Showing papers in "Journal of Conflict Resolution in 1967"

Understanding factor analysis

Abstract: Thousallds of variables have been proposed to explain or describe the complex variety and i~lterco~lnectiolls of social and illternatio~lal relations Perhaps an equal number of hypotheses and theories linkillg these variables have been suggested The few basic variables and propositions central to ullderstalldillg remain to be determined The systematic dependencies and correlations among these variables have been charted only roughly, if at all, and many, if not most, call be ~lleasurecl only on presence-absence or rank order scales And to take the data on any one variable at face value is to beg questions of validity, reliability, and comparability Confronted with entangled behavior unkno\vn interdependencies, nlasses of qualitative and cluantitative variables, and bad data, many social scientists are turning toward factor analysis to uncover major social and internatio~lal pa t terns Vactor hundred variables, conlpellsate for random error and invalidity, and disentangle complex interrelationships into their major and distinct regularities Factor analysis is not without cost, ho\\-ever It is lnathe~llatically complicated and entails diverse and numerous consideratio~~s in application Its technical vocabulary includes strange terms such as e i g e ~ z ~ n l u e s , iv iate , dim,e~zsions, orthogonal, londingr, and co~rrn11~nality Its results usually absorb a dozen or so pages in a given report, leaving little room for a methodological iiltroductio~l or explanation of terms Add to this the fact that students do not ordinarily learn factor allalysis in their formal training, and the stun is the major cost of factor analysis: most laymen, social scientists, and policy-makers find the nature ant1 significance of the results incomprehensible The problem of cornn~unicati~lg factor analysis is especially crucial for peace research Scholars in this field are clraw~l An invitec1 paper for The Jolrrncll of Conflict frolll clisciplines alld professions, alld Resolt~tion Prepared in connection with research supported by the National Sciencc Fotunf ? ~ them are acquainted with thr dation GS-1230 For many helpful comments method made on a previous draft I wish to thank As our empirical kllowledge of conflict Henry Kariel, hlichael Haas, Robert Hefner: processes, behavior, conditions, and pattelns \Voocly Pitts, and J David Singer Portions of the article are taken from Rummel ( 1968) beconle illcreasi~lgly expressed in factor"or a bibliography of applications of factor analvtic terms, those who need this knowlanalysis in the social sciences (esclucling psyedge lnost in order to make illforlned chology), see Rummel (1968) A bibliography of a ~ ~ l i c a t i o n s to conflict and inte~national decisions may be those who are most A A

A note on the "index of cooperation" for Prisoner's Dilemma:

Abstract: Assuming a simple reinforcement effect in repeated plays, we would expect that the frequency of C choices would increase as R and S increase (since these payoffs are associated with the C choice), and correspondingly, the frequency of C should decrease as T and P increase, because these payoffs are associated with the D choice. On the whole, experimental evidence tends to confirm this expectation. Consequently, if we imagine the &dquo;index of cooperation&dquo; for Prisoner’s Dilemma to be a function of the four payoffs, namely,

A Theory of Revolution

Abstract: While prior studies have delineated dimensions of conflict behavior within nations (Rummel, 1963, 1966, 1967; Tanter, 1965, 1966) in order to discover the variables most representative of internal conflict, a purpose of the present inquiry is to discover their theoretical significance. A typology of revolution is presented and two possible causes of revolution-changes in economic development and level of education-are examined regarding the extent of their association with certain characteristics of revolution. Regional differences are found which imply a fundamental distinction between at least two of the categories in the typology.

