Showing papers in "Philosophy of Science in 2003"
TL;DR: The relationship between simulation and experiment is examined in this paper, where the aim is to understand what methodological and epistemological features simulation has in common with experimentation, while at the same time keeping a keen eye on simulation's ancestry as a form of scientific theorizing.
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between simulation and experiment. Many discussions of simulation, and indeed the term “numerical experiments,” invoke a strong metaphor of experimentation. On the other hand, many simulations begin as attempts to apply scientific theories. This has lead many to characterize simulation as lying between theory and experiment. The aim of the paper is to try to reconcile these two points of view—to understand what methodological and epistemological features simulation has in common with experimentation, while at the same time keeping a keen eye on simulation’s ancestry as a form of scientific theorizing. In so doing, it seeks to apply some of the insights of recent work on the philosophy of experiment to an aspect of theorizing that is of growing philosophical interest: the construction of local models.
299 citations
TL;DR: This paper argued that there are no universal inductive inference schemas and that the inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all induction inference is local.
Abstract: Contrary to formal theories of induction, I argue that there are no universal inductive inference schemas. The inductive inferences of science are grounded in matters of fact that hold only in particular domains, so that all inductive inference is local. Some are so localized as to defy familiar characterization. Since inductive inference schemas are underwritten by facts, we can assess and control the inductive risk taken in an induction by investigating the warrant for its underwriting facts. In learning more facts, we extend our inductive reach by supplying more localized inductive inference schemes. Since a material theory no longer separates the factual and schematic parts of an induction, it proves not to be vulnerable to Hume's problem of the justification of induction.
194 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that there exist accounts of representation in both art and science involving isomorphism which accommodate the apparent counterexamples and allow us to understand how “impossible” artistic objects and inconsistent scientific theories can be said to represent.
Abstract: Discussions of representation in science tend to draw on examples from art. However, such examples need to be handled with care given a) the differences between works of art and scientific theories and b) the accommodation of these examples within certain philosophies of art. I shall examine the claim that isomorphism is neither necessary nor sufficient for representation and I shall argue that there exist accounts of representation in both art and science involving isomorphism which accommodate the apparent counterexamples and, moreover, allow us to understand how “impossible” artistic objects and inconsistent scientific theories can be said to represent.
113 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors illustrate Latour's radical approach to localism and show that it has some unpalatable consequences, in particular the suggestion that problems of external validity (or how to generalize experimental results to non-laboratory circumstances) cannot be solved.
Abstract: Experimental “localism” stresses the importance of context‐specific knowledge, and the limitations of universal theories in science. I illustrate Latour's radical approach to localism and show that it has some unpalatable consequences, in particular the suggestion that problems of external validity (or how to generalize experimental results to nonlaboratory circumstances) cannot be solved. In the last part of the paper I try to sketch a solution to the problem of external validity by extending Mayo's error‐probabilistic approach.
111 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that structuralism does not succeed in ridding a structuralist ontology of objects, and that objects are useful heuristic posits, but are ultimately ontologically dispensable.
Abstract: This paper explores the consequences of the two most prominent forms of contemporary structural realism for the notion of objecthood. Epistemic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, but nothing about the natures of unobservable relata whose relations define structures. Ontic structuralists hold that we can know structural aspects of reality, and that there is nothing else to know—objects are useful heuristic posits, but are ultimately ontologically dispensable. I argue that structuralism does not succeed in ridding a structuralist ontology of objects.
94 citations
TL;DR: This paper presents explanation schemas and treatment strategies that characterize how thinking about pathways contributes to biomedical discovery.
Abstract: A biochemical pathway is a sequence of chemical reactions in a biological organism. Such pathways specify mechanisms that explain how cells carry out their major functions by means of molecules and reactions that produce regular changes. Many diseases can be explained by defects in pathways, and new treatments often involve finding drugs that correct those defects. This paper presents explanation schemas and treatment strategies that characterize how thinking about pathways contributes to biomedical discovery. It discusses the significance of pathways for understanding the nature of diseases, explanations, and theories.
86 citations
TL;DR: It is shown that ability to render such phenomena informationally relevant to each other contributes to the evidential support of the theory, and hence that preference for theories that unify the phenomena need not, on a Bayesian account, be built into the prior probabilities of theories.
