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Showing papers in "Nanoethics in 2020"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop a philosophical account of moral disruption in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to a new set of norms, and analyze this process in terms of moral uncertainty.
Abstract: This paper develops a philosophical account of moral disruption. According to Robert Baker, moral disruption is a process in which technological innovations undermine established moral norms without clearly leading to a new set of norms. Here I analyze this process in terms of moral uncertainty, formulating a philosophical account with two variants. On the harm account, such uncertainty is always harmful because it blocks our knowledge of our own and others’ moral obligations. On the qualified harm account, there is no harm in cases where moral uncertainty is related to innovation that is “for the best” in historical perspective or where uncertainty is the expression of a deliberative virtue. The two accounts are compared by applying them to Baker’s historical case of the introduction of mechanical ventilation and organ transplantation technologies, as well as the present-day case of mass data practices in the health domain.

21 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss three major problems in its application and conclude that to serve its purpose, the precautionary principle has to be combined with other decision principles in cases with competing top priorities, and exclude potential dangers whose plausibility is too low to trigger meaningful precautionary action.
Abstract: The precautionary principle has often been described as an extreme principle that neglects science and stifles innovation. However, such an interpretation has no support in the official definitions of the principle that have been adopted by the European Union and by the signatories of international treaties on environmental protection. In these documents, the precautionary principle is a guideline specifying how to deal with certain types of scientific uncertainty. In this contribution, this approach to the precautionary principle is explicated with the help of concepts from the philosophy of science and comparisons with general notions of practical rationality. Three major problems in its application are discussed, and it is concluded that to serve its purpose, the precautionary principle has to (1) be combined with other decision principles in cases with competing top priorities, (2) be based on the current state of science, which requires procedures for scientific updates, and (3) exclude potential dangers whose plausibility is too low to trigger meaningful precautionary action.

17 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that applying their findings to the development of socially acceptable principles for machine learning would violate basic tenets of human rights law and fundamental principles of human dignity, and cite principles of tort law, relevant case law, provisions from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and rules from the German Ethics Code for Autonomous and Connected Driving.
Abstract: Dilemma situations involving the choice of which human life to save in the case of unavoidable accidents are expected to arise only rarely in the context of autonomous vehicles (AVs). Nonetheless, the scientific community has devoted significant attention to finding appropriate and (socially) acceptable automated decisions in the event that AVs or drivers of AVs were indeed to face such situations. Awad and colleagues, in their now famous paper “The Moral Machine Experiment”, used a “multilingual online ‘serious game’ for collecting large-scale data on how citizens would want AVs to solve moral dilemmas in the context of unavoidable accidents.” Awad and colleagues undoubtedly collected an impressive and philosophically useful data set of armchair intuitions. However, we argue that applying their findings to the development of “global, socially acceptable principles for machine learning” would violate basic tenets of human rights law and fundamental principles of human dignity. To make its arguments, our paper cites principles of tort law, relevant case law, provisions from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and rules from the German Ethics Code for Autonomous and Connected Driving.

16 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the adequacy of existing Malaysian occupational safety and health law with regard to specific issues presented by nanotechnology is examined to justify the adoption of soft law instruments as regulatory mechanisms for nanotechnology.
Abstract: Nanotechnology has revolutionized various industries and has become a notable catalyst for economic growth. The emerging issues of human health and safety associated with nanotechnology development have raised regulatory concerns worldwide. In occupational settings, the same novel characteristics of nanomaterials that are utilized for innovation may also be the source of toxins with adverse health effects for workers. The existing regulatory framework may function effectively to regulate chemical substances in their conventional forms but may not be adequate with regard to the specific issues of nanoform substances. A foundation of knowledge concerning properties of nanomaterials, and risk management approaches for these materials have been established, but conclusive results remain elusive. It is difficult for lawmakers to regulate nanotechnology-related activities effectively if conventional regulatory mechanisms are applied. The present article analyses in a country study the adequacy of existing Malaysian occupational safety and health law with regard to the specific issues presented by nanotechnology. The applicable regulatory approaches are examined to justify the adoption of soft law instruments as regulatory mechanisms for nanotechnology. A number of soft law best practices are briefly discussed as a basis to recommend practical solutions to close the existing regulatory gap.