Social control in the adversary system

Abstract: To understand the social control problem of the adversary system, we begin with what is admittedly a conceptual oversimplification-that social organizations are based upon norms of either conflict or cooperation. The family, the university, the industrial enterprise are institutions predicated upon the idea of cooperation. It is believed that the more smoothly the actors within it work together, the more likely will the institution achieve its aims. For such

The establishment of the trust relationship

Abstract: In a situation in which two people are interdependent, Deutsch(1962) defines trusting behavior as choosing to take an ambiguous path that can lead to a beneficial event or a harmful event depending upon the behavior of the other personwhere the harmful event is more punishing than the beneficial event is rewarding. The interdependence of the participants is such that each must take the ambiguous path for both to experience the beneficial event, and if either instead makes a nontrusting choice, the other will experience a harmful event. Bennis, Schein, Berlew, and Steele (1964, p. 223) say that in trust there is "... an implicit assumption that one person will not deliberately hurt the other to satisfy his own needs.. ." That is, there exists the mutual expectation that each will take the ambiguous path in a trust relationship. Considerable work has been done with Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) games to determine the conditions under which trust will be found,2 but little study has been made

Matrix indices and strategy choices in mixed-motive games

Abstract: Rapoport (1964) reported the effect on proportion of cooperative strategy choices over iterations in the Prisoner‘s Dilemma gamc (PD) of varying single matrix payoffs. Oskamp and Perlman (1965) derived a payoff index which was thc average payoff per trio2 and found higher values of the index related to larger proportions of cooperation. They mentioned, but did not test, another index which measured the average adoaritage of competition. Rapoport and Orwant (1962) suggested that the difference bctwccn the payoff for successful defection and unsuccessful cooperation-called thc competitive advantag-might be related to cooperative strategy choices in PD. hlinas et al. (1960) manipulated payoffs so as to vary thc dominance of the cooperation and defection strategies. Althoudi no index was formally defined, it is possible that the average advantage of competition would describe changes in dominancc of the cooperation or defection strategies. Since the formal rules of PD require that the defection strategy be dominant, it is not technically correct to define dl of the hiinas ct al. (1960) matrices as PD matrices, since both equal-dominance and coopcrntive-dominant matrices were used. Hotvever, some

Strategies of inducing cooperation: an experimental study:

Abstract: : Ss played a two-person laboratory game in which they could act altruistically, individualistically, defensively, or aggressively. Ss did not interact with a real person, but 5 programmed strategies were employed to see which was most effective in eliciting cooperation from a non-cooperative S. The strategies were: Turn The Other Cheek - the program responded to a threat or an attack by an altruistic choice and with a cooperative choice otherwise; Nonpunitive - the program responded defensively rather than with counter-threats or counter attacks when the S threatened or attacked, and reciprocated the rest of the S's behavior; Deterrent - the program responded with a threat to any noncooperative act of the S, counter attacked when the S attacked and responded cooperatively to any cooperative behavior from the S; two types of Reformed Sinner strategy - in both the program responded with threats and aggression for the first 15 trials of the game and then changed dramatically on the 16th trial by disarming. In one form of the Reformed Sinner the program followed the Turn The Other Cheek strategy, and in the other the program became Nonpunitive. Results are consistent with findings of other investigators. Ss behaved most competitively during the 15 trials of the Reformed Sinner condition when the program was threatening and aggressive; Ss tended to exploit in the Turn The Other Cheek condition; Ss behaved most cooperatively in the Nonpunitive condition. (Author)

Some theoretic characteristics of economic and political coalitions

Abstract: This paper represents an attempt to make use of a few postulates which are frequently found in cconomic theory, and to achieve thereby some insights into an important problem in the theory of political interactions-the formation of coalitions. It is suggested that the same competitive process which constrains market behavior has, in reality, an equally important role in the determination of alliances, and that the search for a “best” alliance is no different in principle from the search for a lowest price. The resulting analysis will be found to apply to a wide variety of alliance situations provided that two fundamental premises are satisfied: (1) alliance mcmbcrs are motivated by a desire to maximize the value (to themselves) of their membership,l and ( 2 ) membership in one grouping precludes membership in another, that is, choice among alternatives must be a dominant problem.?

