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Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 1995"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the question of how to redistribute individual incomes if those incomes are determined by the agents' characteristics is analyzed, and an axiomatic approach is used to provide characterizations of a specific redistribution mechanism.

196 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a general representation theorem is established for any T -transitive valued binary relation, where T is a left-continuous triangular norm, and Maximal T-transitive relations contained in a given relation are also investigated.

50 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, a set-theoretical comparison of the Condorcet choice correspondences discussed in the literature is provided, and the results on that issue are reviewed and some open problems are identified.

48 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a continuous-time model of the war of attrition with exponential discounting and with two-sided incomplete information is presented, and a characterization of the Bayesian Equilibria of this game, without restricting strategies to be differentiable.

47 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the problem of income inequality for a model in which households may have different incomes and different types was considered, and the equivalence scales are uniquely and implicitly determined by the corresponding welfare ordering.

46 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Iain McLean1
TL;DR: Independence of irrelevant alternatives, as a criterion for evaluating choice and/or ordering rules, was introduced in the modern literature by Huntington (1938), Nash (1950) and Arrow (1951) as discussed by the authors.

41 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, an axiomatic characterization of rank dependent utility for arbitrary consequence spaces, so that certainty equivalents of gambles do not necessarily exist, has been developed, which generalizes von Neumann's expected utility to accommodate Allais type violations of preference judgments.

26 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Michel Truchon1
TL;DR: In this paper, the representation of collective choice rules by voting games and the acyclicity of these rules are discussed. But the results are applied to a large class of voting rules defined by quotas.

25 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the relation between iterate and fixed-point accounts of common belief and common knowledge, using the formal tools of epistemic modal logic, and proved soundness and completeness theorems for modal logics of varying strength.

23 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the notion of strategic stability was studied in games with compact metric spaces of pure strategies and continuous payoff functions, and it was shown that stable sets exist and satisfy versions of the properties of admissibility, forward induction and elimination of dominated strategies.

22 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a discrete time theory of dynamic optimization where the objective is to maximize the long-run probability of survival through risk portfolio choice over time, and the existence of a stationary optimal policy and the functional equation of dynamic programming were established.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider a rule of "hedonic editing" suggested by R.H. Thaler and others to describe how people evaluate the joint receipt of two separate quantities of a real variable x.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors take the position that economic rationality and indecisiveness are compatible ideas, and generalize some familiar methods from revealed preference theory to reveal preference theory, which they call revealed preference.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, an operational method for deriving a linear ranking of alternatives from repeated paired comparisons of the alternatives is presented, where intransitivities in the observed preferences are cleared away by the introduction of decision errors of varying importance.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the continuous representation theorems of Eilenberg, Debreu, Peleg, Herden, and the Beardon Weak Open Gap Theorem can be considered to be equivalent to one another.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In particular, this paper showed that Nash equilibria may not exist unless bidders face demand functions satisfying special restrictions, which raises questions about using the theory of auctions of single objects to predict the outcome of multi-object auctions.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors call the economists' attention to Chebyshev's algebraic inequality and prove three economic theorems with its help: (i) Laspeyres' volume index is greater than Paasche's volume index if there is an inverse relation between price and volume changes; (ii) in a pension model of overlapping cohorts, PAYG is better than CR iff the growth rate is higher than the interest rate.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors introduce and provide axiomatic characterizations of different lexicographic extensions of the proportional solution and the extended claim-egalitarian solution for bargaining problems with claims.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a generalization of Selten's perfect equilibrium for continuous n-person games in normal form is introduced and some properties of the new concept as well as its relationship with other equilibria are studied.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the decision of the Allies to enforce the reparations agreement in the Treaty of Versailles as a Bayesian game where the Allies are uncertain about Germany's capacity to pay reparations.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the trade-off between violations of the Pareto criterion and violations of non-dictatorship when the set X of outcomes is countably infinite was studied.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The main result is a full characterization theorem showing that two information systems are equally informative iff for every given a priori probability vector both generate identical sets of posterior probability vectors.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This paper showed that a mixed strategy can never be evolutionary stable in a truly asymmetric contest, and that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategies is unstable, and applied their result to the battle of the sexes between males and females over the raising of offspring.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a stopping problem model is constructed, where an agent faces a sequence of i.i.d. multi-attribute products, and from each product, he can observe only one attribute.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that for a class of economies with collective ownership, sufficient specialization in the endowment holdings of these economies gives rise to a non-empty core, so achieving social stability.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, an algorithm to perform an analysis on survey data tables with some unreliable entries is presented, which has almost linear complexity depending on the number of elements in the table.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a class of relations which includes irreflexive preference relations and interdependent preferences and obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for representation of the relation by two numerical functions in the sense of a x if and only if u (a ) v (x ).

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the relationships between learning processes based on the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and their myopic and more naive counterparts, and show that convergence under best reply dynamics and dominance solvability are equivalent for all two-player games in this class.