12 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This review focuses on the memory-modifying potential of optogenetic technology, investigating what it is capable of and how it differs from other memory modification technologies (MMTs), and outlines the safety challenges that need to be addressed before optogenetics can be used in humans.
Abstract: Optogenetics is an invasive neuromodulation technology involving the use of light to control the activity of individual neurons. Even though optogenetics is a relatively new neuromodulation tool whose various implications have not yet been scrutinized, it has already been approved for its first clinical trials in humans. As optogenetics is being intensively investigated in animal models with the aim of developing novel brain stimulation treatments for various neurological and psychiatric disorders, it appears crucial to consider both the opportunities and dangers such therapies may offer. In this review, we focus on the memory-modifying potential of optogenetics, investigating what it is capable of and how it differs from other memory modification technologies (MMTs). We then outline the safety challenges that need to be addressed before optogenetics can be used in humans. Finally, we re-examine crucial neuroethical concerns expressed in regard to other MMTs in the light of optogenetics and address those that appear to be unique to the memory-modifying potential of optogenetic technology.

11 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The potential for art-science collaborations to be the basis for deliberative discussions on research agendas and direction is examined and the advantage of specifically identifying public engagement/science communication as a distinct aspect of such projects is suggested so that aesthetic, scientific or social science/philosophical research agendas are not subsumed.
Abstract: Here I examine the potential for art-science collaborations to be the basis for deliberative discussions on research agendas and direction. Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) has become a science policy goal in synthetic biology and several other high-profile areas of scientific research. While art-science collaborations offer the potential to engage both publics and scientists and thus possess the potential to facilitate the desired “mutual responsiveness” (Rene von Schomberg) between researchers, institutional actors, publics and various stakeholders, there are potential challenges in effectively implementing collaborations as well as dangers in potentially instrumentalizing artistic work for science policy or innovation agendas when power differentials in collaborations remain unacknowledged. Art-science collaborations can be thought of as processes of exchange which require acknowledgement of and attention to artistic agendas (how can science be a conceptual and material resource for new aesthetics work) as well as identification of and attention to aesthetic dimensions of scientific research (how are aesthetics and affective framings a part of a specific epistemological resource for scientific research). I suggest the advantage of specifically identifying public engagement/science communication as a distinct aspect of such projects so that aesthetic, scientific or social science/philosophical research agendas are not subsumed to the assumption that the primary or only value of art-science collaborations is as a form of public engagement or science communication to mediate biological research community public relations. Likewise, there may be potential benefits of acknowledging an art-science-RRI triangle as stepping stone to a more reflexive research agenda within the STS/science communication/science policy community. Using BrisSynBio, an EPSRC/BBSRC-funded research centre in synthetic biology, I will discuss the framing for art-science collaborations and practical implementation and make remarks on what happened there. The empirical evidence reviewed here supports the model I propose but additionally, points to the need to broaden the conception of and possible purposes, or motivations for art, for example, in the case of cross-sectoral collaboration with community engaged art.

10 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: These expectations may produce a conception of the human and a self-understanding among BCI users that objectify the body in favour of a brain-centred, cerebral notion of the subject which also plays its part in upholding a normality regime.
Abstract: Brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are envisioned to enable new abilities of action. This potential can be fruitful in particular when it comes to restoring lost motion or communication abilities or to implementing new possibilities of action. However, BCIs do not come without presuppositions. Applying the concept of ability expectations to BCIs, a wide range of requirements on the side of the users becomes apparent. We examined these ability expectations by taking the example of therapeutic BCI users who got enrolled into BCI research studies due to particular physical conditions. Some of the expectations identified are quite explicit, like particular physical conditions and BCI “literacy”. Other expectations are more implicit, such as motivation, a high level of concentration, pain tolerance, emotion control and resources. These expectations may produce a conception of the human and a self-understanding among BCI users that objectify the body in favour of a brain-centred, cerebral notion of the subject which also plays its part in upholding a normality regime.

9 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: It is argued that engineering must not be seen as something stable or characterized by a fixed essence, which has multiple meanings and interpretations, and that most of the debates on synthetic biology cannot be indifferent towards the question which conception of engineering is at play.
Abstract: A recurrent theme in the characterization of synthetic biology is the role of engineering. This theme is widespread in the accounts of scholars studying this field and the biologists working in it, in those of the biologists themselves, as well as in policy documents. The aim of this article is to open this black-box of engineering that is supposed to influence and change contemporary life sciences. Too often, both synthetic biologists and their critics assume a very narrow understanding of what engineering is about, resulting in an unfruitful debate about whether synthetic biology possesses genuine engineering methodologies or not. By looking in more detail to the diversity of engineering conceptions in debates concerning synthetic biology, a richer perspective can be developed. In this article, I will examine five influential ways in which engineering is understood in these debates, namely engineering as applied science, as rational methodology, context-sensitive practice, cunning activity or design. The claim is first of all thus to argue that engineering must not be seen as something stable or characterized by a fixed essence. It rather has multiple meanings and interpretations. Secondly, the claim is that most of the debates on synthetic biology cannot be indifferent towards the question which conception of engineering is at play, since the specific questions and concerns that pop up depend to a great extent on the precise conception of engineering one has in account. Many of the existing debates around synthetic biology can thus be reinterpreted and readdressed once one is aware of which conception of engineering is at play.

