properly understand and effectively influence judgments of risk and benefit.
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors test the main assumptions of the so-called deterrence approach considering both compliance decisions and the process of information acquisition using MouselabWEB and conclude that deterrence information clearly influences tax compliance decisions in their setting but observed deviations from the deterrence model can be attributed to failures to properly integrate all relevant parameters.
Abstract: The highly influential Allingham and Sandmo model of income tax evasion assumes that taxpayers are driven by utility maximization, choosing evasion over compliance if it yields a higher expected profit. We test the main assumptions of this so-called deterrence approach considering both compliance decisions and the process of information acquisition using MouselabWEB. In an incentivized experiment, 109 participants made 24 compliance decisions with varying information presented for four within-subject factors (the four central model parameters: income, tax rate, audit probability, and fine level). Additionally, explicit expected value information was indicated in one of two conditions. The results reveal that participants attended to all relevant information, a prerequisite for expected value-like calculations. As predicted by the deterrence model, choices were clearly influenced by audit probability and fine level. Against the model assumptions, the presented parameters were not integrated adequately, indicated by a non-monotonic increase of evasion with rising expected rate of return from evasion. Additionally, more transitions between information necessary for calculating expected values did not result in higher model conformity, just as presenting explicit information on expected values. We conclude that deterrence information clearly influences tax compliance decisions in our setting but observed deviations from the deterrence model can be attributed to failures to properly integrate all relevant parameters.
TL;DR: The authors found that participants consistently attributed agreeableness (and to a lesser extent, extraversion) a greater role in predicting others' prosocial behavior compared with the role that it plays in reality.
Abstract: Prior research on personality and prosocial behavior has focused on actor-level effects of personality by examining which personality traits predict individuals' prosocial behavior. But do lay people take into account others' personality when making predictions of others' future prosocial behavior? The present research was designed to answer this question. We focused on two interpersonal traits from the Big Five model, agreeableness and extraversion, and examined whether people have accurate lay beliefs about the effects of these traits on prosocial behavior. The results of four studies showed that participants consistently attributed agreeableness (and to a lesser extent, extraversion) a greater role in predicting others' prosocial behavior compared with the role that it plays in reality. Results were consistent in studies of zero-acquaintance interactions and close relationships and when people predicted both single instances and aggregated measures of others' prosocial behavior. Our results did not depend on participants' awareness of research hypotheses and persisted even when they were explicitly warned that the information about others' personality might not be accurate. These findings inform the literature on social perception and stereotype accuracy and contribute to our understanding of how people make future-oriented predictions of others' behavior.
TL;DR: For instance, this article argued that intuition is a multifaceted construct, a single label applied to three distinct types of intuition: Holistic, Inferential, and Affective.
Abstract: We argue that intuition is a multifaceted construct, a single label applied to three distinct types of intuition: Holistic, Inferential, and Affective. The goals of this study were to (1) evaluate the independence of these types of intuition and (2) examine the relationships between each type and various thinking styles, beliefs, and cognitions. Results confirmed the distinction among of the types of intuition and established their differential relationships to other relevant constructs including need for cognition, rumination, religiosity, spirituality, conservatism, cognitive reflection, scientific reasoning, and bullshit receptivity. Affective intuition was associated with participants' religious and political beliefs and with lower levels of cognitive reflection and scientific reasoning. Holistic intuition was positively associated with thinking styles such as need for cognition and the propensity to ruminate. Inferential intuition was not strongly related to any of the measures used in this study, perhaps because our tasks did not rely on domain expertise. The results of this study have implications for theory about intuition and on the applications of intuition in areas such as in judgment and decision-making.
TL;DR: This paper conducted a meta-analysis of studies that directly compared an incentive versus no-incentive conditions (n = 2836) and found a small positive effect of incentivization (Cohen's d = .21) on CRT performance.
Abstract: The effect of performance-based incentives on judgment biases is a controversial issue. A recent extensive meta-analysis of Brañas-Garza et al. (2019, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2019.101455) found no effect of incentives on performance in the cognitive reflection test (CRT), a test commonly used for assessing heuristic versus deliberative judgments. We conducted a meta-analysis of studies that directly compared an incentive versus no-incentive conditions (n = 2836) and found a small positive effect of incentivization (Cohen's d = .21) on CRT performance. In addition, we re-examined the Brañas-Garza et al. (2019) dataset (n = 39,385), taking into consideration not only whether incentivization was used but also the nominal and fiscal size of the incentive. The results show that surprisingly when including only studies that used monetary incentives, the effect of incentivization and incentive size are significant, even when taking into consideration other aspects of the studies. The results thus suggest a small but robust effect of incentives on judgment biases.
TL;DR: The authors found that when people search for information, they do so in order to learn about the descriptive norm, not to intentionally learn about others' dishonesty, and when the decision to search for such information results in observing more dishonest others, participants become more dishonest themselves.
Abstract: When people see that others lie for financial profit, they are more likely to lie themselves. But do people search for information about others' behavior in ethically tempting situations? And among those who search, what type of information do they search for? Specifically, do people search for information about others' dishonesty in particular, to justify their future transgressions, or do they search for information about others' behavior in general to learn about the descriptive social norm? Across four financially incentivized experiments (Ntotal = 2642), participants engaged in a task in which they could lie for profit. Before starting their task, participants could search for information about others' behavior in the same task. Results reveal that when people search for information, they do so in order to learn about the descriptive norm, not to intentionally learn about others' dishonesty. When the decision to search for information results in observing more dishonest others, participants become more dishonest themselves. Testing a boundary condition revealed that when information search is costly (vs. free), people search for less information, observe less dishonest others, and subsequently are less dishonest themselves. Findings suggest that in settings where people may act dishonestly, information about others behavior should be costly to obtain.