Legal levels and multiplicity of legal systems in human societies

Abstract: ment implies universality of political organization-a virtual absence of human societies without pertinent political structures. Moreover, this concept is of paramount importance for a proper presentation and analysis of any political and, consequently, any legal system because it emphasizes the relationship that necessarily exists between such a system and the conglomeration of a society’s subgroups. Since the regulation of the network of interrelations that gives this conglomeration its particular structure is the essence of the society’s political organization, no significant analysis of the politics or law can be made without a proper and consistent reference to the particular system of subgroups to which it pertains. Yet there are numerous anthropological studies that fail to relate accounts of political and legal organizations to the segmentation systems of the pertinent societies. Although one invariably finds an exposition of the membership characteristics and functions of the subgroups, the individual natives are usually not portrayed as taking part in the various activities primarily as members of such groups. Presentations are so focused upon the role and status of the individual that he appears to participate directly in the life of the society as a whole. As a consequence, a misleading impression of a &dquo;monolithic society&dquo; consisting of interacting individuals, rather than a complex society composed of subgroups of different membership inclusiveness, is likely to be created. It is one of the basic premises of this paper that social relations (relations of individuals to Ego) as well as societal relations (relations among the segments of a society)

"Reformed sinner" and "lapsed saint" strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma game 1:

Abstract: Recent experiments using the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) have been equivocal with regard to how variations in the strategy of the other player affect the development of mutual cooperation (Bixenstine and Wilson, 1963; McClintock et al., 1963; Sermat, 1964; Solomon, 1960). Bixenstine and Wilson compared the effects of two &dquo;simulated&dquo; strategies in which there were systematic variations in the number and

Courts and conflict resolution

Abstract: Law seems to have two basic and intimately connected tasks: to solve conflicts and to foster conformity to legal rules. The conflict-solving function has left the most distinctive marks upon the structure of legal thinking and upon the occupational role of the professional jurist. In this paper I shall deal only with a few selected aspects of the relationship between the task of conflict resolution and the structure of law. I shall discuss how this particular task has influenced the structure of the judiciary and the courts, by making some comparisons with other decision-making bodies. I shall then discuss some implications for the develop-

How predictable are negotiations

Abstract: Undoubtedly, many students of negotiation are interested in their subject because negotiation is one of the outstanding mechanisms by which social and political conflicts can be resolved. Their hope is that a close and detailed study of the process of negotiation will yield information which will help to ease some of the world's more threatening tensions. In this paper we shall discuss some of the reasons why reaching this goal is more difficult than

Dimensions of dyadic war, 1820–1952:

Abstract: Lewis Fry Richardson’s (196Ob) published data on 211 violent conflicts ending during 1820-1952 were extensively analy-zcd by him (1960a,b) with the limited tools he had available.‘ Recognizing the great potential of this storehouse of systematically organized data on conflict, scholars have b e y n to apply highly developcd mathematical techniques to reanalyze it.3 With the growing availability, speed, and capability of electronic computers, one can cany out large-scale analyses of Richardson’s data not possible during his time. This brief research report presents the results of such a study‘ involving factor analysis.

Interorganizational conflict: a labor-management bargaining experiment:

Abstract: The recent growth of research on conflict has been stimulated principally by the work of game theorists and psychologists.2 Relatively few recent contributions have been made by sociologists whose interest in conflict is of long standing (cf. Bernard, 1965). One outstanding exception is Coser's work in codifying Simmel's analysis of conflict and in advancing the thesis that conflict often has positive functions in social systems (Coser, 1956). Another exception is Lipset's work on the importance of conflict for democracy and societal integration (Lipset, 1960, pp. 1-2, 27-28, 428ff). Several decades ago, Ross formulated the proposition that noncoincident multiple lines of cleavage have a stabilizing function