8 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce generative critique to R(R)I as a practice that sits in-between adversarial armchair critique and co-opted, uncritical service.
Abstract: Discourses on Responsible Innovation and Responsible Research and Innovation, in short R(R)I, have revolved around but not elaborated on the notion of critique. In this article, generative critique is introduced to R(R)I as a practice that sits in-between adversarial armchair critique and co-opted, uncritical service. How to position oneself and be positioned on this spectrum has puzzled humanities scholars and social scientists who engage in interdisciplinary collaborations with scientists, engineers, and other professionals. Recently, generative critique has been presented as a solution to the puzzle in interdisciplinary collaborations on neuroscientific experiments. Generative critique seeks to create connections across disciplines that help remake seemingly stable objects in moments when taken-for-granted ways of seeing and approaching objects are unsettled. In order to translate generative critique from the neurosciences to R(R)I, socio-technical integration research (STIR) is proposed as a practice of generative critique in interdisciplinary R(R)I collaborations. These collaborations aim to account for societal aspects in research and technology development. For this purpose, a variety of approaches have been developed, including STIR and video-reflexive ethnography (VRE). STIR and VRE resemble each other but diverge on affective, collaborative, and temporal dimensions. Their juxtaposition serves to develop suggestions for how STIR could be modified on these dimensions to better enact generative critique in interdisciplinary R(R)I collaborations. In this way, the article contributes to ongoing discussions in R(R)I and in the engaged programme in science and technology studies more broadly on the dynamics of positioning in collaborative work.

7 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present scientists' understanding of their roles in society and corresponding responsibilities, and propose a heuristic that improves the understanding of the complexity of scientific responsibility, based on qualitative interviews with senior scientists.
Abstract: This paper presents scientists’ understanding of their roles in society and corresponding responsibilities. It discusses the researchers’ perspective against the background of the contemporary literature on scientific responsibility in the social sciences and philosophy and proposes a heuristic that improves the understanding of the complexity of scientific responsibility. The study is based on qualitative interviews with senior scientists. The presented results show what researchers themselves see as their responsibilities, how they assume them, and what challenges they perceive with respect to their responsibilities. Regarding the latter, the interviewed researchers highlight those aspects of responsibility that go beyond the expertise of their professional role, and thus cannot be carried by scientists alone. For example, scientists alone cannot determine the general direction science takes, or the useful application of their research. The interviewed researchers describe those challenges as responsibilities that must be shared across different societal groups. In the theoretical literature, responsibility has been described as a relation between an actor (who), the action for which someone is responsible (what), and the normative framework against which someone is responsible (why). We will draw on this concept of “relational responsibility” to identify the various actors, normative frameworks, and actions relevant to scientific responsibility. This will serve as a heuristic tool to help identify the entanglement of responsibilities spread across several societal groups.