Abstract: A Bayesian account of the virtue of unification is given. On this account, the ability of a theory to unify disparate phenomena consists in the ability of the theory to render such phenomena informationally relevant to each other. It is shown that such ability contributes to the evidential support of the theory, and hence that preference for theories that unify the phenomena need not, on a Bayesian account, be built into the prior probabilities of theories.
79 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that Orzack and Sober's arguments fail since Levins's thesis concerns the pragmatic features of model building not just the formal properties of models, and that there are cases where these model properties cannot be varied independently of one another.
Abstract: Ecologist Richard Levins argues population biologists must trade‐off the generality, realism, and precision of their models since biological systems are complex and our limitations are severe. Steven Orzack and Elliott Sober argue that there are cases where these model properties cannot be varied independently of one another. If this is correct, then Levins's thesis that there is a necessary trade‐off between generality, precision, and realism in mathematical models in biology is false. I argue that Orzack and Sober's arguments fail since Levins's thesis concerns the pragmatic features of model building not just the formal properties of models.
77 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that human races, in the biological sense of local populations adapted to particular environments, do in fact exist; such races are best understood through the common ecological concept of ecotypes, however, human ecotypic races do not in general correspond with ‘folk’ racial categories.
Abstract: Biological research on race has often been seen as motivated by or lending credence to underlying racist attitudes; in part for this reason, recently philosophers and biologists have gone through great pains to essentially deny the existence of biological human races. We argue that human races, in the biological sense of local populations adapted to particular environments, do in fact exist; such races are best understood through the common ecological concept of ecotypes. However, human ecotypic races do not in general correspond with ‘folk’ racial categories, largely because many similar ecotypes have multiple independent origins. Consequently, while human natural races exist, they have little or nothing in common with ‘folk’ races.
73 citations
TL;DR: This paper proposed a new program for philosophy of science, a program for a socially responsible philosophy for science. But it is not a philosophy of philosophy for women, but a philosophy for social justice.
Abstract: Two major reasons feminists are concerned with science relate to science’s social effects: that science can be a powerful ally in the struggle for equality for women; and that all too frequently science has been a generator and perpetuator of inequality. This concern with the social effects of science leads feminists to a different mode of appraising science from the purely epistemic one prized by most contemporary philosophers of science. The upshot, I suggest, is a new program for philosophy of science, a program for a socially responsible philosophy of science.
72 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a critical review of Psillos's argument concerning the case of the caloric theory of heat is presented, showing that beliefs about the properties of material caloric, rejected by subsequent theories, were indeed central to the successes of caloric theory and therefore caloric remains a favorable case for Laudan.
Abstract: A popular and plausible response against Laudan's “pessimistic induction” has been what I call “preservative realism,” which argues that there have actually been enough elements of scientific knowledge preserved through major theory‐change processes, and that those elements can be accepted realistically. This paper argues against preservative realism, in particular through a critical review of Psillos's argument concerning the case of the caloric theory of heat. Contrary to his argument, the historical record of the caloric theory reveals that beliefs about the properties of material caloric, rejected by subsequent theories, were indeed central to the successes of the caloric theory. Therefore caloric remains a favorable case for Laudan. Further, I argue that even confirmed cases of preservation do not warrant an inference to truth.
TL;DR: In this article, a related non-realist explanation of success was proposed, which appears to be the most suitable among those considered by the realists, and they were rejected.
Abstract: Scientific realists have claimed that the posit that our theories are (approximately) true provides the best or the only explanation for their success. In response, I revive two nonrealist explanations. I show that realists, in discarding them, have either misconstrued the phenomena to be explained or mischaracterized the relationship between these explanations and their own. I contend nonetheless that these nonrealist competitors, as well as their realist counterparts, should be rejected; for none of them succeed in explaining a significant list of successes. I propose a related nonrealist explanation of success that appears to be the most suitable among those considered.
TL;DR: It is argued that models as epistemic artifacts provide knowledge in many other ways than just via direct representative links.
Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to suggest that models in scientific practice can be conceived of as epistemic artifacts. Approaching models this way accommodates many such things that working scientists themselves call models but that the semantic conception of models does not duly recognize as such. That models are epistemic artifacts implies, firstly, that they cannot be understood apart from purposeful human activity; secondly, that they are somehow materialized inhabitants of the intersubjective field of that activity; and thirdly, that they can function also as knowledge objects. We argue that models as epistemic artifacts provide knowledge in many other ways than just via direct representative links. To substantiate our view we use a language‐technological artifact, a parser, as an example.
TL;DR: Ereshefsky as discussed by the authors argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts, and rejected eliminativism about the species category.
Abstract: Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. Based on the idea that the species concept is a so‐called investigative kind concept, it is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.
TL;DR: It is explained how race is used in medicine as a proxy for genes that encode drug metabolizing enzymes and how a proper understanding of race calls into doubt the practice of treating race as a marker of any medically relevant genetic trait.
Abstract: Race is a prominent category in medicine. Epidemiologists describe how rates of morbidity and mortality vary with race, and doctors consider the race of their patients when deciding whether to test them for sickle-cell anemia or what drug to use to treat their hypertension. At the same time, critics of racial classification say that race is not real but only an illusion or that race is scientifically meaningless. In this paper, I explain how race is used in medicine as a proxy for genes that encode drug metabolizing enzymes and how a proper understanding of race calls into doubt the practice of treating race as a marker of any medically relevant genetic trait.
TL;DR: The authors argue that the selective confirmation strategy is unconvincincincing without some prospectively applicable criterion of idleness for theoretical posits, and that existing efforts to provide one either convict all theoretical positions of idlessness (Kitcher) or stand refuted by detailed consideration of the very examples (optical/electromagnetic ether, caloric fluid) to which they appeal (Psillos).
Abstract: Realists have responded to challenges from the historical record of successful but ultimately rejected theories with what I call the selective confirmation strategy: arguing that only idle parts of past theories have been rejected, while truly success‐generating features have been confirmed by further inquiry. I argue first, that this strategy is unconvincing without some prospectively applicable criterion of idleness for theoretical posits, and second, that existing efforts to provide one either convict all theoretical posits of idleness (Kitcher) or stand refuted by detailed consideration of the very examples (optical/electromagnetic ether, caloric fluid) to which they appeal (Psillos). I also argue that available avenues for improving on these proposals are unpromising.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that biological populations are made when contextual features determine which kinds and degrees of relations to privilege over others, and so how to bound genes in space and time.
Abstract: At least below the level of species, biological populations are not mind‐independent objects that scientists discover. Rather, biological populations are pragmatically constructed as objects of investigation according to the aims, interests, and values that inform particular research contexts. The relations among organisms that are constitutive of population‐level phenomena (e.g., mating propensity, genealogy, and competition) occur as matters of degree and so give rise to statistically defined open‐ended biological systems. These systems are rendered discrete units to satisfy practical needs and theoretical preferences associated with specific contexts of investigation. While it may be possible to defend a realist position regarding biological relations among organisms, biological populations are “made” when contextual features determine which kinds and degrees of relations to privilege over others, and so how to bound genes in space and time. Consequently, the objectivity of population‐based approaches ...
TL;DR: In this paper, different approaches (Hilbert space and algebraic) were proposed to understand the content of quantum theories in light of this non-uniqueness. But neither approach suffices to support explanatory aspirations encountered in the thermodynamic limit of quantum statistical mechanics.
Abstract: If a classical system has infinitely many degrees of freedom, its Hamiltonian quantization need not be unique up to unitary equivalence. I sketch different approaches (Hilbert space and algebraic) to understanding the content of quantum theories in light of this non‐uniqueness, and suggest that neither approach suffices to support explanatory aspirations encountered in the thermodynamic limit of quantum statistical mechanics.
TL;DR: An alternative view of evolutionary theory is outlined, according to which natural selection explains adaptive evolution by appeal to the statistical structure of populations, and development explains the causes of adaptive evolution at the level of individuals.
Abstract: According to a prominent view of evolutionary theory, natural selection and the processes of development compete for explanatory relevance. Natural selection theory explains the evolution of biological form insofar as it is adaptive. Development is relevant to the explanation of form only insofar as it constrains the adaptation‐promoting effects of selection. I argue that this view of evolutionary theory is erroneous. I outline an alternative, according to which natural selection explains adaptive evolution by appeal to the statistical structure of populations, and development explains the causes of adaptive evolution at the level of individuals. Only together can a statistical theory of selection and a mechanical theory of development explain why populations of organisms comprise individuals that are adapted to their conditions of existence.
