Showing papers in "Philosophical Investigations in 2006"

Wittgenstein on the Experience of Meaning and the Meaning of Music

Abstract: On the basis of some ideas of Wittgenstein’s, an argument is presented to the effect that the ability to feel or to experience meaning conditions the ability to mean, and is thus essential to our notion of meaning. The experience of meaning, as manifested in the “fine shades” of use and behaviour, is central to Wittgenstein’s late conception of meaning. In explicating the basic elements involved here, I first try to clarify the notion of feeling and its relationship to meaning, emphasising its central role in music as explanatory of its use in language. The feeling of words, in this sense, is an objective feature of their meaning and use, and should be distinguished from feelings as psychological processes or experiences that may accompany the use of words. I then explain its philosophical significance by arguing that word-feeling, and the “experience of meaning,” are basically instances of Wittgenstein’s general conception of aspect and aspect-perception, which are important elements in his later conception of meaning and of thought. The nature of this experience is explicated in terms of grasping internal relations and relevant comparisons, which is manifested in a “mastery of a technique,” or “feeling at home” in a certain practice. In this sense, I argue, the ability to experience the meaning of a word is essential to the very intentionality of our thought and language. The ability to experience meaning is also a precondition for using words in a “secondary sense,” which is of great significance in itself. I conclude by pointing to the application of these notions of understanding, feeling and experience, as well as their explication in terms of comparisons, internal relations and mastery of technique, to music, where they are so apt and natural.

A No‐Theory?: Against Hutto on Wittgenstein

Abstract: This ambitious book aims to carve out in greater detail than has hitherto been attempted by anyone the relatively new space that its sub-title intimates. The book is ambitious and polemical, including against this reviewer’s work; this review will at times – responding to Hutto’s way of setting out the debate – be somewhat lively, too. Dan Hutto wishes to assert both that the Tractatus does not present a philosophical theory and that he does not wish to be identified with ‘the therapeutic view’, by which he refers to the ConantDiamond etc. account of certain features of the Tractatus and also of Wittgenstein’s later work. The continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought can be seen, according to Hutto, in the lack of theory which is evidenced throughout Wittgenstein’s work. In particular, the key to understanding what sort of philosophical activity Wittgenstein was advocating in the Tractatus, is, says Hutto, to be sought in Wittgenstein’s conception of logic. Hutto hopes to end up with a different view than the ‘view’ of Conant and Diamond on all this. But does he succeed in understanding the latter? Does he in practice consider it seriously enough as a candidate interpretation of the text? He clearly does not think that the ‘propositions’ of the Tractatus are nonsensical or meaningless, as he tells us what they mean. For

The Unity of Language and Logic in Wittgenstein's Tractatus

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to offer an interpretation of the Tractatus’ proof of the unity of logic and language. The kernel of the proof is the thesis that the sole logical constant is the general propositional form. I argue that the Grundgedanke, the existence of the sole fundamental operation N and the analyticity thesis, together with the fact that the operation NN can always be seen as having no specific formal difference between its result and its base, imply that NN is intrinsic to every elementary proposition. I also argue that the picture theory of proposition is an account of the generation of propositions via naming, and that its crucial idea is that naming is the instantiation of the form of a name, which consists in arbitrarily picking out an object as the meaning of the name from those objects sorted out by the form of the name. It follows that the existential quantifier, that is, NN, is intrinsic to naming (and therefore to every elementary proposition). It is then proven that the sole logical constant is the general propositional form. This, together with the truth-functionality of logical necessity, implies that logic and language are unified via a general rule – logical syntax.

Investigating emotions philosophically

Abstract: Among today's philosophers of emotion there are, on the one hand, those that do “conceptual analysis” and, on the other hand, those that oppose such an approach as empirically naive, as sanctifying our ordinary use of words and as based on an analytic/synthetic distinction and an outmoded theory of meaning. This paper is an attempt to show why this critique is misplaced and to clarify how conceptual investigations of emotions relate to empirical investigations.