6 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
Lewis Coyne1
TL;DR: The authors argue that synthetic organisms differ in kind from natural organisms and machines, and differ only by degree from genetically modified organisms, and suggest that this is nevertheless sufficient to give us specific ethical reservations about synthetic biology: namely, that more than any other widely used biotechnology, it is characterized by a drive to mastery that stands opposed to due appreciation of the giftedness of life.
Abstract: This article is concerned with two interrelated questions: what, if anything, distinguishes synthetic from natural organisms, and to what extent, if any, creating the former is of moral significance. These are ontological and ethical questions, respectively. As the title indicates, I address both from a broadly neo-Aristotelian perspective, i.e. a teleological philosophy of life and virtue ethics. For brevity’s sake, I shall not argue for either philosophical position at length, but instead hope to demonstrate their legitimacy through their explanatory power. I firstly argue that synthetic organisms differ in kind from natural organisms and machines, and differ only by degree from genetically modified organisms. I then suggest that this is nevertheless sufficient to give us specific ethical reservations about synthetic biology: namely, that more than any other widely used biotechnology, it is characterised by a drive to mastery that stands opposed to due appreciation of the giftedness of life.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) and Public Engagement at BrisSynBio, a BBSRC/EPSRC Synthetic Biology Research Centre that is now part of the Bristol BioDesign Institute at University of Bristol (UK).
Abstract: Finding avenues for collaboration and engagement between the arts and the sciences (natural and social) was a central theme of investigation for the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) and Public Engagement programme at BrisSynBio, a BBSRC/EPSRC Synthetic Biology Research Centre that is now part of the Bristol BioDesign Institute at University of Bristol (UK). The reflections and experiments that appear in this dossier are a sample of these investigations and are contributed by Maria Fannin, Katy Connor and David Roden. Darian Meacham coordinated and introduces the dossier.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that the living machines metaphor builds upon a certain perception of life entailing an idea of radical human control of the living world, looking back at the historical preconditions for this metaphor.
Abstract: Within biology and in society, living creatures have long been described using metaphors of machinery and computation: ‘bioengineering’, ‘genes as code’ or ‘biological chassis’. This paper builds on Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) argument that such language mechanisms shape how we understand the world. I argue that the living machines metaphor builds upon a certain perception of life entailing an idea of radical human control of the living world, looking back at the historical preconditions for this metaphor. I discuss how design is perceived to enable us to shape natural beings to our will, and consider ethical, epistemological and ontological implications of the prevalence of this metaphor, focusing on its use within synthetic biology. I argue that we urgently need counter-images to the dominant metaphor of living machines and its implied control and propose that artworks can provide such counter-images through upsetting the perception of life as controllable. This is argued through discussion of artworks by Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr, by Tarsh Bates and by Ai Hasegawa, which in different ways challenge mechanistic assumptions through open-ended engagement with the strangeness and messiness of life.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a set of guidelines for the planning and development of sustainable national centers dealing with the safety of nanomaterials and nanotechnologies toward public health and environment.
Abstract: This work presents a blueprint or set of guidelines for the planning and development of sustainable national centers dealing with the safety of nanomaterials and nanotechnologies toward public health and environment. The blueprint was developed following a methodological approach of EU-wide online survey and workshop with several stakeholders. The purpose was to identify the key elements and challenges in the development and sustainability of a national nanosafety center. The responses were received from representatives of 16 national nanosafety centers across Europe and 44 people from 18 EU member states who represented the stakeholder groups of researchers, academics, industry, regulators, civil society, and consultants. By providing an overview of the organizational design of existing national nanosafety centers across EU and converging demands in the field of nanosafety, the blueprint principally benefits those EU member states who do not have a national nanosafety center, but intend to develop an entity to manage the human health, environmental, ethical, and social concerns/risks toward the growing nationwide activities on engineered nanomaterials, e.g., their production, use or disposal, at national level.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors argue that the current COVID-19 pandemic is a message from nature to humans to stop exploiting the earth to the extent that we have been, and that it is in our interests to look after the earth, something that Indigenous Australians knew well.
Abstract: Claims have been made that the current COVID-19 pandemic is a message from nature to stop exploiting the earth to the extent that we have been. While there is no direct evidence that this pandemic is a result of human actions with respect to the earth, ample evidence exists that deforestation and other environmental changes, together with climate change, do make it more likely that viruses will cross from wildlife to humans. We humans are mammals and our welfare depends on the health of the earth. We are not so different from other living creatures in this regard. It is in our interests to look after the earth, something that Indigenous Australians knew well. Mother Earth must be cared for if she is to care for us. Nature perhaps is sending us a message in the same sense that my car does if I do not maintain it. It stops functioning properly. We have to modify nature to satisfy our needs but we must be careful how we modify it.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The distinction between noise and randomness in reference to the functional relationships that each may play in the evolution of living and/or synthetic systems is addressed.
Abstract: This paper explores the functional role of noise in synthetic biology and its relation to the concept of randomness. Ongoing developments in the field of synthetic biology are pursuing the re-organisation and control of biological components to make functional devices. This paper addresses the distinction between noise and randomness in reference to the functional relationships that each may play in the evolution of living and/or synthetic systems. The differentiation between noise and randomness in its constructive role, that is, between noise as a perturbation in routine behaviours and noise as a source of variability that cells may exploit, indicates the need for a clarification and rectification (whenever necessary) of the conflicting uses of the notion of noise in the studies of the so-called noise biology.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed the text representation of graphene in Sweden's most circulated newspapers from 2004 to 2018 and found that the Swedish newspaper discourse on graphene echoes discourses of promise formulated elsewhere in society; it is not very diversified in terms of themes; positive and neutral representations rather than by risk; and it makes limited reference to the nano-discourse.
Abstract: Textual representation of graphene in Sweden’s most circulated newspapers is analyzed in 229 articles from 2004 to 2018. What is and is not said about graphene is explored through systematically identifying the lexical and grammatical patterns of sentences using the word “graphene.” Graphene is said to be a super material with certain properties, to be an object of research, commercialization, and application, and to have societal significance. Given frequent classifications of graphene as a nanomaterial in scientific discourse, there is notably limited reference to graphene as “nano” in the newspapers and only marginal reference to risk. This paper discusses the findings regarding this Swedish newspaper discourse on graphene in relation to its intertextuality, i.e., how texts draw upon and recontextualize other texts: the Swedish newspaper discourse on graphene echoes discourses of promise formulated elsewhere in society; it is not very diversified in terms of themes; it is dominated by positive and neutral representations rather than by risk; and it makes limited reference to the nano-discourse, even though, according to most definitions, graphene is a nanomaterial.