TL;DR: An account of data manipulation in scientific experiments is offered and it will be seen that a description in terms of data models allows one to understand cases in which data acquisition and data manipulation cannot be separated into two independent activities.
Abstract: This paper offers an account of data manipulation in scientific experiments. It will be shown that in many cases raw, unprocessed data is not produced, but rather a form of processed data that will be referred to as a data model. The language of data models will be used to provide a framework within which to understand a recent debate about the status of data and data manipulation. It will be seen that a description in terms of data models allows one to understand cases in which data acquisition and data manipulation cannot be separated into two independent activities.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the Minkowski quantization does not constitute a satisfactory example of physically relevant, unitarily inequivalent quantizations, and indicate what it would take to settle the open question of whether such an example exists.
Abstract: We discuss the intertwined topics of Fulling non‐uniqueness and the Unruh effect. The Fulling quantization, which is in some sense the natural one for an observer uniformly accelerated through Minkowski spacetime to adopt, is often heralded as a quantization of the Klein‐Gordon field which is both physically relevant and unitarily inequivalent to the standard Minkowski quantization. We argue that the Fulling and Minkowski quantizations do not constitute a satisfactory example of physically relevant, unitarily inequivalent quantizations, and indicate what it would take to settle the open question of whether a satisfactory example exists. A popular gloss on the Unruh effect has it that an observer uniformly accelerated through the Minkowski vacuum experiences a thermal flux of Rindler quanta. Taking the Unruh effect, so glossed, to establish that the notion of particle must be relativized to a reference frame, some would use it to demote the particle concept from fundamental status. We explain why ...
TL;DR: In this article, the notions of intervention, invariance, and causal correctness are defined and theorems showing that invariance is indeed a mark of causality when the concepts are appropriately interpreted are given.
Abstract: In much recent work, invariance under intervention has become a hallmark of the correctness of a causal‐law claim. Despite its importance this thesis generally is either simply assumed or is supported by very general arguments with heavy reliance on examples, and crucial notions involved are characterized only loosely. Yet for both philosophical analysis and practicing science, it is important to get clear about whether invariance under intervention is or is not necessary or sufficient for which kinds of causal claims. Furthermore, we need to know what counts as an intervention and what invariance is. In this paper I offer explicit definitions of two different kinds for the notions intervention, invariance, and causal correctness. Then, given some natural and relatively uncontroversial assumptions, I prove two distinct sets of theorems showing that invariance is indeed a mark of causality when the concepts are appropriately interpreted.
TL;DR: A proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game‐theoretic models played on a social network is sketched, in hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the long‐term evolutionary dynamics of such models, and hence the evolution of social norms.
Abstract: Recent years have seen increased interest in the question of whether it is possible to provide an evolutionary game theoretic explanation for certain kinds of social norms. These explanatory approaches often rely on the fact that, in certain evolutionary models, the basin of attraction of "fair" or "just" strategies occupies a certain percentage of the state space. I sketch a proof of a general representation theorem for a large class of evolutionary game theoretic models played on a social network, in the hope that this will contribute to a greater understanding of the basins of attraction of such models -- and hence the evolution of social norms. More precisely, I show how many kinds of social networks can be translated into random boolean networks. The interesting and useful part of this result is that, for many social networks, one can find a bijection $f$ between the state space of the social network and the state space of the random boolean network, such that the state $S`$ follows the state $S$ under the dynamical laws of the social network if and only if $f(S`)$ follows the state $f(S)$ under the dynamics of the random boolean network. In some cases, it is not possible to find such a bijection; in these cases, one can find an injection $f$ with the property that if $S`$ follows $S$ under the dynamics of the social network, then $f(S`)$ follows $f(S)$ under the dynamics of the random boolean network. I then use this method to catalog all the basins of attraction for some simple two-strategy games (the prisoner`s dilemma and the stag hunt) played on a ring, drawing on the work of Wuensche and Lesser (1992).