A test of the mirror-image hypothesis: Kennedy and Khrushchev

Abstract: Many Americans seem to assume that the tone of Communist propaganda is similar to Khrushchev's celebrated statement, "We will bury you." This statement has usually been interpreted to reflect the assumed Communist intention to conquer the world by force of arms. In this context it has been interpreted to mean, "We will kill you and then bury you." However, in its own context the statement could be better interpreted as meaning: "We will outlast you and be present at your funeral when you die a natural death." In other words, it would seem that Khrushchev was simply boasting, in accordance with classical Communist theory, that socialism would outlast capitalism in the process of social evolution. As opposed to the interpretation of Communist propaganda emphasizing offensive uses of military methods to achieve Communist purposes, Bronfenbrenner (1961) has suggested that the Cold War attitudes of Russians are very similar to those of Americans. As a result of many conversations with Russian people in the Soviet Union, Bronfenbrenner came to the conclusion that the Russians' distorted picture of

Conflict and its resolution in the Supreme Court

Abstract: court communications, draft opinions, slip opinions with comments on them, memoranda, memoirs, and so forth. Those are the data underlying the present study. Although this inquiry is to a large extent exploratory, it attempts nonetheless to be rigorous by defining key concepts operationally and presenting evidence in support of hypotheses where it is available. Yet it would be a mistake to view this study as more than a tentative presentation of concepts and hypotheses that may be useful in future research concerning conflict and its resolution in the Supreme Court. The discussion that follows begins with a consideration of the positive and negative consequences of conflict in the Court. Then

A political geography of revolution: China, Vietnam, and Thailand:

Abstract: location and elimination of guerrilla forces and their leaders. It is the significance of the location of such guerrilla bases that is the focus for this paper. The consistency of locational elements in the guel~rilla bases in the cases of China and Vietnam (and ap

Some factors affecting choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma:

Abstract: A number of rcccnt studies have employed scvcral variants of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Lucc and Raiffa, 1957) to study conditions affecting the developmcnt of coopcrativc behavior (Bixenstinc, Potash, and Wilson, 1963; Deutsch, 1958, 1960; Lutzker, 1961; hfarlowc, 1962; hlinas, Scodcl, hiarlowe, and Rawson, 1960; Scodel, hiinas, Ratoosh, and Lipctz, 1959; Solomon, 1960). The Prisoner‘s Dilemma is well known as a mised-motivc gamc whose formal propcrtics arc such that the two playcrs have both mutual and divergent interests; i.e., maximization of the payoffs to both pnrtncrs is not possible without mutual trust and coopcration. The conflict bctwcen players in mixed-motive games is rather analogous to the conflicting interests found in many interpersonal and intcmationa! situations (Rapoport, 1960). This study poses thc following principal question: Is it possiblc, by use of instructions that require role-playing in a hypothetical situation, to rcplicatc some of the major findings already reported for choice behavior in the Prisoncr’s Dilemma? In other words, do the variables influencing choicc in the Prisoner’s Dilemma operate in a paper-and-pencil version of the problem as they do in thc usual expcrimcntal situa-

Live simulation of affect-laden cultural cognitions

Abstract: Since Guetzkow's pioneering work in the simulation of international relations (Guetzkow et al., 1963), attempts have been made to apply the strategy of simulation to other areas of (research) interest to the social scientist. A particular application has been found in the study of cross-cultural communication (Fiedler, Stolurow, and Triandis, 1965; Haines, 1964), an area long beset with methodological pitfalls and research hazards and relatively deemphasized in the Guetzkow inter-nation simulation (in favor of more manageable roles reflecting such dimensions as power, decision-making, and organizational restraints). The strategy of applying a quasi-experimental device like simulation to this rich but for the most part experimentally untouched field of crosscultural communication seems especially appropriate because of the technique's specific discovery potential and heuristic value (Snyder, 1963). The approach to cross-cultural communication by Fiedler and his associates at Illi-