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This discussion, the economist Partha Dasgupta and the UN Environment Programme’s Executive Director Inger Andersen have argued that the Covid-19 crisis shows that the authors must change their economy and recognise that human wealth depends on nature's health, and protecting and enhancing their environment must from now on be at the heart of their efforts to achieve economic prosperity.
Abstract: The Covid-19 crisis has broken the spell. For anyone who does not deliberately close their eyes out of selfinterest and is not benighted by conspiracy theories, it has rendered visible the many weaknesses and various strengths of our global system and of national societies. During the crisis, and perhaps related to it, the largest ever movement to combat racism—a midwife of capitalism and scourge of modernity—emerged in the USA and has spread to many other parts of the world. Even beforehand, developments and events such as the rise of anti-science governments with pro-fascist leanings and religiously fanatic members, increasing international tensions (also between major powers), and the massive bushfires in Australia could be read as signs of a broader global crisis that reveal that our global system is not viable and that humanity senses this. I am thus very happy that JohnWeckert, our journal’s founding editor, has decided to reflect in our latest issue on both the Covid-19 pandemic and the bushfires, responding to indigenous thinking and thereby contributing to an ongoing discussion about nature. In this discussion, the economist Partha Dasgupta and the UN Environment Programme’s Executive Director Inger Andersen [1] have argued that the Covid-19 crisis shows that we must change our economy and recognise that human wealth depends on nature’s health. In their view, protecting and enhancing our environment must from now on be at the heart of our efforts to achieve economic prosperity. They write that ‘Covid-19 is nature sending us a message’, adding that ‘[i]n fact, it reads like an SOS signal for the human enterprise, bringing into sharp focus the need to live within the planet’s means’ ([1], n.p.). In an interesting caveat against such reasoning, Alan Levinovitz [2] argues that while ‘nature’may look like a secular term, this framing is fundamentally a religious one; he further points out that religious leaders throughout history have interpreted natural disasters as divine punishments. And he writes ([2], n.p.): ‘The urgency of living in harmony with nature has never been more acute. But we should not make the mistake of believing that living in harmony with nature requires living naturally. After all, the technology required for renewable energy is far less natural than simply burning wood. Refrigeration and freezing prevent spoilage and food waste. Humans are, as the author HG Wells put it, unnatural animals’. In his view, the ‘time has come to abandon our false faith in natural goodness and confront the complexity of what it means to be responsible unnatural animals in a natural world’. In his article, Weckert argues that as mammals, we are vulnerable, and he urges us to be aware of the consequences of how we treat nature and to be prepared to react to those consequences. Regarding the Earth as our mother, as is widespread in indigenous thinking, might in his opinion prove a useful way of keeping a focus on nature’s importance for human well-being and perhaps survival. For him, it is not about relinquishing agency vis-à-vis nature; we are not victims but rather Nanoethics https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-020-00372-6

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, a case study of a particular technology project that sought ways to produce industrial and consumer products from algal oils is presented, where the role of those within the scientific community need not (and sometimes will inevitably not) involve value-free inquiry.
Abstract: It has become a standard for researchers carrying out biotechnology projects to do a life cycle assessment (LCA). This is a process for assessing the environmental impact of a technology, product or policy. Doing so is no simple matter, and in the last decades, a rich set of methodologies has developed around LCA. However, the proper methods and meanings of the process remain contested. Preceding the development of the international standard that now governs LCA, there was a lively debate in the academic community about the inclusion of ‘values’ within the process. We revisit this debate and reconsider the way forward for LCA. We set out ways in which those outside of science can provide input into LCAs by informing the value assumptions at stake. At the same time, we will emphasize that the role of those within the scientific community need not (and sometimes, will inevitably not) involve value-free inquiry. We carry out this exploration through a case study of a particular technology project that sought ways to produce industrial and consumer products from algal oils.