TL;DR: In this article , the authors used a modified repeated one-shot prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in which the incentives to be greedy or fearful were parametrically and independently manipulated.
Abstract: Cooperation often coexists with defection in social interactions. Individuals may choose non-cooperation in social dilemmas either out of fear (fear of being exploited by a non-cooperative player) or out of greed (the desire to increase private payoff by defecting from a cooperative player). However, the developmental trajectories of such motives in social interactions remain unclear. In order to find out how fear and greed influence children's cooperative behaviors differentially, children aged 7 to 11 were tested in Study 1 using a modified repeated one-shot prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in which the incentives to be greedy or fearful were parametrically and independently manipulated. Results showed that children were sensitive to the greed effect at age 7 and their sensitivity was stable across middle childhood, while only 11-year-old children were significantly affected by fear when the greed level was low. These findings suggest that in the context of PDG, sensitivity to social threat increases with age across middle childhood especially under low temptation to exploit others, and the greed motive may be less influenced by age in this period. By continuing to use the same experiment with young adults, Study 2 revealed that young adults also demonstrated a diminished fear motive when the greed level was low in the PDG. Moreover, the sensitivity to social motives of 11-year-olds was comparable to the levels of young adults. Together, the present findings confirm that two different social motives underlie the development of cooperation in middle childhood.
TL;DR: This article found that ambiguity aversion occurs in a wide variety of qualitative contexts but to different degrees for different people and may be partially driven by unfavorable prior estimates of the likely outcomes of the ambiguous events.
Abstract: Most studies of ambiguity aversion rely on experimental paradigms involving monetary bets. Thus, the extent to which ambiguity aversion occurs outside of such contexts is much less understood, particularly when the situation cannot easily be reduced to numerical terms. The present work seeks to understand whether people prefer to avoid ambiguous decisions in a variety of different qualitative domains (e.g., work, family, love, friendship, exercise, study, and health), and, if so, to determine the role played by prior beliefs in those domains. Across three studies, we presented participants with 24 vignettes and measured the degree to which they preferred risk to ambiguity in each. We also asked them for their prior probability estimates about the likely outcomes in the ambiguous events. Ambiguity aversion was observed in the vast majority of vignettes, but at different magnitudes. It was predicted by whether the vignette involved gain or loss as well as by people's prior beliefs; however, the heterogeneity between people meant that the role of prior beliefs was only evident in an individual-level analysis (i.e., not at the group level). Our results suggest that the desire to avoid ambiguity occurs in a wide variety of qualitative contexts but to different degrees for different people and may be partially driven by unfavorable prior estimates of the likely outcomes of the ambiguous events.
TL;DR: In this paper , the authors explored conformity in punishment for norm violations and how this behavior is enhanced or weakened by empathic concern (N = 1108), where participants acted as third parties to punish unfairness either in a third-party punishment game or in lifelike unfair allocation scenarios.
Abstract: Conformity—shifting one's behavior patterns towards group norms—is both common and powerful. Prior research shows that conformity can drive behavioral patterns towards both positive and negative outcomes (e.g., environmentalism vs. anti-environmentalism). However, we know little about conformity in response to sanctions for norm violations. This research explores conformity in punishment for norm violations and how this behavior is enhanced or weakened by empathic concern (N = 1108). The participants acted as third parties to punish unfairness either in a third-party punishment game or in lifelike unfair allocation scenarios. They behaved in a group where other members inflicted either high or low punishment on the unfair proposers. The results of this study show that the participants conformed to both the high-punishment norm and the low-punishment norm, and their conformity persisted after removing the group context (Studies 1A and 1B). Studies 2A and 2B show that evoking empathic concern towards recipients (victims) in unfair situations increased the punishment of the dictator and diminished conformity to the low-punishment norm. Study 3 shows that the enhancement effect of empathic concern on conformity when embedded in the high-punishment norm strengthened over time, whereas the weakening effect of empathic concern on conformity among those representing a low-punishment norm declined over time. These findings extend the understanding of conformity and the role of emotion in this behavior, with the potential for conformity-modulating interventions.
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TL;DR: The Journal of Behavioral Decision Making Volume 35, Issue 4 ISSUE INFORMATIONFree Access Issue Information First published: 01 September 2022 https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2257 as discussed by the authors .
Abstract: Journal of Behavioral Decision MakingVolume 35, Issue 4 ISSUE INFORMATIONFree Access Issue Information First published: 01 September 2022 https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2257AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat Abstract No abstract is available for this article. Volume35, Issue4October 2022 RelatedInformation
TL;DR: This article examined how measured intelligence, referred to as IQ, predicts a consumer's decisions on whether to participate in online horse wagering, how much to spend on those bets, and which horserace betting products to consume.
Abstract: We examine how measured intelligence, referred to as IQ, predicts a consumer's decisions on whether to participate in online horse wagering, how much to spend on those bets, and which horserace betting products to consume. We combine three individual-level archival data sets from Finland, including all online horse bets during a 1-year period from the state-sanctioned monopoly operator, the Finnish Defence Forces' IQ test scores from male conscripts born between 1962 and 1990 (N = 705,809), and administrative registry data on socioeconomic status, income, and education for these men. An analysis of male bettors (N = 15,488) shows that IQ is a positive predictor of participation and spending. In addition, high IQ is associated with choosing more complex (high variance) betting products. We find that these results are driven primarily by numerical IQ.