Wittgenstein on Understanding and Interpretation (Comments on the work of Thomas Morawetz)

Abstract: Wittgenstein's distinction between understanding and interpretation is fundamental to the account of meaning in Philosophical Investigations. In his discussion of rule-following, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the idea that understanding or grasping a rule is a matter of interpretation. Wittgenstein explains meaning and rule-following in terms of action, rejecting both realist and Cartesian accounts of the mental. I argue that in his effort to employ Wittgenstein's views on meaning and rule-following, Professor Morawetz embraces the position Wittgenstein rejects. In the course of making his case for law as a “deliberative practice,” Professor Morawetz embraces interpretation as a fundamental element of human practices, thereby taking up precisely the view Wittgenstein rejects

Socrates in the Platonic Dialogues

Abstract: If Socrates is portrayed holding one view in one of Plato's dialogues and a different view in another, should we be puzzled? If (as I suggest) Plato's Socrates is neither the historical Socrates, nor a device for delivering Platonic doctrine, but a tool for the dialectical investigation of a philosophical problem, then we should expect a new Socrates, with relevant commitments, to be devised for each setting. Such a dialectical device – the tailor-made Socrates – fits with what we know of other contributions to the genre of the Sokratikos Logos, to which Plato was neither the first nor the only contributor.

Do the Concepts of Grammar and Use in Wittgenstein Articulate a Theory of Language or Meaning

Abstract: The paper elucidates Wittgenstein's later conception of philosophy as devoid of theories or theses, comprehending this as an articulation of a strategy for avoiding dogmatism in philosophy. More specifically, it clarifies Wittgenstein's conception by using what he says about the concepts of meaning and language as an example and by developing an interpretation that purports to make plain that what Wittgenstein says about these issues does not constitute a philosophical thesis. Adopting Wittgenstein's approach, we can, arguably, have a richer view of meaning and language than a commitment to philosophical theses allows for. I conclude with remarks on the method of analysis in terms of necessary conditions.

An Argument Against Reduction in Morality and Epistemology

Abstract: To avoid Moore’s open question objection and similar arguments, reductionist philosophers argue that normative (e.g. moral and epistemic) and natural terms are only coextensive, but not synonymous. These reductionists argue that the normative content of normative terms is not a feature of their extension, but is accounted for in some other way (e.g. as a feature of these terms’ meaning). However, reductionist philosophers cannot account for this “normative surplus” while remaining true to their original reductionist motivations. The reductionist’s theoretical commitments both require and forbid a reductionist account of the normative content of moral and epistemic concepts.

Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: There – Like our Life – Rush Rhees The Third Wittgenstein: The Post-Investigations Works – Danièle Moyal-Sharrock Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty – Edited by Danièle Moyal-Sharrock

Abstract: Books reviewed: Rush Rhees, Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: There – Like our Life, D. Z. Phillips (ed.), (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 195 pp. incl. Index; $29.95; referred to in the text as Rhees. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, The Third Wittgenstein: The Post-Investigations Works (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 225 pp. incl. Index; $99.95; referred to in the text as Third Witt. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (ed.), Understanding Wittgenstein’s On Certainty (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004), 250 pp. incl. Index; $75.00; referred to in the text as M-S. Reviewed by Louisiana State University Baton Rouge Louisiana 70803 USA

‘About’ Puzzles, Muddles and First Person Inferences

Abstract: Often we have coarsely grained knowledge: for example, we know about how many people are present. In possessing such knowledge, we also have finer grained knowledge of what is not: there certainly is nothing like that number of people here. The combination of such knowledge types, through sorites, generates contradiction and bafflement. This paper seeks to resolve the bafflement: it rejects a Timothy Williamson proposal, introduces muddle numbers and inference gaps, and shows how the different grains of knowledge do not always meet. In so doing, the paper identifies a distinctive first-person inferring.

Tom Morawetz's “Robust Enterprise”: Jurisprudence after Wittgenstein

Abstract: I examine one theme within Tom Morawetz's complex jurisprudential work (stemming from Wittgenstein): the concept of a practice. After considering this theme in some detail, I then sketch a different jurisprudential approach that still proceeds within the inspiration of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Here, I summarise Stanley Cavell's elaborate recounting of Wittgenstein's twin concepts, “criteria” and “grammar.” In a third and final section, I employ this alternative method to provide a brief example of how a Wittgensteinian approach might be made towards explicating and understanding Holmes’ classic claim regarding the need in jurisprudence to separate legal and moral concepts.