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine a dispositional property that has been receiving increased attention in biology, evolvability, and identify three compatible but distinct investigative approaches, distinguish two interpretations of evo-vability and treat the difference between dispositions of individuals versus populations.
Abstract: In this paper I examine a dispositional property that has been receiving increased attention in biology, evolvability. First, I identify three compatible but distinct investigative approaches, distinguish two interpretations of evolvability, and treat the difference between dispositions of individuals versus populations. Second, I explore the relevance of philosophical distinctions about dispositions for evolvability, isolating the assumption that dispositions are intrinsically located. I conclude that some instances of evolvability cannot be understood as purely intrinsic to populations and suggest alternative strategies for resolving this difficulty.
TL;DR: This work states that for biological systematics there needs to be a better way of conceiving characters, and no character individuation principle identified so far is adequate.
Abstract: Ontological questions in biology have typically focused on the nature of species: what are species; how are they identified and individuated? There is an analogous, but much neglected concern: what are characters; how are they identified and individuated? Character individuation is significant because biological systematics relies on a parsimony principle to determine phylogeny and classify taxa, and the parsimony principle is usually interpreted to favor the phylogenetic hypothesis that requires the fewest changes in characters. But no character individuation principle identified so far is adequate. For biological systematics we need a better way of conceiving characters.
TL;DR: This paper argued that Kourany's "A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty-First Century" contains three levels of projects: (1) a naturalistic project, (2) a critical project, and (3) a political project.
Abstract: I contend that Janet Kourany’s “A Philosophy of Science for the Twenty‐First Century” contains three levels of projects: (1) a naturalistic project, (2) a critical project, and (3) a political project. The naturalistic project is already well established. The critical project is less valued and less established within the profession, but seems a worthy and achievable goal. The political project, I argue, takes one outside the professional pursuit of the philosophy of science. The critical project encompasses both the evaluation of scientific research programs and of empirical conclusions. I contend that the former is widely acknowledged as legitimate while the latter is unacceptable.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined recent suggestions to reformulate quantum mechanics with realistic foundations by reformulating it in light of quantum information theory (QIT) and found that these suggestions are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise.
Abstract: Recent suggestions to supply quantum mechanics (QM) with realistic foundations by reformulating it in light of quantum information theory (QIT) are examined and are found wanting by pointing to a basic conceptual problem that QIT itself ignores, namely, the measurement problem. Since one cannot ignore the measurement problem and at the same time pretend to be a realist, as they stand, the suggestions to reformulate QM in light of QIT are nothing but instrumentalism in disguise.
TL;DR: This article argued that the foundational laws of physics are universal in their scope and that the diversity of the concepts and regularities we actually use to describe nature and predict and explain its behavior leaves us with no reason to believe that our foundational physical theories actually apply outside of delicately contrived systems within the laboratory.
Abstract: It has been argued, most trenchantly by Nancy Cartwright, that the diversity of the concepts and regularities we actually use to describe nature and predict and explain its behavior leaves us with no reason to believe that our foundational physical theories actually “apply” outside of delicately contrived systems within the laboratory. This paper argues that, diversity of method notwithstanding, there is indeed good reason to think that the foundational laws of physics are universal in their scope.
TL;DR: The authors distinguishes and critiques several forms of pluralism about the levels of selection, and introduces a novel way of thinking about the biological properties and processes typically conceptualized in terms of distinct levels.
Abstract: This paper distinguishes and critiques several forms of pluralism about the levels of selection, and introduces a novel way of thinking about the biological properties and processes typically conceptualized in terms of distinct levels In particular, “levels” should be thought of as being entwined or fused Since the pluralism discussed is held by divergent theorists, the argument has implications for many positions in the debate over the units of selection And since the key points on which the paper turns apply beyond this specific issue, the paper may prove of general interest in thinking about the metaphysics of science
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that we quite literally have no idea what it might mean to claim that our best current physical theories will prove to be similar to our best future physical theories.
Abstract: There is good reason to suppose that our best physical theories are false. Moreover, I will argue, we quite literally have no idea what it might mean to claim that they are approximately true. Nonetheless, the belief that our best current physical theories will prove to be similar to our best future physical theories plays an important role in inquiry.