Psychological constructs in foreign policy prediction

Abstract: ion than the ones to follow, as it is a way of perceiving the field of foreign policy itself. It is peculiar to the field of foreign policy and probably of little use elsewhere. Yet it belongs to a class of constructs which describe in polar terms how particular experts view their operational environments. For example, lawyers may view law as a whole or any individual case as a purposive activity containing an internal morality that strives for self-consistency and justice (Fuller, 1964), or he may view it as a positivist set of commands to be interpreted solely according to the intention, whether good or bad, of the legislator (Hart, 1961; cf. Tomkins, 1963). There are &dquo;progressive&dquo; or &dquo;traditional&dquo; educators, &dquo;pure&dquo; and &dquo;practical&dquo; mathematicians, &dquo;fundamental&dquo; and &dquo;technical&dquo; stock market speculators, and macroand micro-economists. Supreme Court justices might be typified, with respect to certain classes of constitutional cases, according to a construct of deference or nondeference to popularly-elected branches.4 3 As Cattell points out (1957, p. 87), the opposite to "north polar conditions" may in one sense be "equatorial conditions" and in another "south polar conditions." 4 Many jurimetric studies seem to adopt overly simplistic constructs such as "liberal-conservative" or "activist-nonactivist." Justice Frankfurter’s career demonstrates the futility of these, as he was clearly a "liberal" in the 1930s and a "conservative" in the 1950s (the country changed!); he demonstrated judicial restraint with respect to "political questions" but was an activist on the issue of police brutality. However, all these decisions of his may be explained on a deference-to-popularly-elected-branches construct. In the 1930s Frankfurter "liberally" approved Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation just CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME XI NUMBER 3

Social ideology and reactions to international events

Abstract: : The study is an attempt to test the implications of a theory of social ideology concerning reactions to international crises. It was postulated that each individual, as a product of socialization, develops an ideological orientation towards others in which they are conceptualized as good, strong, and humanistic on one end of a continuum and bad, weak, and 'object' on the other end of the continuum. It was suggested that each conceptual pattern is influential in determining the values relative to the (a) punishment - reward system of society, (b) the power-structure, and the (c) interpersonal relationships. The purpose of the investigation was to test the hypotheses that (a) the more positive the conception of man, the greater the tendency to advocate negotiation in international conflicts, to accept international controls, and to support economic aid to other nations, and (b) the more positive the ideological orientation, the less the ethnocentricism and authoritarianism. (Author)

The role of sanction in conflict resolution

Abstract: A contextual approach to the study of sanction maps an important connection between the behavioral sciences and jurisprudence.I Modem jurisprudence is open to the scientific study of every phase of law in society. The problems may be conceived from the point of view of a contemplative spectator of events or of an imaginative manipulator who thinks in terms of postulated goals.2 Although the present discussion will not employ mathematical notation, the categories are defined with the formation of mathematical models in mind, and with an eye to the choice of operational indices that point toward workable programs of investigation. It will be evident from the analysis of the sanctioning process that conflicts-demands

The effects of the win-loss difference upon cooperative responding in a “dangerous” game:

Abstract: A dangerous game is defined as one in wliich threat expression may be unilateral but punishment is always bilateral. In other words, when one person threatens his opponent, he exposes both the latter and himself to risk of substantial loss. Dangerous situations or games are prevalcnt in our socicty today. The game of “Chickcn” as playcd by tcenagcrs in their automobiles is a good example, as is tlic case of two nations threatening one another with thermonuclear destruction. There are, of course, numcrous other examples since, as Schclling (1966) suggests, the Chicken type of confrontation is a common form of adversary engagement. If only tlic structure of the situation is considered, the gamc of Chicken is thc most dangerous of games. Using only one of its

Class Conflict and Images of Society

Abstract: [The article commences by referring to a resurgence of interest by social theorists in conflict and coercion in society. Among recent works, Dahrendorf’s (1959) theory of social conflict “stands out for its clarity of expression and its generality”. The purpose of Lopreato’s study is, then, to “examine the empirical validity of some aspects of this … approach”.]